Commentary Aristotle Physics
Lecture 3. Whether place is form or matter
We may distinguish generally between predicating B of A because it [A] is itself and [doing so] because it is something else, and particularly between place that is common—the place in which all bodies are—and the proper place occupied primarily by each.
I mean, for instance, that you are now in the heavens because you are in the air and it is in the heavens; and you are in the air because you are on the earth; and you are similarly on the earth because you are in this place that contains no more than you.
Now if place is what primarily contains each body, it would be a limit, such that the place would be the species and form of each body by which the magnitude or the matter of the magnitude is defined: for this is the limit of each body. If, then, we look at the question in this way, the place of a thing is its form.
But, if we regard the place as the extension of the magnitude, it is the matter. For this is different from the magnitude: it is what is contained and defined by the form, as by a bounding plane. Matter or the indeterminate is of this nature; when the boundary and attributes of a sphere are taken away, nothing but the matter is left.
This is why Plato says in the Timaeus that matter and space are the same, for the “participant” and space are identical. (It is true, indeed, that the account he gives there of the “participant” is different from what he says in his unwritten teaching. Nevertheless, he did identify place and space.) I mention Plato because, while all hold place to be something, he alone tried to say what it is.
In view of these facts, we should naturally expect to find difficulty in determining what place is, if indeed it is one of these two things, matter or form. They demand a very close scrutiny, especially as it is not easy to tell them apart.
But it is at any rate not difficult to see that place cannot be either of them. The form and the matter are not separate from the thing, but the place can be separated. As we pointed out, where air was, water in turn comes to be, the one replacing the other, and similarly with other bodies. Hence, the place of a thing is neither a part nor a state of it, but is separable from it. For place is supposed to be something like a vessel—the vessel being a transportable place. But the vessel is no part of the thing.
Insofar as it is separable from the thing, then, it is not the form, and qua containing, it is different from the matter.
Also, it is held both that what is anywhere is itself something and that there is a different thing outside it.
Plato, of course, if we may digress, ought to tell us why the form and the numbers are not in place, if “what participates” is place—whether what participates is the “great” and the “small” or the matter, as he called it in writing in the Timaeus.
Further, how could a body be carried to its own place, if place was the matter or the form? It is impossible that what has no reference to motion or the distinction of up and down can be place. So place must be looked for among things that have these characteristics.
If the place is in the thing (it must be if it is either form or matter), place will have a place: for both the form and the infinite undergo change and motion along with the thing, and are not always in the same place, but are where the thing is. Hence the place will have a place.
Further, when water is produced from air, the place has been destroyed, for the resulting body is not in the same place. What sort of destruction, then, is that? This concludes my statement of the reasons why place must be something, and again of the difficulties that may be raised about its essential nature.
422. Having inquired dialectically into the question of place’s existence, the Philosopher now attacks the question: what is place?
First, he gives dialectical reasons showing that place is form or matter;
second, he gives reasons to the contrary, at, but it is at “any rate” (209b21; [429]).
As to the first, he does three things:
first, he gives a reason showing that place is form;
second, that place is matter, at “but, if we regard” (209b6; [425]);
third, from these he draws a corollary, at “in view of these facts” (209b17; [428]).
423. He first says, therefore (209a31), that, just as some beings are per se beings and others per accidens, so in regard to place, one place is common, in which all bodies exist, and another is proper and is called place primarily and per se. Now, common place is so called only per accidens and in relation to a previous place. He explains this thus: I can say that you are in the heavens because you are in the air, which is in the heavens; and I can say that you are in the air and in the heavens because you are on earth; and you are said to be on earth because you are in a place containing nothing but you.
424. Consequently, what contains a thing primarily and per se is its per se place. Now, such a place is the boundary at which a thing is terminated. Therefore, place is properly and per se a boundary of a thing. But the boundary of each thing is its form, because it is through the form that the matter of anything is limited to its own existence and magnitude to a determinate measure. For the quantities of things follow upon their forms. Therefore, according to this, it seems that place is the form. However, it should be noted that, in this argument, there is the fallacy of consequent, for it is a syllogism in the second figure with two affirmative premises.
425. Then, at “but, if we regard” (209b6), he gives a reason of Plato through which it seemed to him that place is matter. To see this, one must note that the ancients thought that place was the space enveloped by the boundaries of the container, which has the dimensions of length, breadth, and depth. But this space did not seem to be the same as any sensible body, because the space remained the same even when various bodies successively entered it and left. Thus, it follows that place is a set of separate dimensions.
426. Plato wished to demonstrate from this that place is matter. This is what Aristotle says: because some consider that place is the distance of the magnitude of space distinct from every sensible body, place would seem to be matter. For the distance or dimension of a magnitude is distinct from the magnitude. For magnitude signifies something terminated by some species, as a line is terminated by points, and a surface by line, and a body by surface, and these are species of magnitude. But the dimension of space is contained under a determined form as a body is determined by a plane, that is, by a surface, as by a definite boundary.
Now, whatever is contained under boundaries seems to be in itself not determined. What is not determined in itself but by a form and boundary is matter, which has the account of the infinite. For were we to remove from some spherical body its sensible qualities and the boundaries by which the dimension of its magnitude acquires its definite figure, nothing would remain but the matter. Consequently, the dimensions themselves, which are not determined by themselves but by something else, are matter. This followed mainly from the underlying principles of Plato, who posited numbers and quantities as the substance of things.
427. Therefore, because place is dimensions and dimensions are matter, Plato said in the Timaeus that place and matter are the same. For he said that whatever is a receptacle of anything is a place, failing to distinguish between the receptiveness of place and of that of matter. Hence, since matter receives form, it follows that matter is place.
Yet it should be noted that Plato spoke in various ways about receptacles: for in the Timaeus he said that the receptacle is matter, but in his unwritten teaching, his oral teaching in the schools, he said that the receptacle was the large and the small, which, however, he allied with matter, as we have said above. Yet no matter to what he attributed receptivity, he always said that the receptacle and place are the same. Therefore, while many did say that place is something, Plato alone endeavored to say what place is.
428. Then, at “in view of these facts” (209b17), he concludes from the foregoing that, if place is either matter or form, it seems reasonable to say that it is difficult to know what place is, because both matter and form involve very lofty and difficult speculation. Moreover, it is not easy to know either of them without the other.
429. Then, at “but it is at any rate” (209b21), he gives five reasons to the contrary.
In the first of these, he says that it is not difficult to see that place is neither matter nor form. For form and matter are not separate from the thing of which they are components, but place can be separated—in the place where air was, water now is. In like manner, other bodies also mutually change place. Hence, it is clear that place is not part of a thing, as matter or form. Nor is place an accident of a thing, because parts and accidents are not separable from a thing, but place is separable. He shows this by an example. Place seems to be related to the thing in place as a vessel, the only difference being that place is immobile and the vessel mobile, as will be explained below. Consequently, since place is separable, it is not form. But that place is not matter is shown not only by the fact that it is separable, but also by the fact that it contains, while matter does not contain but is contained.
430. He now gives a second reason at “also, it is held” (209b32). Since he had shown that place is neither matter nor form on the ground that place is separated from the thing in place, he now wishes to show that, even if place were never separated from the thing in place, yet the very fact that we say something is in place shows that place is neither form nor matter. For whatever is said to be anywhere seems both to be something and to be distinct from that in which it is. Hence, when something is said to be in place, it follows that place is outside the thing; but matter and form are not outside the thing. Therefore, neither matter nor form is place.
431. In the third reason, at “Plato, of course” (209b33), he makes a digression to argue specifically against the position of Plato. For it was said in book 3 that Plato posited that ideas and numbers are not in a place. But logically, according to his opinion about place, they should be in a place, since whatever is participated is in the participant—and he said that species and numbers are participated either by matter or by the large and the small. Accordingly, species and number exist in matter or in the large and small. Therefore, if matter or the large and the small are place, it follows that numbers and species are in place.
432. He gives the fourth reason at “further, how could a body” (210a2). In this regard, he says that no good explanation could be given of how something could be moved according to place if matter and form are place. For it is impossible to assign a place in things that are not moved up or down or in any direction of place. Hence, place must be sought in things that are moved according to place. But, if place is something intrinsic to what is moved (which would be the case if matter or form were place), it follows that place will be in a place, for whatever is changed in respect to place is itself in a place. Now, whatever is in a thing, such as its species and the infinite—that is, its matter—is moved with the thing, since they are not always in the same place, but are wherever the thing is. Therefore, matter and form must be in a place. Therefore, if either of them is place, it follows that place is in a place, which is unacceptable.
433. The fifth reason is then given at “further, when water” (210a9). Whenever anything is corrupted, the parts of its species are somehow corrupted. Now, matter and form are the parts of the species. Therefore, when the thing corrupts, then the matter and form are corrupted, at least per accidens. Consequently, if matter and form are place, it follows that place is corrupted, if place pertains to the species. Now, the body that is generated would not be in the same place, if the place of air pertained to the species of the air, as when water is generated from air. But no explanation can be given of how place is corrupted; hence it cannot be said that matter or form are place.
Finally, he summarizes by asserting that we have stated why it seems place must exist and what causes doubt about its existence.