Commentary Aristotle Metaphysics
Lecture 10. Methods of refutation
But the same method of discussion is not applicable in all of these cases, because some men need persuasion and others force. For the ignorance of those who have formed their opinions as a result of difficulties is easily cured, because refutation is directed not against their words but against their thought. But the cure for all of those who argue for the sake of argument consists in refuting what they express in speech and in words.
Those who have experienced difficulties have formed this opinion because of things observed in the sensible world—namely, the opinion that contradictories and contraries can both be true at the same time, inasmuch as they see that contraries are generated from the same thing.
Therefore, if it is impossible for non-being to come into being, the thing must have existed before as both contraries equally. This is Anaxagoras’ view, for he says that everything is mixed in everything else. And Democritus is of the same opinion, for he holds that the void and the full are equally present in any part, and yet one of these is non-being and the other being.
Concerning those who base their opinions on these grounds, then, we say that in one sense they speak the truth, and that in another they do not know what they are saying. For being has two meanings, so that in one sense a thing can come to be from non-being and in another sense it cannot. Hence the same thing can both be and not be at the same time, but not in the same respect; for while the same thing can be potentially two contraries at the same time, it cannot perfectly in act.
Further, we shall expect them to believe that among beings there is also another kind of substance to which neither motion nor generation nor corruption belongs in any way.
663. Having raised arguments against those who deny the first principle, and having settled the issue, here the Philosopher indicates how one must proceed differently against various men who adopted different versions of the above-mentioned error. This is divided into two parts.
In the first, he shows that one must proceed differently against different men.
In the second, he begins to proceed in a different way than he did above, at those who have experienced.
He accordingly says, first, that the same method of discussion, that is, of popular address (or of good grammatical construction, according to another translation, or of well ordered argument or intercession, as is said in the Greek, that is, of persuasion), is not applicable to all of the foregoing positions—that is, to the position that contradictories can be true, and to the position that truth consists in appearances.
For some thinkers adopt the foregoing positions for two reasons.
Some do so because of some difficulty, for since certain sophistical arguments occur to them, from which the foregoing positions seem to follow, and they do not know how to solve them, they accept the conclusion. Hence their ignorance is easily cured. For one must not oppose them or attack the arguments which they give, but must appeal to their thought, clearing up the mental difficulties which have led them to form such opinions; then they will give up these positions.
664. Others adopt the foregoing positions not because of any difficulty which leads them to such things, but only because they want to argue for the sake of argument, that is, because of a certain insolence, inasmuch as they want to maintain impossible theories of this kind for their own sake, since the contrary of these cannot be demonstrated. The cure for these men is the refutation or rejection of what they express in speech and in words, that is, on the grounds that the word in a statement has some meaning. Now the meaning of a statement depends on the meaning of the words, such that it is necessary to return to the principle that words signify something. This is the principle which the Philosopher used above.
665. Those who. Since the Philosopher met the difficulties above on this point by considering the meaning of words, he begins here to meet those who are in difficulties by solving their problems.
First, he deals with those who held that contradictories are true at the same time;
second, he deals with those who held that everything which appears so is true, at and similarly.
First, he sets forth the difficulty which led some men to admit that contradictories are true at the same time.
Second, he clears up this difficulty, at concerning those.
He says, then, that the opinion on this point—that the parts of a contradiction may be true at the same time—was formed by some men as a result of a difficulty which arose with regard to sensible things, in which generation and corruption and motion are apparent. For it seemed that contraries were generated from the same thing: for example, air, which is warm, and earth, which is cold, both come from water.
But everything which is generated comes from something that existed before, for non-being cannot come into being, since nothing comes from nothing. A thing therefore had to have in itself contradictories simultaneously, because if both the hot and the cold are generated from one and the same thing, then it turns out to be hot and not-hot itself.
666. It was because of such reasoning that Anaxagoras claimed that everything is mixed in everything else. For from the fact that anything at all seemed to come from anything else, he thought that one thing could come from another only if it already existed in it. Democritus also seems to have agreed with this theory, for he claimed that the void and the full are combined in any part of a body. And these are like being and non-being, because the full has the character of being and the void the character of non-being.
667. Concerning those. Here he solves the foregoing difficulty in two ways.
First, he says that the opinion of those who have adopted the foregoing absurd views because of some difficulty must be met by appealing to their thought, as has been stated.
Therefore, concerning those who base their opinions, those who think that contradictories are true at the same time, on these grounds, that is, on the reasoning mentioned above, we say that in one sense they speak the truth and in another they do not know what they are saying since their statements are absurd.
For being has two meanings: actual being and potential being. Therefore, when they say that being does not come from non-being, in one sense they are right and in another they are not. For being does not come from actual being but from potential being.
Hence in one sense the same thing can be at the same time both being and non-being, and in another sense it cannot; for the same thing can be contraries potentially, but it cannot be both perfectly in act, that is, actually. For if something warm is potentially both hot and cold, it still cannot be actually both.
668. Further, we shall. Then he gives the second solution. He says that we deem it fitting that they should accept or think that there is some kind of substance to which neither motion nor generation nor corruption belongs, as is proved in Physics 8. Now one could not conclude to the existence of this kind of substance by reason of what has been said above, namely, that contraries belong to it, because nothing is generated from them.
This solution seems to be like the one reached by the Platonists, who, because of the changeable character of sensible things, were compelled to posit unchangeable separate forms (namely, those of which definitions are given, and demonstrations made, and certain knowledge is had) on the grounds that there could be no certain knowledge of sensible things because of their changeableness and the mixture of contrariety which they contain. But the first solution is a better one.
Lecture 11. Why some considered appearances to be true
And similarly the theory that truth consists in appearances comes to some thinkers from sensible things. For they think that the truth should not be judged by the large or small number who uphold some view, and they point out that the same thing appears to be sweet to some when they taste it and bitter to others. Hence, if all men were ill or all were mad, and only two or three were healthy or in possession of their wits, the latter would appear ill or mad and not the former. Further, they say that the impressions made upon many of the other animals are contrary to those made upon us, and that to the senses of each person things do not always appear to be the same. Therefore, it is not always evident which of these views is true or which is false, but both appear equally so. And it is for this reason that Democritus says that either nothing is true or it is not evident to us.
669. Having solved the difficulty which led the ancient philosophers to maintain that contradictories are true at the same time, the Philosopher now dispels the difficulty which led some thinkers to maintain that every appearance is true. This part is divided into two.
First, he gives the difficulties which led some thinkers to hold the position mentioned above.
Second, he dispels these difficulties, at but in reply.
First, he gives the reason which led these men to maintain that every appearance is true.
Second, he explains why they reasoned in this way, at and in general.
He therefore first says that just as the opinion which maintained that contradictories are true at the same time came from certain sensible things in which it happens that contradictories come from the same thing, so too the theory that truth consists in appearances, or the opinion about the truth of appearances, is derived from certain sensible things, that is, by those who are not perverse but are drawn into this position because of difficulties.
This occurs because they find that different men hold contrary opinions about the same sensible things, and they give three reasons in support of their position.
First, they point out that the same thing appears to taste sweet to some and bitter to others, so that men have contrary opinions about all sensible things.
Second, they note that many animals make judgments about sensible things that are contrary to ours, for what seems tasty to the ox or to the ass is judged by man to be unpalatable.
Third, they say that the same man at different times makes different judgments about sensible things, for what now appears to be sweet and palatable to him at another time seems bitter or tasteless.
670. And no certain reason can be given that clearly indicates which of these opinions is true or which is false, because one of these seems no truer to one person than the other does to another person. Therefore, they must be equally true or equally false. Hence Democritus said that either nothing is definitely true or, if anything is true, it is not evident to us. Even though we acquire our knowledge of things through the senses, their judgment is not certain, since they do not always judge in the same way. Hence we do not seem to have any certainty regarding the truth so that we can say that this opinion is definitely true and its contrary definitely false.
671. But someone could say, in opposing this position, that some rule can be adopted whereby a person can discern among contrary opinions the one that is true. That is, we might say that the judgment which healthy people make about sensible things is right, and the one which sick people make is not; and that the judgment which wise and intelligent people make in matters of truth is right, and the one which foolish or ignorant people make is not. He rejects this reply at the very start on the grounds that no certain judgment about the truth of any theory can be fittingly based on the number, large or small, of persons who hold it, according to which that would be said to be true which seems so to many, and that to be false which seems so to a few. For sometimes what many believe is not simply true.
Now health and sickness or wisdom and foolishness do not seem to differ only by reason of the greater or smaller number of people involved. For if all or most persons were like those who are now thought to be ignorant or foolish, they would be considered wise, and those who are now thought to be wise would be considered foolish. The same applies in the case of health and sickness. Hence the judgment regarding truth and falsity of one who is healthy and wise is no more credible than the judgment of one who is ill and foolish.