Sophist
StrangerBut this is utterly impossible.
StrangerThen only the third hypothesis remains.
StrangerFor, surely, either all things have communion with all; or nothing with any other thing; or some things communicate with some things and others not.
StrangerAnd two out of these three suppositions have been found to be impossible.
StrangerEvery one then, who desires to answer truly, will adopt the third and remaining hypothesis of the communion of some with some.
StrangerThis communion of some with some may be illustrated by the case of letters; for some letters do not fit each other, while others do.
StrangerAnd the vowels, especially, are a sort of bond which pervades all the other letters, so that without a vowel one consonant cannot be joined to another.
StrangerBut does every one know what letters will unite with what? Or is art required in order to do so?
TheaetetusArt is required.
StrangerWhat art?
TheaetetusThe art of grammar.
StrangerAnd is not this also true of sounds high and low?—Is not he who has the art to know what sounds mingle, a musician, and he who is ignorant, not a musician?
StrangerAnd we shall find this to be generally true of art or the absence of art.
StrangerAnd as classes are admitted by us in like manner to be some of them capable and others incapable of intermixture, must not he who would rightly show what kinds will unite and what will not, proceed by the help of science in the path of argument? And will he not ask if the connecting links are universal, and so capable of intermixture with all things; and again, in divisions, whether there are not other universal classes, which make them possible?
TheaetetusTo be sure he will require science, and, if I am not mistaken, the very greatest of all sciences.
StrangerHow are we to call it? By Zeus, have we not lighted unwittingly upon our free and noble science, and in looking for the Sophist have we not entertained the philosopher unawares?
TheaetetusWhat do you mean?
StrangerShould we not say that the division according to classes, which neither makes the same other, nor makes other the same, is the business of the dialectical science?
TheaetetusThat is what we should say.
StrangerThen, surely, he who can divide rightly is able to see clearly one form pervading a scattered multitude, and many different forms contained under one higher form; and again, one form knit together into a single whole and pervading many such wholes, and many forms, existing only in separation and isolation. This is the knowledge of classes which determines where they can have communion with one another and where not.
StrangerAnd the art of dialectic would be attributed by you only to the philosopher pure and true?
TheaetetusWho but he can be worthy?
StrangerIn this region we shall always discover the philosopher, if we look for him; like the Sophist, he is not easily discovered, but for a different reason.
TheaetetusFor what reason?
StrangerBecause the Sophist runs away into the darkness of not-being, in which he has learned by habit to feel about, and cannot be discovered because of the darkness of the place. Is not that true?
TheaetetusIt seems to be so.
StrangerAnd the philosopher, always holding converse through reason with the idea of being, is also dark from excess of light; for the souls of the many have no eye which can endure the vision of the divine.
TheaetetusYes; that seems to be quite as true as the other.
StrangerWell, the philosopher may hereafter be more fully considered by us, if we are disposed; but the Sophist must clearly not be allowed to escape until we have had a good look at him.
StrangerSince, then, we are agreed that some classes have a communion with one another, and others not, and some have communion with a few and others with many, and that there is no reason why some should not have universal communion with all, let us now pursue the enquiry, as the argument suggests, not in relation to all ideas, lest the multitude of them should confuse us, but let us select a few of those which are reckoned to be the principal ones, and consider their several natures and their capacity of communion with one another, in order that if we are not able to apprehend with perfect clearness the notions of being and not-being, we may at least not fall short in the consideration of them, so far as they come within the scope of the present enquiry, if peradventure we may be allowed to assert the reality of not-being, and yet escape unscathed.
TheaetetusWe must do so.
StrangerThe most important of all the genera are those which we were just now mentioning—being and rest and motion.
TheaetetusYes, by far.
StrangerAnd two of these are, as we affirm, incapable of communion with one another.
TheaetetusQuite incapable.
StrangerWhereas being surely has communion with both of them, for both of them are?
StrangerThat makes up three of them.
StrangerAnd each of them is other than the remaining two, but the same with itself.
StrangerBut then, what is the meaning of these two words, ‘same’ and ‘other’? Are they two new kinds other than the three, and yet always of necessity intermingling with them, and are we to have five kinds instead of three; or when we speak of the same and other, are we unconsciously speaking of one of the three first kinds?
TheaetetusVery likely we are.
StrangerBut, surely, motion and rest are neither the other nor the same.
TheaetetusHow is that?
StrangerWhatever we attribute to motion and rest in common, cannot be either of them.
TheaetetusWhy not?
StrangerBecause motion would be at rest and rest in motion, for either of them, being predicated of both, will compel the other to change into the opposite of its own nature, because partaking of its opposite.
StrangerYet they surely both partake of the same and of the other?
StrangerThen we must not assert that motion, any more than rest, is either the same or the other.
TheaetetusNo; we must not.
StrangerBut are we to conceive that being and the same are identical?
TheaetetusPossibly.
StrangerBut if they are identical, then again in saying that motion and rest have being, we should also be saying that they are the same.
TheaetetusWhich surely cannot be.
StrangerThen being and the same cannot be one.
TheaetetusScarcely.
StrangerThen we may suppose the same to be a fourth class, which is now to be added to the three others.
StrangerAnd shall we call the other a fifth class? Or should we consider being and other to be two names of the same class?
TheaetetusVery likely.
StrangerBut you would agree, if I am not mistaken, that existences are relative as well as absolute?
StrangerAnd the other is always relative to other?
StrangerBut this would not be the case unless being and the other entirely differed; for, if the other, like being, were absolute as well as relative, then there would have been a kind of other which was not other than other. And now we find that what is other must of necessity be what it is in relation to some other.
TheaetetusThat is the true state of the case.
StrangerThen we must admit the other as the fifth of our selected classes.
StrangerAnd the fifth class pervades all classes, for they all differ from one another, not by reason of their own nature, but because they partake of the idea of the other.
StrangerThen let us now put the case with reference to each of the five.
TheaetetusHow?
StrangerFirst there is motion, which we affirm to be absolutely ‘other’ than rest: what else can we say?
TheaetetusIt is so.
StrangerAnd therefore is not rest.
StrangerAnd yet is, because partaking of being.
StrangerAgain, motion is other than the same?
TheaetetusJust so.
StrangerAnd is therefore not the same.
TheaetetusIt is not.
StrangerYet, surely, motion is the same, because all things partake of the same.
StrangerThen we must admit, and not object to say, that motion is the same and is not the same, for we do not apply the terms ‘same’ and ‘not the same,’ in the same sense; but we call it the ‘same,’ in relation to itself, because partaking of the same; and not the same, because having communion with the other, it is thereby severed from the same, and has become not that but other, and is therefore rightly spoken of as ‘not the same.’
StrangerAnd if absolute motion in any point of view partook of rest, there would be no absurdity in calling motion stationary.
TheaetetusQuite right,—that is, on the supposition that some classes mingle with one another, and others not.
StrangerThat such a communion of kinds is according to nature, we had already proved before we arrived at this part of our discussion.
StrangerLet us proceed, then. May we not say that motion is other than the other, having been also proved by us to be other than the same and other than rest?
TheaetetusThat is certain.
StrangerThen, according to this view, motion is other and also not other?
StrangerWhat is the next step? Shall we say that motion is other than the three and not other than the fourth,—for we agreed that there are five classes about and in the sphere of which we proposed to make enquiry?
TheaetetusSurely we cannot admit that the number is less than it appeared to be just now.
StrangerThen we may without fear contend that motion is other than being?
TheaetetusWithout the least fear.
StrangerThe plain result is that motion, since it partakes of being, really is and also is not?
TheaetetusNothing can be plainer.
StrangerThen not-being necessarily exists in the case of motion and of every class; for the nature of the other entering into them all, makes each of them other than being, and so non-existent; and therefore of all of them, in like manner, we may truly say that they are not; and again, inasmuch as they partake of being, that they are and are existent.
TheaetetusSo we may assume.
StrangerEvery class, then, has plurality of being and infinity of not-being.
TheaetetusSo we must infer.
StrangerAnd being itself may be said to be other than the other kinds.
StrangerThen we may infer that being is not, in respect of as many other things as there are; for not-being these it is itself one, and is not the other things, which are infinite in number.
TheaetetusThat is not far from the truth.
StrangerAnd we must not quarrel with this result, since it is of the nature of classes to have communion with one another; and if any one denies our present statement [viz., that being is not, etc.], let him first argue with our former conclusion [i.e., respecting the communion of ideas], and then he may proceed to argue with what follows.
TheaetetusNothing can be fairer.
StrangerLet me ask you to consider a further question.
TheaetetusWhat question?
StrangerWhen we speak of not-being, we speak, I suppose, not of something opposed to being, but only different.
TheaetetusWhat do you mean?
StrangerWhen we speak of something as not great, does the expression seem to you to imply what is little any more than what is equal?
StrangerThe negative particles, ou and me, when prefixed to words, do not imply opposition, but only difference from the words, or more correctly from the things represented by the words, which follow them.
StrangerThere is another point to be considered, if you do not object.
TheaetetusWhat is it?
StrangerThe nature of the other appears to me to be divided into fractions like knowledge.
TheaetetusHow so?
StrangerKnowledge, like the other, is one; and yet the various parts of knowledge have each of them their own particular name, and hence there are many arts and kinds of knowledge.
StrangerAnd is not the case the same with the parts of the other, which is also one?
TheaetetusVery likely; but will you tell me how?
StrangerThere is some part of the other which is opposed to the beautiful?
TheaetetusThere is.
StrangerShall we say that this has or has not a name?
TheaetetusIt has; for whatever we call not-beautiful is other than the beautiful, not than something else.
StrangerAnd now tell me another thing.
TheaetetusWhat?
StrangerIs the not-beautiful anything but this—an existence parted off from a certain kind of existence, and again from another point of view opposed to an existing something?
StrangerThen the not-beautiful turns out to be the opposition of being to being?
StrangerBut upon this view, is the beautiful a more real and the not-beautiful a less real existence?
TheaetetusNot at all.
StrangerAnd the not-great may be said to exist, equally with the great?
StrangerAnd, in the same way, the just must be placed in the same category with the not-just—the one cannot be said to have any more existence than the other.
StrangerThe same may be said of other things; seeing that the nature of the other has a real existence, the parts of this nature must equally be supposed to exist.
StrangerThen, as would appear, the opposition of a part of the other, and of a part of being, to one another, is, if I may venture to say so, as truly essence as being itself, and implies not the opposite of being, but only what is other than being.
TheaetetusBeyond question.
StrangerWhat then shall we call it?
TheaetetusClearly, not-being; and this is the very nature for which the Sophist compelled us to search.
StrangerAnd has not this, as you were saying, as real an existence as any other class? May I not say with confidence that not-being has an assured existence, and a nature of its own? Just as the great was found to be great and the beautiful beautiful, and the not-great not-great, and the not-beautiful not-beautiful, in the same manner not-being has been found to be and is not-being, and is to be reckoned one among the many classes of being. Do you, Theaetetus, still feel any doubt of this?
TheaetetusNone whatever.
StrangerDo you observe that our scepticism has carried us beyond the range of Parmenides’ prohibition?
TheaetetusIn what?
StrangerWe have advanced to a further point, and shown him more than he forbad us to investigate.
TheaetetusHow is that?
StrangerWhy, because he says—
‘Not-being never is, and do thou keep thy thoughts from this way of enquiry.’
TheaetetusYes, he says so.
StrangerWhereas, we have not only proved that things which are not are, but we have shown what form of being not-being is; for we have shown that the nature of the other is, and is distributed over all things in their relations to one another, and whatever part of the other is contrasted with being, this is precisely what we have ventured to call not-being.
TheaetetusAnd surely, Stranger, we were quite right.
StrangerLet not any one say, then, that while affirming the opposition of not-being to being, we still assert the being of not-being; for as to whether there is an opposite of being, to that enquiry we have long said good-bye—it may or may not be, and may or may not be capable of definition. But as touching our present account of not-being, let a man either convince us of error, or, so long as he cannot, he too must say, as we are saying, that there is a communion of classes, and that being, and difference or other, traverse all things and mutually interpenetrate, so that the other partakes of being, and by reason of this participation is, and yet is not that of which it partakes, but other, and being other than being, it is clearly a necessity that not-being should be. And again, being, through partaking of the other, becomes a class other than the remaining classes, and being other than all of them, is not each one of them, and is not all the rest, so that undoubtedly there are thousands upon thousands of cases in which being is not, and all other things, whether regarded individually or collectively, in many respects are, and in many respects are not.
StrangerAnd he who is sceptical of this contradiction, must think how he can find something better to say; or if he sees a puzzle, and his pleasure is to drag words this way and that, the argument will prove to him, that he is not making a worthy use of his faculties; for there is no charm in such puzzles, and there is no difficulty in detecting them; but we can tell him of something else the pursuit of which is noble and also difficult.
TheaetetusWhat is it?
StrangerA thing of which I have already spoken;—letting alone these puzzles as involving no difficulty, he should be able to follow and criticize in detail every argument, and when a man says that the same is in a manner other, or that other is the same, to understand and refute him from his own point of view, and in the same respect in which he asserts either of these affections. But to show that somehow and in some sense the same is other, or the other same, or the great small, or the like unlike; and to delight in always bringing forward such contradictions, is no real refutation, but is clearly the new-born babe of some one who is only beginning to approach the problem of being.
StrangerFor certainly, my friend, the attempt to separate all existences from one another is a barbarism and utterly unworthy of an educated or philosophical mind.
TheaetetusWhy so?
StrangerThe attempt at universal separation is the final annihilation of all reasoning; for only by the union of conceptions with one another do we attain to discourse of reason.
StrangerAnd, observe that we were only just in time in making a resistance to such separatists, and compelling them to admit that one thing mingles with another.
TheaetetusWhy so?
StrangerWhy, that we might be able to assert discourse to be a kind of being; for if we could not, the worst of all consequences would follow; we should have no philosophy. Moreover, the necessity for determining the nature of discourse presses upon us at this moment; if utterly deprived of it, we could no more hold discourse; and deprived of it we should be if we admitted that there was no admixture of natures at all.
TheaetetusVery true. But I do not understand why at this moment we must determine the nature of discourse.
StrangerPerhaps you will see more clearly by the help of the following explanation.
TheaetetusWhat explanation?
StrangerNot-being has been acknowledged by us to be one among many classes diffused over all being.
StrangerAnd thence arises the question, whether not-being mingles with opinion and language.
TheaetetusHow so?
StrangerIf not-being has no part in the proposition, then all things must be true; but if not-being has a part, then false opinion and false speech are possible, for to think or to say what is not—is falsehood, which thus arises in the region of thought and in speech.
TheaetetusThat is quite true.
StrangerAnd where there is falsehood surely there must be deceit.
StrangerAnd if there is deceit, then all things must be full of idols and images and fancies.
StrangerInto that region the Sophist, as we said, made his escape, and, when he had got there, denied the very possibility of falsehood; no one, he argued, either conceived or uttered falsehood, inasmuch as not-being did not in any way partake of being.
StrangerAnd now, not-being has been shown to partake of being, and therefore he will not continue fighting in this direction, but he will probably say that some ideas partake of not-being, and some not, and that language and opinion are of the non-partaking class; and he will still fight to the death against the existence of the image-making and phantastic art, in which we have placed him, because, as he will say, opinion and language do not partake of not-being, and unless this participation exists, there can be no such thing as falsehood. And, with the view of meeting this evasion, we must begin by enquiring into the nature of language, opinion, and imagination, in order that when we find them we may find also that they have communion with not-being, and, having made out the connexion of them, may thus prove that falsehood exists; and therein we will imprison the Sophist, if he deserves it, or, if not, we will let him go again and look for him in another class.
TheaetetusCertainly, Stranger, there appears to be truth in what was said about the Sophist at first, that he was of a class not easily caught, for he seems to have abundance of defences, which he throws up, and which must every one of them be stormed before we can reach the man himself. And even now, we have with difficulty got through his first defence, which is the not-being of not-being, and lo! here is another; for we have still to show that falsehood exists in the sphere of language and opinion, and there will be another and another line of defence without end.
StrangerAny one, Theaetetus, who is able to advance even a little ought to be of good cheer, for what would he who is dispirited at a little progress do, if he were making none at all, or even undergoing a repulse? Such a faint heart, as the proverb says, will never take a city: but now that we have succeeded thus far, the citadel is ours, and what remains is easier.
StrangerThen, as I was saying, let us first of all obtain a conception of language and opinion, in order that we may have clearer grounds for determining, whether not-being has any concern with them, or whether they are both always true, and neither of them ever false.
StrangerThen, now, let us speak of names, as before we were speaking of ideas and letters; for that is the direction in which the answer may be expected.
TheaetetusAnd what is the question at issue about names?
StrangerThe question at issue is whether all names may be connected with one another, or none, or only some of them.
TheaetetusClearly the last is true.
StrangerI understand you to say that words which have a meaning when in sequence may be connected, but that words which have no meaning when in sequence cannot be connected?
TheaetetusWhat are you saying?
StrangerWhat I thought that you intended when you gave your assent; for there are two sorts of intimation of being which are given by the voice.
TheaetetusWhat are they?
StrangerOne of them is called nouns, and the other verbs.
TheaetetusDescribe them.
StrangerThat which denotes action we call a verb.
StrangerAnd the other, which is an articulate mark set on those who do the actions, we call a noun.
StrangerA succession of nouns only is not a sentence, any more than of verbs without nouns.
TheaetetusI do not understand you.
StrangerI see that when you gave your assent you had something else in your mind. But what I intended to say was, that a mere succession of nouns or of verbs is not discourse.
TheaetetusWhat do you mean?
StrangerI mean that words like ‘walks,’ ‘runs,’ ‘sleeps,’ or any other words which denote action, however many of them you string together, do not make discourse.
TheaetetusHow can they?
StrangerOr, again, when you say ‘lion,’ ‘stag,’ ‘horse,’ or any other words which denote agents—neither in this way of stringing words together do you attain to discourse; for there is no expression of action or inaction, or of the existence of existence or non-existence indicated by the sounds, until verbs are mingled with nouns; then the words fit, and the smallest combination of them forms language, and is the simplest and least form of discourse.
TheaetetusAgain I ask, What do you mean?
StrangerWhen any one says ‘A man learns,’ should you not call this the simplest and least of sentences?
StrangerYes, for he now arrives at the point of giving an intimation about something which is, or is becoming, or has become, or will be. And he not only names, but he does something, by connecting verbs with nouns; and therefore we say that he discourses, and to this connexion of words we give the name of discourse.
StrangerAnd as there are some things which fit one another, and other things which do not fit, so there are some vocal signs which do, and others which do not, combine and form discourse.
StrangerThere is another small matter.
TheaetetusWhat is it?
StrangerA sentence must and cannot help having a subject.
StrangerAnd must be of a certain quality.
StrangerAnd now let us mind what we are about.
TheaetetusWe must do so.
StrangerI will repeat a sentence to you in which a thing and an action are combined, by the help of a noun and a verb; and you shall tell me of whom the sentence speaks.
TheaetetusI will, to the best of my power.
Stranger‘Theaetetus sits’—not a very long sentence.
TheaetetusNot very.
StrangerOf whom does the sentence speak, and who is the subject? that is what you have to tell.
TheaetetusOf me; I am the subject.
StrangerOr this sentence, again—
TheaetetusWhat sentence?
Stranger‘Theaetetus, with whom I am now speaking, is flying.’
TheaetetusThat also is a sentence which will be admitted by every one to speak of me, and to apply to me.
StrangerWe agreed that every sentence must necessarily have a certain quality.
StrangerAnd what is the quality of each of these two sentences?
TheaetetusThe one, as I imagine, is false, and the other true.
StrangerThe true says what is true about you?
StrangerAnd the false says what is other than true?
StrangerAnd therefore speaks of things which are not as if they were?
StrangerAnd says that things are real of you which are not; for, as we were saying, in regard to each thing or person, there is much that is and much that is not.
StrangerThe second of the two sentences which related to you was first of all an example of the shortest form consistent with our definition.
TheaetetusYes, this was implied in recent admission.
StrangerAnd, in the second place, it related to a subject?
StrangerWho must be you, and can be nobody else?
TheaetetusUnquestionably.
StrangerAnd it would be no sentence at all if there were no subject, for, as we proved, a sentence which has no subject is impossible.
StrangerWhen other, then, is asserted of you as the same, and not-being as being, such a combination of nouns and verbs is really and truly false discourse.
StrangerAnd therefore thought, opinion, and imagination are now proved to exist in our minds both as true and false.
TheaetetusHow so?
StrangerYou will know better if you first gain a knowledge of what they are, and in what they severally differ from one another.
TheaetetusGive me the knowledge which you would wish me to gain.
StrangerAre not thought and speech the same, with this exception, that what is called thought is the unuttered conversation of the soul with herself?