Commentary Aristotle Metaphysics
Lecture 4. How many sciences study all causes?
Therefore, let us discuss first the problem about which we first spoke: whether it is the office of one science or of many to study all the genera of causes.
For how will it be the office of one science to come to principles since they are not contrary?
Furthermore, in the case of many existing things not all the principles are present. How can a principle of motion be present in all immobile things, or how can the nature of the good be found there?
For everything which is a good in itself and by reason of its own nature is an end and thus a cause, because it is for its sake that other things come to be and exist. Further, the end and that for the sake of which something comes to be is the terminus of some action.
But all actions involve motion. Therefore, it would be impossible for this principle to be present in immobile things, nor could there be an autoagathon, that is, a good in itself.
Hence in mathematics too nothing is proved by means of this cause, nor is there any demonstration on the grounds that a thing is better or worse. Nor does anyone make any mention at all of anything of this kind. And for this reason some of the Sophists, for example, Aristippus, disregarded these. For in the other arts, even in the servile ones, such as the art of building and cobbling, all things are to be explained on the grounds that they are better or worse; but the mathematical sciences give no account of things that are good or evil.
But on the other hand, if there are many sciences of the causes, and different sciences for different principles, which of these must be said to be the one that is being sought, or which one of those who have them is best informed about the subject under investigation?
For it is possible for the same thing to have all the kinds of causes. For example, in the case of a house the source of motion is the art and the builder, the final cause is its function, the matter is earth and stones, and the form is the plan.
Therefore, from the things established a little while ago, which of the sciences should be called wisdom?
For there is a reason for calling each one of them such. For inasmuch as wisdom takes precedence and is a more authoritative science, and one which the others, like slaves, have no right to contradict, then the science that deals with the end and the good is such a science, because other things are for the sake of this.
But insofar as wisdom has been defined as the science of first causes and of what is most knowable, such a science will be about substance. For while a subject may be known in many ways, we say that he who knows what a thing is in its being knows it better than he who knows it in its non-being.
And in the former case one knows better than another, especially he who knows what a thing is, and not how great it is or of what sort it is or anything that it is naturally disposed to do or to undergo. Further, in the case of other things, too, we think that we know every single thing (and those of which there are demonstrations) when we know what each is—for example, what squaring is, because it is finding the middle term. The same thing is true in other cases.
But with regard to processes of generation and actions and every change, we think that we know these perfectly when we know the principle of motion. But this differs from and is opposite to the end of motion. And for this reason it seems to be the province of a different science to speculate about each one of these causes.
Can one science consider many causes?
369. Having raised the questions which cause difficulty in this science, Aristotle begins here to treat them dialectically. This is divided into three parts.
In the first part, he treats the questions which pertain to the method of investigation of this science.
In the second, he treats the questions which pertain to substances, at furthermore, there is.
In the third, he treats the questions which pertain to the principles of substances, at concerning the principles.
First, he argues dialectically about this science’s method of investigation, with reference to the causes by means of which it demonstrates;
second, with reference to the first principles of demonstration, at but insofar;
third, with reference to substances themselves, at and there is the problem.
First, he takes up again the question about which he plans to argue dialectically, concluding from the order in which the questions have been listed that it is necessary first to debate those issues which were stated first in the list of questions—namely, whether it is the function of one science or of many to investigate all the genera of causes. In this way the order of argument corresponds to the order in which the questions have been raised.
370. For how will it be. Second, he gives the arguments relating to this question, and in regard to this he does three things.
First, he gives an argument for the purpose of showing that it is not the office of a single science to consider all the genera of causes.
Second, assuming that it belongs to different sciences to consider the different genera of causes, he asks which genus of cause it is that is investigated by first philosophy. He argues on both sides of this question, at but on the other hand.
Third, he draws from this second dispute the conclusion of the first arguments, at but with regard to.
In regard to the first he gives two arguments.
He asks, since it belongs to one science to consider contraries, how it will belong to one science to consider principles, since they are not contrary? This view, if it is considered superficially, seems to be of no importance, for it appears to follow from the destruction of the antecedent, as if one were to argue thus. If principles are contraries, they belong to one science; therefore, if they are not contraries, they do not belong to one science.
371. Therefore, it can be said that in these disputes the Philosopher not only uses probable arguments, but sometimes also uses sophistical ones when he gives arguments introduced by others. But it does not seem reasonable that in such an important matter so great a Philosopher would have introduced an argument which is both trifling and insignificant. Hence a different explanation must be given, namely, that if one rightly considers the nature of the various things that belong to the same science, some belong to a single science insofar as they are different, but others insofar as they are reduced to some one thing. Hence many other different things are found to belong to one science insofar as they are reduced to one thing (for example, to one whole, one cause, or one subject). But contraries and all opposites belong essentially to one science by reason of the fact that one is the means of knowing the other. And from this comes this probable proposition that all different things that are contraries belong to one science. Therefore, if principles were different and were not contraries, it would follow that they would not belong to one science.
372. Furthermore, in the case. Here he gives the second argument, which runs thus. In the case of different things that belong to one science, whatever science considers one also considers another. This is evident in the case of contraries, which are different and belong essentially to one science without being reduced to some other unity. But not every science which considers one cause considers all causes. Therefore, the study of all the causes does not belong to a single science.
373. He proves the minor premise thus. Different sciences deal with different beings, and there are many beings to which all the causes cannot be assigned. He makes this clear, first, with regard to that cause which is called the source of motion, for it does not seem that there can be a principle of motion in immobile things. Now certain immobile things are posited, especially by the Platonists, who claim that numbers and substances are separate entities. Hence, if any science considers these, it cannot consider the cause which is the source of motion.
374. Second, he shows that the same thing is true of the final cause, which has the character of good. For it does not seem that the character of goodness can be found in immobile things, if it is conceded that everything which is good in itself and by reason of its own nature is an end. And it is a cause in the sense that all things come to be and exist because of it and for its sake.
However, he says everything which is a good in itself and by reason of its own nature in order to exclude the useful good, which is not predicated of the end, but of the means to the end. Hence those things that are said to be good only in the sense that they are useful for something else are not good in themselves and by reason of their own nature. For example, a bitter medicine is not good in itself, but only insofar as it is directed to the end, health, which is a good in itself. But an end, or that for the sake of which something comes to be, seems to be the terminus of an action. But all actions seem to involve motion.
Therefore, it seems to follow that this principle—that is, the final cause, which has the character of goodness—cannot exist in immobile things. Further, since those things that exist of themselves apart from matter must be immobile, it therefore does not seem possible that an autoagathon (or a good-in-itself) exists, as Plato held. For he called all immaterial and unparticipated things entities which exist of themselves, just as he called the idea of man “man-in-himself,” as though not something participated in matter. Hence he also called the good-in-itself that which is its own goodness unparticipated—namely, the first principle of all things.
375. Moreover, with a view to strengthening this argument he introduces an example. From the fact that there cannot be an end in the case of immobile things, it seems to follow that, in the mathematical sciences (which abstract from matter and motion), nothing is proved by means of this cause, as in the science of nature (which deals with mobile things) something is proved by means of the notion of good. For example, we may give as the reason why man has hands that by them he is more capable of executing the things that reason conceives.