Good and Evil

SOCRATES. Then are there some who desire the evil and others who desire the good? Do not all men, my dear sir, desire good?

MENO. I think not.

SOCRATES. There are some who desire evil?

MENO. Yes.

SOCRATES. Do you mean that they think the evils which they desire, to be good; or do they know that they are evil and yet desire them?

MENO. Both, I think.

SOCRATES. And do you really imagine, Meno, that a man knows evils to be evils and desires them notwithstanding?

MENO. Certainly I do.

SOCRATES. And desire is of possession?

MENO. Yes, of possession.

SOCRATES. And does he think that the evils will do good to him who possesses them, or does he know that they will do him harm?

MENO. There are some who think that the evils will do them good, and others who know that they will do them harm.

SOCRATES. And, in your opinion, do those who think that they will do them good know that they are evils?

MENO. Certainly not.

SOCRATES. Is it not obvious that those who are ignorant of their nature do not desire them; but they desire what they suppose to be goods although they are really evils; and if they are mistaken and suppose the evils to be goods they really desire goods?

MENO. Yes, in that case.

Every art and every inquiry, and similarly every action and pursuit, is thought to aim at some good; and for this reason the good has rightly been declared to be that at which all things aim. But a certain difference is found among ends; some are activities, others are products apart from the activities that produce them. Where there are ends apart from the actions, it is the nature of the products to be better than the activities. Now, as there are many actions, arts, and sciences, their ends also are many; the end of the medical art is health, that of shipbuilding a vessel, that of strategy victory, that of economics wealth. But where such arts fall under a single capacity- as bridle-making and the other arts concerned with the equipment of horses fall under the art of riding, and this and every military action under strategy, in the same way other arts fall under yet others- in all of these the ends of the master arts are to be preferred to all the subordinate ends; for it is for the sake of the former that the latter are pursued.

Good, then, is the sum and source of all desirable things. That which has not in itself any good, either in reality or in semblance, can in no wise be desired. Contrariwise, even things which by nature are not good are desired as if they were truly good, if they seem to be so. Whereby it comes to pass that goodness is rightly believed to be the sum and hinge and cause of all things desirable. Now, that for the sake of which anything is desired itself seems to be most wished for. For instance, if anyone wishes to ride for the sake of health, he does not so much wish for the exercise of riding as the benefit of his health. Since, then, all things are sought for the sake of the good, it is not these so much as good itself that is sought by all. But that on account of which all other things are wished for was, we agreed, happiness; wherefore thus also it appears that it is happiness alone which is sought. From all which it is transparently clear that the essence of absolute good and of happiness is one and the same.’