Commentary Aristotle Physics
Lecture 21. The meaning of “now,” “then,” “presently,” “lately,” “long ago,” and “suddenly”
The “now” is the link of time, as has been said (for it connects past and future time), and it is a limit of time (for it is the beginning of the one and the end of the other). But this is not obvious, as it is with the point, which is fixed.
It divides potentially, and insofar as it is dividing, the “now” is always different, but insofar as it connects, it is always the same, as it is with mathematical lines.
For the intellect it is not always one and the same point, since it is different when one divides the line; but insofar as it is one, it is the same in every respect. So the “now” also is, in one way, a potential dividing of time and, in another, the termination of both parts and their unity.
And the dividing and the uniting are the same thing and in the same reference, but in essence, they are not the same. So, one kind of “now” is described in this way.
Another is when the time is near this kind of “now.” “He will come now” because he will come today; “he has come now” because he came today.
But the things in the Iliad have not happened “now,” nor is the flood “now”—not that the time from now to then is not continuous, but because they are not near.
“At some time” means a time determined in relation to the first of the two types of “now,” for instance, “at some time” Troy was taken, and “at some time,” there will be a flood; for it must be determined with reference to the “now.”
There will thus be a determinate time from this “now” to that, and there was such in reference to the past event.
But, if there be no time which is not “sometime,” every time will be determined.
Will time then fail? Surely not, if motion always exists. Is time then always different, or does the same time recur? Clearly time is in the same way as motion is. For if one and the same motion sometimes recurs, it will be one and the same time, and if not, it will not be. Since the “now” is an end and a beginning of time—not of the same time, however, but the end of that which is past and the beginning of that which is to come—it follows that, as the circle has its convexity and its concavity, in a sense, in the same thing, so time is always at a beginning and at an end.
And, for this reason, it seems to be always different, for the “now” is not the beginning and the end of the same thing; if it were, it would be, at the same time and in the same respect, two opposites. And time will not fail, for it is always at a beginning.
“Presently” refers to the part of future time that is near the indivisible present “now” (“When do you walk?” “Presently,” because the time in which he is going to do so is near), and “just” refers to the part of past time that is not far from the “now” (“When do you walk?” “I have just been walking”).
But to say that Troy has just been taken—we do not say that, because it is too far from the “now.”
“Lately,” too, refers to the part of past time that is near the present “now.” “When did you go?” “Lately,” if the time is near the existing now. “Long ago” refers to the distant past. “Suddenly” refers to what has departed from its former condition in a time imperceptible because of its smallness.
612. After showing how time is related to things that exist in time, the Philosopher here shows how, in virtue of their relations to the now, certain words derived various meanings with respect to time.
About this, he does two things:
first, he explains the meaning of “now”;
second, the meaning of certain other words that are determined by the now, at “at some time” means (222a24; [615]).
As to the first, he does two things:
first, he gives the proper and principal meaning of “now”;
second, he gives a secondary meaning, at “another is when the time” (222a21; [614]).
613. In regard to the first, he says three things about the now.
The first of these (222a10) is that the now joins past time to the future, insofar as it is the boundary of time—the beginning of the future and the end of the past—although this is not so evident in the now as in a point. For a point is stationary, and therefore can be considered twice: once as a beginning, and once as an end. But this does not occur with the now, as was said above.
Second, at “it divides potentially” (222a14), he says that time is divided according to the now as a line is divided according to the point. But nevertheless the now divides time insofar as it, the now, is considered to be many in potency, insofar as it is taken separately as the beginning of this time and separately as the end of that time. And insofar as it is taken in this way, the now is taken as different, but insofar as it is taken as it connects time and giving it continuity, it is taken as one and the same. And he shows this from a similar situation in mathematical lines in which it is more evident. For in mathematical lines, the point in the middle of a line is not always taken as the same, for insofar as the line is divided, there is understood one point that is the end of one line, and one point that is the end of the other. For lines, insofar as they are actually divided, are considered as contiguous—and contiguous things are those whose boundaries are together. But, insofar as the point continues the parts of the line, it is one and the same, since continuous things are those whose boundary is the same. And this is the situation with the now in respect of time: it can be taken in one way as potentially dividing time and in another way as the common boundary of two times, uniting them and making them continuous.
Third, at “and the dividing” (222a19), he says that the now that divides and continues time is one and the same as to subject, though differing in account, as the foregoing has made clear. So much for the first meaning of now.
614. Then, at “another is when the time” (222a21), he gives a secondary meaning of “now,” saying that “now” has another meaning, for it can be taken not as the boundary of time continuing the past with the future, but as the time near to the present now, whether that time is past or future, as when we say, “he will come now,” because he will come today, or when we say, “he has come now,” because he came today. But we do not say that the Trojan War has happened now, nor that the flood took place now, because, although the whole of the time is continuous, nevertheless it is not close to the present now.
615. Then, at “at some time” means (222a24), he explains certain things that are determined by the now.
And first, what “then” signifies.
About this, he does two things:
first, he gives its meaning;
second, he raises a difficulty, at “but, if there be” (222a28; [616]).
He therefore says first (222a24) that “then” signifies a time determined by some previous now, whether near or remote. For we can say that Troy was destroyed “then” and that the deluge took place “then.” For what is said to have taken place “then” must be enclosed between some preceding now or instant and the present. For it will be necessary to say that there is a time period of definite quantity from the present time to that now that was in the past.
In this way, it is evident that “then” differs from the second meaning of “now” in two ways:
first, “then” always refers to the past;
second, it matters not whether it refers to the near past or the remote past;
but “now” refers to the near, and it matters not whether it be past or future.
616. Then, at “but, if there be” (222a28), he raises a difficulty in the light of the foregoing and solves it. For he had said that the time that is called “then” is included within a past now and the present, and hence all time called “then” must be finite. But there is no time that cannot be called “then.” Therefore, all time is finite. Now, all finite time runs out. It seems, therefore, that one must say that time runs out. But if motion is always and time is the measure of motion, it follows that time will not run out. Therefore, we shall be forced to say, if all time is finite, either that time is always different, or that the same time is repeated over and over. And this situation must exist in time just as it is in motion. For if there is some eternally one and the same motion, then there will have to be one and the same time; but, if there is not one and the same motion, there will not be one and the same time.
617. According to his opinion, as will be clear in book 8, motion never had a beginning and will never end. Thus, one and the same motion is being repeated not numerically, but specifically. For it is not numerically the same revolution that is taking place now and that took place in the past, but it is specifically the same one. Nevertheless, the whole motion is one in continuity, because one revolution is continuous with the next, as will be proved in book 8. And what was said of motion must also apply to time.
From this, he shows that time will never fail. For it is evident from the foregoing that the now is both a beginning and an end, although not in relation to the same thing: it is an end with respect to the past and a beginning with respect to the future. Accordingly, the situation with respect to the now is like that of the circle, in which its concavity and convexity are the same thing in reality but differ according as they are related to diverse things. Convexity is had in a circle with respect to things outside it, and concavity with respect to things inside it.
And, because nothing of time can be taken but the now (as was said above), it follows that time is always at a beginning and at an end. And, for this reason, time seems to be different, for the now is not the beginning and end of the same time, but of different times; otherwise, opposite things would be true of the same thing according to the same aspect. For beginning and end have opposite accounts, and if the same thing were a beginning and an end with respect to the same, opposites would exist in the same thing according to the same aspect.
He further concludes from the foregoing that, since the now is both a beginning and an end of time, time will never fail, for time cannot be understood without a now, as was said above, and the now is the beginning of a time. Hence, time is always existing in a beginning of itself. But what is at its beginning is not failing; therefore, time will not fail. By the same reasoning, it can be proved that time did not commence insofar as the now is the end of a time.
But this reasoning proceeds on the supposition that motion had no beginning and will have no end, as he says. On this supposition, one would have to say that any “now” is an end and a beginning of time. But, if it be said that motion had a beginning or that it will cease, it follows that some now will be a beginning of a period of time and not an end, and some now will be an end but not a beginning, as happens also in a line. For if there were an infinite line, any point designated in it would be a beginning and an end. But, if the line is finite, some point in it is a beginning only, or an end only. But this will be investigated more in detail in book 8.
618. Then, at “‘presently’ refers” (222b7), he shows what is meant by the words “presently” and “just,” and that they have the same meaning of “now.” For “presently” and “just” refer to what is near the present indivisible now, whether it is part of the future or part of the past. It refers to a part of the future when I ask, “when will he leave?” and it is answered, “presently”—because the time in which this will take place is close. The past is referred to when I ask, “when are you going?” and it is answered, “I have just gone.” However, in regard to events that are distant, we do not say “presently” or “just”: for example, we do not say that Troy has just been destroyed, because this is very remote from the present now.
619. Then, at “‘lately,’ too, refers” (222b12), he explains certain other words referring to time. And he says that “lately” signifies that a period of the past is near the present now, as when, if it is asked, “when did so-and-so come?” the answer is “lately” if the past time is very close to the present.
But we say “long ago” when the time past is far from the present.
Finally, we say that something occurs “suddenly” when the time in which it takes place is imperceptibly small.