Commentary Aristotle Physics
He shows first that the subject to which the coming to be is attributed is two in account.
Second, at “but there are different” (190a31; [107]), he shows that it is necessary to assume a subject in every coming to be.
He shows the first point in two ways. First (190a17), he points out that, in the subject to which the coming to be is attributed, there is something that is permanent and something that is not permanent. For that which is not an opposite of the terminus of the production is permanent, for man remains when he becomes musical, but the non-musical does not remain. And from this it is clear that man and the non-musical are not the same in account, since the one remains but the other does not.
106. Second, at “we speak of” (190a21), he shows the same thing in another way. With reference to the non-permanent things, it is much better to say, this comes to be from this, than it is to say, this becomes this (although this latter also may be said, but not as properly). For we say that the musical comes to be from the non-musical. We also say that the non-musical becomes musical, but this is accidental, insofar as that which happens to be non-musical becomes musical.
But, in permanent things, this is not said. For we do not say that the musical comes to be from man; rather, we say that the man becomes musical.
Even in reference to permanent things, we sometimes say, this comes to be from this, as we say that a statue comes to be from bronze. But this happens because, by the name “bronze,” we understand the “unshaped,” and so this is said by reason of the privation that is understood.
And, although we say, this comes to be from this, with reference to permanent things, yet it is better to say with reference to non-permanent things both that this becomes this and that this comes to be from this, whether non-permanent things are taken as opposites or as composed of the opposite and the subject. Thus, from this very fact that we use different modes of speech with reference to the subject and the opposite, it is clear that the subject and the opposite, such as man and the non-musical, are two in account.
107. Next, at “but there are different” (190a31), he proves the other point that he had assumed: in every natural production, there must be a subject. The proof of this point by argumentation belongs to metaphysics. Hence this is proved in Metaphysics 7. He proves it here only by induction.
He does this first in regard to the things that come to be;
second, in regard to the modes of coming to be, at “generally, things” (190b4; [108]).
He therefore first (190a31) says that, since “to come to be” is used in many ways, “to come to be simply” is said only of the coming to be of substances, whereas other things are said to come to be accidentally. This is so because “to come to be” implies the beginning of existing.
Therefore, in order for something to come to be simply, it is required that previously it was not simply, which happens in those things that come to be substantially. For when a man comes to be, not only was he previously not a man, but it is true to say that he simply was not. But when a man becomes white, it is not true to say that he previously was not, but that he previously was not such.
However, those things that come to be accidentally clearly depend upon a subject. For quantity and quality and the other accidents, whose coming to be is accidental, cannot be without a subject. For only substance does not exist in a subject. Further, it is clear, if one considers the point, that even substances come to be from a subject. For we see that plants and animals come to be from seed.
108. Next, at “generally, things” (190b4), he shows the same thing by induction from the modes of coming to be. He says that, of things that come to be, some come to be by change of figure, as the statue comes to be from the bronze; others come to be by addition, as is clear in all instances of increase, as the river comes to be from many streams; others come to be by subtraction, as an image of Mercury comes to be from stone by sculpture; still other things come to be by composition, such as a house; and others come to be by alteration, as those things whose matter is changed, either by nature or by art. And, in all of these cases, it is apparent that they come to be from some subject.
Hence it is clear that everything that comes to be comes to be from a subject. But it must be noted that artificial things are here enumerated along with those things that come to be simply (even though artificial forms are accidents), because artificial things are in some way in the genus of substance by reason of their matter.
Or else perhaps he lists them because of the opinion of the ancients, who thought of natural things and artificial things in the same way, as will be said in book 2.
109. Next, at “thus, clearly, from what” (190b10), he draws his conclusion. He says that it has been shown from what was said above that that to which coming to be is attributed is always composed.
And since, in any production, there is “that at which the coming to be is terminated” and “that to which the coming to be is attributed,” the latter of which has two parts—namely, the subject and the opposite—it is then clear that there are three things in any coming to be: the subject, the terminus of the production, and the opposite of this terminus.
Thus, when a man becomes musical, the opposite is the non-musical, the subject is the man, and musical is the terminus of the production. And, in like manner, shapelessness and lack of figure and lack of order are opposites, while bronze and gold and stone are subjects in artificial productions.
Lecture 13. Matter, form, and privation, the per se and per accidens principles in natural coming-to-be
Thus, if there are causes and first principles that constitute natural objects and from which they primarily are or have come to be—meaning have come to be what each is said to be in its essential nature, not what each is accidentally—then everything plainly comes to be from both subject and form.
For “musical man” is composed (in a way) of “man” and “musical”: you can analyze it into the definitions of its elements. It is clear, then, that what comes to be will come to be from these elements.
Now, the subject is one numerically, though it is two in form. (For it is the man, the gold—the “matter” generally—that is counted, for it is more of the nature of a “this,” and what comes to be does not come from it accidentally; the privation, on the other hand, and the contrary are accidental in the process.) And the positive form is one—the order, the acquired art of music, or any similar predicate.
Thus, there is one sense in which we must declare the principles to be two and another in which they are three—that is, one sense in which the contraries are the principles, such as the musical and the unmusical, the hot and the cold, or the tuned and the untuned, and another sense in which the contraries are not the principle, since it is impossible for the contraries to be acted on by each other. But this difficulty also is solved by the fact that the substratum is different from the contraries, for it is itself not a contrary.
And so, the principles are, in a way, not more in number than the contraries, but as it were two; nor yet are they precisely two, since there is a difference of essential nature, but three. For “to be man” is different from “to be unmusical,” and “to be unformed” from “to be bronze.”
We have now stated the number of the principles of natural objects that are subject to generation and how the number is reached, and it is clear that there must be a substratum for the contraries, and that the contraries must be two.
(Yet, in another way of putting it, this is not necessary, as one of the contraries will serve to effect the change by its successive absence and presence.)
The underlying nature is an object of scientific knowledge by analogy. For as the bronze is to the statue, the wood to the bed, or the matter and the formless before receiving form to any thing that has form, so is the underlying nature to substance, that is, the “this” or existent. This, then, is one principle (though not one or existent in the same sense as the “this something”), and the definition was one, as we agreed; then, further, there is its contrary, the privation. In what sense these are two, and in what sense more, has been stated above.
Briefly, we explained first that only the contraries were principles, and later that a substratum was indispensable, and that the principles were three; our last statement has elucidated the difference between the contraries, the mutual relation of the principles, and the nature of the substratum.
Whether the form or the substratum is the essential nature of a physical object is not yet clear. But that the principles are three, and in what sense, and the way in which each is a principle, is clear. So much, then, for the question of the number and the nature of the principles.
110. After the Philosopher has shown that three things are found in every natural coming to be, he intends here to show from the foregoing how many principles of nature there are.
Concerning this, he makes two points.
First, he explains his position.
Second, at “briefly, we explained” (191a15; [119]), in recapitulation, he explains what has already been said and what remains to be said.
Concerning the first part, he makes two points.
First, he shows that there are three principles of nature.
Second, he names them, at “the underlying nature” (191a7; [118]).
Concerning the first part, he makes three points.
First, he explains the truth about the first principles of nature.
Second, at “thus, there is one sense” (190b29; [114]), from this disclosure of the truth, he answers the problems about the principles that were raised above.
Third, since the ancients had said that the principles are contraries, he shows whether or not contraries are always required, at “we have now stated” (191a3; [115]).
Concerning the first part, he makes two points.
First, he shows that there are two per se principles of nature.