Commentary Aristotle Physics
Another way is to predicate of a subject something that is not of its essence but yet inheres in the subject. This inherent thing may be traceable to the matter in the subject, in which case one has the predicament of “quantity” (for quantity is properly a result of matter; for which reason Plato traced the “large” to matter);
or it is traceable to the form, and in this case, there is the predicament of “quality” (for which reason qualities are founded on quantity, as color in a surface, and figure in lines or in a plane);
or the predication may be due to a relation existing between subject and something else, and thus we have the predicament of “relation” (for when I say, “the man is a father,” it is not something absolute that is predicated of the man, but a relation in him to something without).
The third mode of predicating is when something outside the subject is predicated after the manner of denomination. This allows even extrinsic accidents to be predicated of substance, but yet we do not say that man is whiteness, but that man is white. To be denominated by something extrinsic can occur, generally speaking, to all things in one way or another, and in a special way in those matters that refer only to man.
Speaking generally, a thing can be denominated by something extrinsic either according to the account of cause or according to that of measure. For something is denominated “caused” or “measured” on account of its relationship to something extrinsic.
Now, there are four genera of causes, two of which are parts of the essence, namely, matter and form. Hence, any predication based on these two pertains to the predicament of “substance,” as when I say that man is rational and that man is corporeal.
In regard to the other two causes, the final cause does not cause separately from the agent, for the end is a cause only insofar as it influences the agent. Therefore, the only cause according to which a thing can be denominated something as based on something extrinsic is the agent cause.
Consequently, when something is denominated from the agent cause, it is the predicament of “passion,” for to undergo is nothing but the undergoing of something from an agent. On the other hand, if the agent cause is denominated on account of its effect, one has the predicament of “action,” for action is an act from the agent into something else, as stated above.
In regard to measures, it will be either intrinsic or extrinsic. An intrinsic measure would be a thing’s own length and width and depth. In these cases, a subject is being denominated something by reason of what inheres intrinsically; hence, this pertains to the predicament “quantity.”
The extrinsic measures are time and place. It is the predicament “when” whenever something is denominated by time; when it is denominated by place, it is the predicament “where” or the predicament “position,” which adds to “where” the order of the parts in place. Such an order of parts is not considered in regard to the measure that is time, for the order of parts in time is already implied in the account of time, since time is the number of motion according to the order of the “before” and the “after.” Thus, it is through denomination from time or place that something is said to be “when” or “where.”
There is a special predicament for human beings. In other animals, nature provided the requirements for preserving life, such as horns for defense, a tough and woolly hide as a covering, and claws or the like for proceeding without harm. Hence, when animals are said to be “armed” or “covered” or “shod” by reason of this equipment, they are somehow so called not by reason of something extrinsic, but of something intrinsic, something that is part of them. Hence, such are referred to the predicament of “substance,” as the same would be if man were said to be endowed with hands or feet.
But the other things could not be endowed upon man by nature, both because they would be out of keeping with the precise balance of his constitution and because reason makes man capable of an enormous number of works, for the performance of which nature could not have endowed him with specific instruments. In the place of all these instruments, man has reason, which he can use to make for himself the things that are intrinsic to other animals. So, when a man is said to be armed or clothed or shod, he is denominated thus by reason of something extrinsic to him that is neither a cause nor a measure. Hence it is located in a special predicament called “habit.”
But we should not fail to note that this predicament is, in certain matters, used also for other animals, not inasmuch as they are considered in their nature, but insofar as they are put at the service of man. Thus we say that a horse is caparisoned or saddled or armed.
323. This makes it clear that, although motion is one, yet there are two predicaments that are based on motion, depending on the different external things according to which the predicamental denominations are made. For an agent is one thing from which, as from something external, the predicament of “passion” is taken; and the patient is some other thing from which something is denominated an agent. This solves the first difficulty.
324. The second doubt is easy to solve. For the account of motion depends not only on that which pertains to motion in reality but also on that which reason apprehends. In reality, motion is nothing more than an imperfect act, which is a sort of beginning of a perfect act in that which is being moved; thus, in that which is becoming white, some whiteness has begun to be. But, in order that what is imperfect have the account of motion, it is further required that we understand it as a mean between two. The one mentioned earlier is compared to motion as potency to act (hence motion is called act). The consequent one is compared to motion as the perfect to the imperfect or as act to potency; hence motion is called the act of a being that exists in potency, as we said above.
But anything imperfect, if it is not considered to be tending on to something other as perfect, is called the terminus of motion, and one will not have a motion according to which something is being moved—as, for example, if something should start to become white and then the alteration was immediately stopped.
Therefore, in regard to what there is of motion in external reality, motion is placed reductively in that genus that terminates the motion as the imperfect is reduced to the perfect, as stated above.
But, in regard to what reason apprehends about motion—namely, that it is midway between two terms—here the account of cause and effect are brought in, because, for something to be reduced from potency to act, an agent cause is required. From this aspect, motion pertains to the predicaments of “action” and “passion,” for these two predicaments are based on the accounts of acting cause and of effect, as was said above.
325. Then, at “what motion is, then” (202b23), he defines motion more particularly. He says that we have pointed out what motion is both in general and in particular—because, from what was said about the definition of motion in general, it is clear how it can be defined in particular. For if motion is the act of the mobile as such, it follows that alteration is the act of the alterable as alterable, and so on for other particular kinds of motion. And, because there was a doubt whether motion is an act of the mover or of the mobile—and we showed that it is an act of the active as from it and of the passive as in it—then, to remove any further doubts, we can say somewhat more explicitly that motion is an act of the potency of that which is active and of that which is passive. In this way, we could have said that building is an act of the builder and of the buildable as such. The same is true of healing and of other motions.