Commentary Aristotle Metaphysics
Book 1. History of Metaphysical Inquiry
Lecture 1. The dignity and object of this science
All men naturally desire to know.
A sign of this is the delight we take in the senses; for apart from their usefulness they are loved for themselves, and most of all the sense that operates through the eyes. For not only that we may act, but even when we intend to do nothing, we prefer sight (as we may say) to all the other senses. The reason is that of all the senses this most enables us to know and reveals many differences between things.
Animals by nature, then, are born with sensory power.
Now in some animals memory arises from the senses, but in others it does not; for this reason the former are prudent and more capable of being taught than those that are unable to remember. Those that cannot hear sounds are prudent but unable to learn, as the bee and any other similar type of animal there may be. But any that have this sense together with memory are able to learn.
Thus other animals live by imagination and memory and share little in experience, whereas the human race lives by art and reasoning.
Now in men experience comes from memory, for many memories of the same thing produce the capacity of a single experience. And experience seems to be somewhat like science and art.
But in men science and art come from experience, for experience causes art and inexperience causes luck, as Polus rightly states. Art comes into being when from many conceptions acquired by experience a single universal judgment is formed about similar things.
For to judge that this [medicine] has been beneficial to Callias and Socrates and many other individuals who suffer from this disease is a matter of experience; but to judge that it has been beneficial to all individuals of a particular kind (such as the phlegmatic, the bilious, or the feverish) who suffer from this disease is a matter of art.
In practical matters, then, experience seems to differ in no way from art. But we see that men of experience are more proficient than those who have theory without experience. The reason is that experience is a knowledge of singulars, whereas art is a knowledge of universals. But all actions and processes of generation are concerned with singulars. For the physician heals man only incidentally, but he heals Socrates, or Callias, or some individual that can be named, to whom the nature of man happens to belong. Therefore, if anyone has theory without experience, and knows the universal but not the singulars contained in this, he will very often make mistakes. For it is only the individual man who can be cured.
Yet we think that to know and to refute objections belong to art rather than to experience, and we are of the opinion that those who are proficient in art are wiser than men of experience, as it is more to know if one’s wisdom pursues all things.
Now this is because the former know the cause whereas the latter do not. For those who have experience know that something is so but do not know why, whereas the others know the why and the cause.
For this reason, too, we think that the architects in each art are more honorable, and that they know more and are wiser than the manual laborers, because they understand the causes of the things done.
Indeed, we think that the latter resemble certain inanimate things, which act but do not know what they do, like a fire which burns. Therefore, inanimate things perform each of their actions as a result of a certain natural disposition, whereas manual laborers perform theirs through habit, implying that some men are wiser not insofar as they are practical, but insofar as they themselves have the theories and know the causes.
In general, a sign of scientific knowledge is the ability to teach, and for this reason we think that art rather than experience is science. For those who have an art are able to teach, whereas the others are not.
Furthermore, we do not hold that any one of the senses is wisdom, since the cognition of singular things belongs especially to the senses. However, these do not tell us why a thing is so; for example, they do not tell us why fire is hot but only that it is so.
It is only fitting, then, that the one who discovered any art whatsoever that went beyond the common perceptions of men should be admired by men, not only because of some usefulness of his discoveries, but as one who is wise and as distinguishing from others. And as more of the arts were discovered, some to supply the necessities of life, and others to introduce us [to the sciences], those who discovered the latter were always considered to be wiser than those who discovered the former, because their sciences were not for the sake of utility.
Hence, after all such arts had already been developed, those sciences were discovered which are pursued for the sake of neither pleasure nor necessity. This happened first in those places where men had leisure. Hence the mathematical arts originated in Egypt, for there the priestly class was permitted leisure.
(The difference between art and science and similar mental states has been stated in the Nicomachean Ethics.)
Now the reason for undertaking this investigation is that all men think that the science that is called wisdom deals with the primary causes and principles of things. Hence, as we have said before, the man of experience is considered to be wiser than one who has any of the senses; the artist wiser than the man of experience; the architect wiser than the manual laborer; and speculative knowledge wiser than practical knowledge. It is quite evident, then, that wisdom is a science of certain causes and principles.
Three reasons people naturally desire to know
1. Aristotle first sets down an introduction to this science, in which he treats of two things.
First, he points out with what this science is concerned.
Second, he explains what kind of science it is, at that this is not a practical science.
First, he shows that the office of this science, which is called wisdom, is to consider the causes of things.
Second, he explains with what causes or kinds of causes it is concerned, at but since we are in search.
In regard to the first, he prefaces certain preliminary considerations from which he argues in support of his thesis.
Second, he draws a conclusion from these considerations, at now the reason for undertaking.
First, he makes clear the dignity of scientific knowledge in general.
Second, he explains the hierarchy in knowing, at animals by nature.
Now he establishes the dignity of scientific knowledge from the fact that it is naturally desired as an end by all men. Hence, in regard to this he does two things.
First, he states his intention.
Second, he proves it, at a sign of this.
Accordingly, he first says that the desire to know belongs by nature to all men.
2. Three reasons can be given for this. The first is that each thing naturally desires its own perfection. Hence matter is also said to desire form as any imperfect thing desires its perfection. Therefore, since the intellect, by which man is what he is, considered in itself is all things potentially, and becomes them actually only through knowledge, because the intellect is none of the things that exist before it understands them, as is stated in On the Soul 3, so each man naturally desires knowledge just as matter desires form.
3. The second reason is that each thing has a natural inclination to perform its proper operation, as something hot is naturally inclined to heat, and something heavy to be moved downwards. Now the proper operation of man as man is to understand, for by reason of this he differs from all other things. Hence the desire of man is naturally inclined to understand and therefore to possess scientific knowledge.
4. The third reason is that it is desirable for each thing to be united to its source, since it is in this that the perfection of each thing consists. This is also the reason why circular motion is the most perfect motion, as is proved in Physics 8, because its terminus is united to its starting point. Now it is only by means of his intellect that man is united to the separate substances, which are the source of the human intellect and to which the human intellect is related as something imperfect to something perfect. It is for this reason, too, that the ultimate happiness of man consists in this union. Therefore, man naturally desires to know.
The fact that some men do not devote any study to this science does not disprove this thesis. For those who desire some end are often prevented from pursuing it for some reason or other, either because of the difficulty of attaining it or because of other occupations. And in this way, too, even though all men desire knowledge, still not all devote themselves to the pursuit of it because they are held back by other things such as pleasures or the needs of the present life—or they may even avoid the effort that learning demands because they are lazy.
Now Aristotle makes this statement in order to show that it is not pointless to search for a science that is not useful for anything else (such as this science), since a natural desire cannot exist in vain.
5. Then he establishes his thesis by means of an example. Since our senses serve us in two respects—in knowing things and in meeting the needs of life—we love them for themselves inasmuch as they enable us to know and also assist us to live. This is evident from the fact that all men take the greatest delight in the sense that is most knowing, the sense of sight. We value it not merely so we can do things, but even when we are not required to act at all. This is because this sense of sight is the most knowing of all our senses and makes us aware of many differences between things.