Commentary on 1 Corinthians
Lecture 2. Resurrection of the dead
15:12 Now if Christ be preached, that he arose again from the dead, how do some in you say that there is no resurrection of the dead? [n. 911]
15:13 But if there be no resurrection of the dead, then Christ is not risen again. [n. 917]
15:14 And if Christ be not risen again, then is our preaching vain: and your faith is also vain. [n. 918]
15:15 And we are even found to be false witnesses of God: because we have given testimony against God, that he has raised up Christ, whom he has not raised up, if the dead rise not again. [n. 919]
15:16 For if the dead rise not again, neither is Christ risen again.
15:17 And if Christ be not risen again, your faith is vain: for you are yet in your sins. [n. 921]
15:18 Then they also who are fallen asleep in Christ are perished. [n. 922]
15:19 If in this life only we have hope in Christ, we are of all men most miserable. [n. 923]
911. Having built up faith in the resurrection of Christ, the Apostle now proves by the resurrection of Christ the future resurrection of the dead.
First, he proves the future resurrection; second, he shows the quality of those rising, at but some man will say (1 Cor 15:35); third, he describes the order of the resurrection, at behold, I tell you a mystery (1 Cor 15:51). In regard to the first he does two things: first, he proves the future resurrection of the dead with a reason taken from the resurrection of Christ; second, with a reason taken from the lives of the saints, at otherwise, what shall they do (1 Cor 15:29). He proves the resurrection of the dead from the resurrection of Christ with this reason: if Christ arose, then the dead will rise. In regard to this reason he does three things: first, he presents a conditional proposition, namely, if Christ arose, the dead also will rise; second, he proves the antecedent of this conditional, at but if there be no resurrection of the dead (1 Cor. 15:13); third, he proves that the conditional is true, at but now Christ is risen (1 Cor 15:20).
912. First, therefore, he says: I have said that whether I preached or others, namely, the apostles, you have so believed. Now if Christ be preached by us that he rose again from the dead, how do some in you, i.e., among you, say that there is no resurrection of the dead? As if to say: if Christ rose from the dead, as we preach: since we believe that Christ died and rose again (1 Thess 4:14), no one should doubt the future resurrection of the dead. Hence: he who raised Christ Jesus from the dead will give life to our mortal bodies (Rom 8:10).
913. But this argument seems invalid, since it argues by affirming from the greater. For although Christ rose in particular in virtue of his divinity, it does not follow that other men will rise.
To this some answer that it is not from the greater but from a similar. For to die and to rise belong to Christ according to his human nature, and they say, that the argument is similar, as though I should say: the soul of Socrates is immortal; therefore all souls of men are immortal.
But it seems better to say that it is arguing from a cause, because the resurrection of Christ is the cause of our resurrection. Therefore, according to the Gloss it should be said: if Christ, who is the efficient cause of our resurrection, arose, how do some in you say that there is no resurrection of the dead?
Yet one should not say that he is the efficient cause only after the manner of merit, because by rising he did not merit it, since he was already a comprehensor, and lived the life of glory, unless perhaps the merit of the resurrection of the dead be referred to the death of Christ. Neither is he merely the exemplary cause, as some say, but he is the efficient and exemplary cause. Hence Augustine says, On John, that the Word made flesh vivifies souls and raises the dead. Therefore, it is clear that if Christ rose, the dead also will rise.
914. But on the other hand, to rise from the dead is above nature; but this is done only by the infinite power of God: therefore, the resurrection of Christ’s body is not the efficient cause of the resurrection of the dead, since the humanity of Christ or the body is a creature, although it cannot be said of Christ or of the man, that he is a creature.
The answer is that inasmuch as God or the godhead is in Christ, Christ is the exemplary and efficient cause of the resurrection of the dead through his humanity, as through an instrument of his divinity.
To answer the objection it should be noted that the flesh of Christ or the humanity is not said to produce an effect of infinite power, inasmuch as it is flesh or humanity, but inasmuch as it is the flesh and humanity of Christ.
915. But there is another question: once the sufficient cause is posited, the effect follows at once; therefore, if the resurrection of Christ is the sufficient cause of the resurrection of the dead, then the dead should all rise and not merely be delayed.
The answer is that an effect follows from instrumental causes according to the condition of the principal cause. Therefore, since God is the principal cause of our resurrection, but Christ’s resurrection is the instrumental cause, our resurrection follows Christ’s resurrection according to God’s arrangement, which directed that it happen at such a time.
916. But if God had not been incarnate, would men rise?
It seems not, because Christ would not have suffered and arisen.
I answer that this objection is null, because when something is directed by some cause, one should argue to it, observing the order of that cause. Therefore, it must be said that God directed the resurrection of the dead to occur in that manner; yet another manner could still be found by God, if he willed.
917. Then when he says: but if there be no resurrection of the dead, then Christ is not risen, he proves that Christ has risen, and this by leading to incongruities.
In regard to this he does two things: first, he leads to the incongruities; second, he shows that they are incongruities, at we are even found false witnesses of God.
918. In regard to the first he makes his deduction by supposing that if Christ had not risen, the dead will not rise. If this is so, two undesirable things follow: one is that the Apostle’s preaching is vain and useless; the other is that the faith of the Corinthians is in vain.
Hence he says: and if Christ be not risen again, your faith is in vain. And this is what he says: from the fact that I or others preach this. He says, therefore: and if Christ be not risen again, then is our preaching in vain, i.e., false, because you have so believed; and this is a great incongruity, that the truth did not underprop their preaching, especially since the Apostle says: I have not run or labored in vain (Phil 2:16).
919. We are even found false witnesses of God. Here he shows that those two things are incongruous. First, he shows that it is incongruous, if the preaching of the apostles were in vain or false; second, he shows that if it is incongruous, their faith would be in vain, at and if Christ be not risen again.
920. First, it is shown to be incongruous, because they would be false witnesses not only for saying vain things or things against any man falsely, which is a mortal sin, but false witnesses against God, which is a sacrilege. For if God did not raise Christ from the dead, we are found to be false witnesses; and if the dead do not rise, God did not raise Christ from the dead: will you speak falsely for God? (Job 13:7).
And this is the worst, namely, that something be attributed to God which he does not do and to praise in him what is not his. Hence Augustine says: when something false is praised in God, it is not lesser but a greater crime than if the truth were reviled. The reason for this is that our intellect can never praise God so much as not to fall short of his perfection; therefore, if the intellect knows every truth about God totally, this is due to God’s excellence. But if something he does not have to do is attributed to God, it seems that our intellect is greater than God and understands something greater than he, which is falsely attributed to him. And this is contrary to 1 John: God is greater than our heart (1 John 3:20).
921. And if Christ be not risen, your faith is in vain. Here he shows that it is incongruous, if their faith were vain. He shows this with three incongruities, which follow therefrom.
The first is that it is clear that falseness does not have the power to cleanse. But faith cleanses from sins: he cleansed their hearts by faith (Acts 15:9). If, therefore, our faith is in vain, which would be the case if Christ has not risen, because you did believe that he arose, your sins are not forgiven. And this is what he says: for you are yet in your sins.
922. But because someone could say: although faith does not cleanse sins, they can be cleansed by good works. Therefore, he adds a second incongruity, namely, that the dead, who cannot be cleansed in the other life, have perished without hope of salvation. And so, as if concluding, he says: they who are fallen asleep, i.e., died in hope of salvation, in Christ, i.e., in the faith of Christ, are perished, because in the other life, there are no meritorious works.
923. But because someone could still say: I do not care about sins, I do not care about the dead, as long as in this life I have peace and quiet. Therefore, he adds a third incongruity, when he says: if in this life only we have hope in Christ, we are of all men most miserable.
And he rests on this argument: if there is no resurrection of the dead, it follows that nothing good is possessed by men except in this life alone; and if this is so, then those who suffer many evils and tribulations in this life are more miserable. Therefore, since the apostles and Christians suffer many tribulations, it follows that they are more miserable than other men, who at least enjoy the good things of this world.
924. But there seem to be two doubts about this reasoning:
one is that what the Apostle says does not seem to be universally true, namely, that Christians are confident in this life only, because they could say that, although our bodies do not possess any good things except in this life, which is mortal, yet according to the soul they have many good things in the other life.
This can be turned aside in two ways: in one way, because if the resurrection of the body is denied, it is not easy, rather, it is difficult, to sustain the immortality of the soul. For it is clear that the soul is naturally united to the body and is departed from it, contrary to its nature and per accidens. Hence the soul devoid of its body is imperfect, as long as it is without the body. But it is impossible that what is natural and per se be finite and, as it were, nothing; and that which is against nature and per accidens be infinite, if the soul endures without the body. And so, the Platonists positing immortality, posited re-incorporation, although this is heretical. Therefore, if the dead do not rise, we will be confident only in this life.
In another way, because it is clear that man naturally desires his own salvation; but the soul, since it is part of man’s body, is not an entire man, and my soul is not I; hence, although the soul obtains salvation in another life, nevertheless, not I or any man. Furthermore, since man naturally desires salvation even of the body, a natural desire would be frustrated.
925. The second doubt is that it seems that if bodies do not rise, we Christians would be not more miserable than other men, because those who are in sins undergo greater labors: they have labored to commit iniquity (Jer 4:5); the impious say: we have walked difficult paths (Wis 5:7). But of the good and just it is said: the fruit of the Spirit is love, joy, peace (Gal 5:22).
The answer to this is that evils in this world are not to be sought as such, but inasmuch as they are directed to some good. But the apostles and Christians have suffered many evils in the world. Therefore, unless they were directed to some good, they would be more miserable than other men. Either they are directed to a future good or to a present good; but they are not ordained to a future good, if there is no resurrection of the dead.
But if they are ordained to a present good, this is either the good of the intellect, as philosophers of nature suffered poverty and many other evils, in order to know the truth. But it cannot be directed to this, if there is no resurrection of the dead, because then their faith would be false, because they preached a future resurrection. But falsity is not a good of the intellect. Or it is a good of morals, as moral philosophers suffered many evils to acquire virtues and fame. But neither can they be directed to this, because if there is no resurrection of the dead, it is not regarded as virtuous and glorious to wish to renounce all pleasant things and undergo the punishments of death and contempt; rather it is considered folly. And so it is clear that they would be more miserable than other men.