Sophist
StrangerAnd there is the other, which they call ignorance, and which, because existing only in the soul, they will not allow to be vice.
TheaetetusI certainly admit what I at first disputed—that there are two kinds of vice in the soul, and that we ought to consider cowardice, intemperance, and injustice to be alike forms of disease in the soul, and ignorance, of which there are all sorts of varieties, to be deformity.
StrangerAnd in the case of the body are there not two arts which have to do with the two bodily states?
TheaetetusWhat are they?
StrangerThere is gymnastic, which has to do with deformity, and medicine, which has to do with disease.
StrangerAnd where there is insolence and injustice and cowardice, is not chastisement the art which is most required?
TheaetetusThat certainly appears to be the opinion of mankind.
StrangerAgain, of the various kinds of ignorance, may not instruction be rightly said to be the remedy?
StrangerAnd of the art of instruction, shall we say that there is one or many kinds? At any rate there are two principal ones. Think.
TheaetetusI will.
StrangerI believe that I can see how we shall soonest arrive at the answer to this question.
TheaetetusHow?
StrangerIf we can discover a line which divides ignorance into two halves. For a division of ignorance into two parts will certainly imply that the art of instruction is also twofold, answering to the two divisions of ignorance.
TheaetetusWell, and do you see what you are looking for?
StrangerI do seem to myself to see one very large and bad sort of ignorance which is quite separate, and may be weighed in the scale against all other sorts of ignorance put together.
TheaetetusWhat is it?
StrangerWhen a person supposes that he knows, and does not know; this appears to be the great source of all the errors of the intellect.
StrangerAnd this, if I am not mistaken, is the kind of ignorance which specially earns the title of stupidity.
StrangerWhat name, then, shall be given to the sort of instruction which gets rid of this?
TheaetetusThe instruction which you mean, Stranger, is, I should imagine, not the teaching of handicraft arts, but what, thanks to us, has been termed education in this part of the world.
StrangerYes, Theaetetus, and by nearly all Hellenes. But we have still to consider whether education admits of any further division.
TheaetetusWe have.
StrangerI think that there is a point at which such a division is possible.
TheaetetusWhere?
StrangerOf education, one method appears to be rougher, and another smoother.
TheaetetusHow are we to distinguish the two?
StrangerThere is the time-honoured mode which our fathers commonly practised towards their sons, and which is still adopted by many—either of roughly reproving their errors, or of gently advising them; which varieties may be correctly included under the general term of admonition.
StrangerBut whereas some appear to have arrived at the conclusion that all ignorance is involuntary, and that no one who thinks himself wise is willing to learn any of those things in which he is conscious of his own cleverness, and that the admonitory sort of instruction gives much trouble and does little good—
TheaetetusThere they are quite right.
StrangerAccordingly, they set to work to eradicate the spirit of conceit in another way.
TheaetetusIn what way?
StrangerThey cross-examine a man’s words, when he thinks that he is saying something and is really saying nothing, and easily convict him of inconsistencies in his opinions; these they then collect by the dialectical process, and placing them side by side, show that they contradict one another about the same things, in relation to the same things, and in the same respect. He, seeing this, is angry with himself, and grows gentle towards others, and thus is entirely delivered from great prejudices and harsh notions, in a way which is most amusing to the hearer, and produces the most lasting good effect on the person who is the subject of the operation. For as the physician considers that the body will receive no benefit from taking food until the internal obstacles have been removed, so the purifier of the soul is conscious that his patient will receive no benefit from the application of knowledge until he is refuted, and from refutation learns modesty; he must be purged of his prejudices first and made to think that he knows only what he knows, and no more.
TheaetetusThat is certainly the best and wisest state of mind.
StrangerFor all these reasons, Theaetetus, we must admit that refutation is the greatest and chiefest of purifications, and he who has not been refuted, though he be the Great King himself, is in an awful state of impurity; he is uninstructed and deformed in those things in which he who would be truly blessed ought to be fairest and purest.
StrangerAnd who are the ministers of this art? I am afraid to say the Sophists.
TheaetetusWhy?
StrangerLest we should assign to them too high a prerogative.
TheaetetusYet the Sophist has a certain likeness to our minister of purification.
StrangerYes, the same sort of likeness which a wolf, who is the fiercest of animals, has to a dog, who is the gentlest. But he who would not be found tripping, ought to be very careful in this matter of comparisons, for they are most slippery things. Nevertheless, let us assume that the Sophists are the men. I say this provisionally, for I think that the line which divides them will be marked enough if proper care is taken.
TheaetetusLikely enough.
StrangerLet us grant, then, that from the discerning art comes purification, and from purification let there be separated off a part which is concerned with the soul; of this mental purification instruction is a portion, and of instruction education, and of education, that refutation of vain conceit which has been discovered in the present argument; and let this be called by you and me the nobly-descended art of Sophistry.
TheaetetusVery well; and yet, considering the number of forms in which he has presented himself, I begin to doubt how I can with any truth or confidence describe the real nature of the Sophist.
StrangerYou naturally feel perplexed; and yet I think that he must be still more perplexed in his attempt to escape us, for as the proverb says, when every way is blocked, there is no escape; now, then, is the time of all others to set upon him.
StrangerFirst let us wait a moment and recover breath, and while we are resting, we may reckon up in how many forms he has appeared. In the first place, he was discovered to be a paid hunter after wealth and youth.
StrangerIn the second place, he was a merchant in the goods of the soul.
StrangerIn the third place, he has turned out to be a retailer of the same sort of wares.
TheaetetusYes; and in the fourth place, he himself manufactured the learned wares which he sold.
StrangerQuite right; I will try and remember the fifth myself. He belonged to the fighting class, and was further distinguished as a hero of debate, who professed the eristic art.
StrangerThe sixth point was doubtful, and yet we at last agreed that he was a purger of souls, who cleared away notions obstructive to knowledge.
StrangerDo you not see that when the professor of any art has one name and many kinds of knowledge, there must be something wrong? The multiplicity of names which is applied to him shows that the common principle to which all these branches of knowledge are tending, is not understood.
TheaetetusI should imagine this to be the case.
StrangerAt any rate we will understand him, and no indolence shall prevent us. Let us begin again, then, and re-examine some of our statements concerning the Sophist; there was one thing which appeared to me especially characteristic of him.
TheaetetusTo what are you referring?
StrangerWe were saying of him, if I am not mistaken, that he was a disputer?
TheaetetusWe were.
StrangerAnd does he not also teach others the art of disputation?
TheaetetusCertainly he does.
StrangerAnd about what does he profess that he teaches men to dispute? To begin at the beginning—Does he make them able to dispute about divine things, which are invisible to men in general?
TheaetetusAt any rate, he is said to do so.
StrangerAnd what do you say of the visible things in heaven and earth, and the like?
TheaetetusCertainly he disputes, and teaches to dispute about them.
StrangerThen, again, in private conversation, when any universal assertion is made about generation and essence, we know that such persons are tremendous argufiers, and are able to impart their own skill to others.
TheaetetusUndoubtedly.
StrangerAnd do they not profess to make men able to dispute about law and about politics in general?
TheaetetusWhy, no one would have anything to say to them, if they did not make these professions.
StrangerIn all and every art, what the craftsman ought to say in answer to any question is written down in a popular form, and he who likes may learn.
TheaetetusI suppose that you are referring to the precepts of Protagoras about wrestling and the other arts?
StrangerYes, my friend, and about a good many other things. In a word, is not the art of disputation a power of disputing about all things?
TheaetetusCertainly; there does not seem to be much which is left out.
StrangerBut oh! my dear youth, do you suppose this possible? for perhaps your young eyes may see things which to our duller sight do not appear.
TheaetetusTo what are you alluding? I do not think that I understand your present question.
StrangerI ask whether anybody can understand all things.
TheaetetusHappy would mankind be if such a thing were possible!
SocratesBut how can any one who is ignorant dispute in a rational manner against him who knows?
TheaetetusHe cannot.
StrangerThen why has the sophistical art such a mysterious power?
TheaetetusTo what do you refer?
StrangerHow do the Sophists make young men believe in their supreme and universal wisdom? For if they neither disputed nor were thought to dispute rightly, or being thought to do so were deemed no wiser for their controversial skill, then, to quote your own observation, no one would give them money or be willing to learn their art.
TheaetetusThey certainly would not.
StrangerBut they are willing.
TheaetetusYes, they are.
StrangerYes, and the reason, as I should imagine, is that they are supposed to have knowledge of those things about which they dispute?
StrangerAnd they dispute about all things?
StrangerAnd therefore, to their disciples, they appear to be all-wise?
StrangerBut they are not; for that was shown to be impossible.
TheaetetusImpossible, of course.
StrangerThen the Sophist has been shown to have a sort of conjectural or apparent knowledge only of all things, which is not the truth?
TheaetetusExactly; no better description of him could be given.
StrangerLet us now take an illustration, which will still more clearly explain his nature.
TheaetetusWhat is it?
StrangerI will tell you, and you shall answer me, giving your very closest attention. Suppose that a person were to profess, not that he could speak or dispute, but that he knew how to make and do all things, by a single art.
TheaetetusAll things?
StrangerI see that you do not understand the first word that I utter, for you do not understand the meaning of ‘all.’
TheaetetusNo, I do not.
StrangerUnder all things, I include you and me, and also animals and trees.
TheaetetusWhat do you mean?
StrangerSuppose a person to say that he will make you and me, and all creatures.
TheaetetusWhat would he mean by ‘making’? He cannot be a husbandman;—for you said that he is a maker of animals.
StrangerYes; and I say that he is also the maker of the sea, and the earth, and the heavens, and the gods, and of all other things; and, further, that he can make them in no time, and sell them for a few pence.
TheaetetusThat must be a jest.
StrangerAnd when a man says that he knows all things, and can teach them to another at a small cost, and in a short time, is not that a jest?
StrangerAnd is there any more artistic or graceful form of jest than imitation?
TheaetetusCertainly not; and imitation is a very comprehensive term, which includes under one class the most diverse sorts of things.
StrangerWe know, of course, that he who professes by one art to make all things is really a painter, and by the painter’s art makes resemblances of real things which have the same name with them; and he can deceive the less intelligent sort of young children, to whom he shows his pictures at a distance, into the belief that he has the absolute power of making whatever he likes.
StrangerAnd may there not be supposed to be an imitative art of reasoning? Is it not possible to enchant the hearts of young men by words poured through their ears, when they are still at a distance from the truth of facts, by exhibiting to them fictitious arguments, and making them think that they are true, and that the speaker is the wisest of men in all things?
TheaetetusYes; why should there not be another such art?
StrangerBut as time goes on, and their hearers advance in years, and come into closer contact with realities, and have learnt by sad experience to see and feel the truth of things, are not the greater part of them compelled to change many opinions which they formerly entertained, so that the great appears small to them, and the easy difficult, and all their dreamy speculations are overturned by the facts of life?
TheaetetusThat is my view, as far as I can judge, although, at my age, I may be one of those who see things at a distance only.
StrangerAnd the wish of all of us, who are your friends, is and always will be to bring you as near to the truth as we can without the sad reality. And now I should like you to tell me, whether the Sophist is not visibly a magician and imitator of true being; or are we still disposed to think that he may have a true knowledge of the various matters about which he disputes?
TheaetetusBut how can he, Stranger? Is there any doubt, after what has been said, that he is to be located in one of the divisions of children’s play?
StrangerThen we must place him in the class of magicians and mimics.
TheaetetusCertainly we must.
StrangerAnd now our business is not to let the animal out, for we have got him in a sort of dialectical net, and there is one thing which he decidedly will not escape.
TheaetetusWhat is that?
StrangerThe inference that he is a juggler.
TheaetetusPrecisely my own opinion of him.
StrangerThen, clearly, we ought as soon as possible to divide the image-making art, and go down into the net, and, if the Sophist does not run away from us, to seize him according to orders and deliver him over to reason, who is the lord of the hunt, and proclaim the capture of him; and if he creeps into the recesses of the imitative art, and secretes himself in one of them, to divide again and follow him up until in some sub-section of imitation he is caught. For our method of tackling each and all is one which neither he nor any other creature will ever escape in triumph.
TheaetetusWell said; and let us do as you propose.
StrangerWell, then, pursuing the same analytic method as before, I think that I can discern two divisions of the imitative art, but I am not as yet able to see in which of them the desired form is to be found.
TheaetetusWill you tell me first what are the two divisions of which you are speaking?
StrangerOne is the art of likeness-making;—generally a likeness of anything is made by producing a copy which is executed according to the proportions of the original, similar in length and breadth and depth, each thing receiving also its appropriate colour.
TheaetetusIs not this always the aim of imitation?
StrangerNot always; in works either of sculpture or of painting, which are of any magnitude, there is a certain degree of deception; for if artists were to give the true proportions of their fair works, the upper part, which is farther off, would appear to be out of proportion in comparison with the lower, which is nearer; and so they give up the truth in their images and make only the proportions which appear to be beautiful, disregarding the real ones.
StrangerAnd that which being other is also like, may we not fairly call a likeness or image?
StrangerAnd may we not, as I did just now, call that part of the imitative art which is concerned with making such images the art of likeness-making?
TheaetetusLet that be the name.
StrangerAnd what shall we call those resemblances of the beautiful, which appear such owing to the unfavourable position of the spectator, whereas if a person had the power of getting a correct view of works of such magnitude, they would appear not even like that to which they profess to be like? May we not call these ‘appearances,’ since they appear only and are not really like?
StrangerThere is a great deal of this kind of thing in painting, and in all imitation.
StrangerAnd may we not fairly call the sort of art, which produces an appearance and not an image, phantastic art?
TheaetetusMost fairly.
StrangerThese then are the two kinds of image-making—the art of making likenesses, and phantastic or the art of making appearances?
StrangerI was doubtful before in which of them I should place the Sophist, nor am I even now able to see clearly; verily he is a wonderful and inscrutable creature. And now in the cleverest manner he has got into an impossible place.
TheaetetusYes, he has.
StrangerDo you speak advisedly, or are you carried away at the moment by the habit of assenting into giving a hasty answer?
TheaetetusMay I ask to what you are referring?
StrangerMy dear friend, we are engaged in a very difficult speculation—there can be no doubt of that; for how a thing can appear and seem, and not be, or how a man can say a thing which is not true, has always been and still remains a very perplexing question. Can any one say or think that falsehood really exists, and avoid being caught in a contradiction? Indeed, Theaetetus, the task is a difficult one.
TheaetetusWhy?
StrangerHe who says that falsehood exists has the audacity to assert the being of not-being; for this is implied in the possibility of falsehood. But, my boy, in the days when I was a boy, the great Parmenides protested against this doctrine, and to the end of his life he continued to inculcate the same lesson—always repeating both in verse and out of verse:
‘Keep your mind from this way of enquiry, for never will you show that not-being is.’
Such is his testimony, which is confirmed by the very expression when sifted a little. Would you object to begin with the consideration of the words themselves?
TheaetetusNever mind about me; I am only desirous that you should carry on the argument in the best way, and that you should take me with you.
StrangerVery good; and now say, do we venture to utter the forbidden word ‘not-being’?
TheaetetusCertainly we do.
StrangerLet us be serious then, and consider the question neither in strife nor play: suppose that one of the hearers of Parmenides was asked, ‘To what is the term “not-being” to be applied?’—do you know what sort of object he would single out in reply, and what answer he would make to the enquirer?
TheaetetusThat is a difficult question, and one not to be answered at all by a person like myself.
StrangerThere is at any rate no difficulty in seeing that the predicate ‘not-being’ is not applicable to any being.
TheaetetusNone, certainly.
StrangerAnd if not to being, then not to something.
TheaetetusOf course not.
StrangerIt is also plain, that in speaking of something we speak of being, for to speak of an abstract something naked and isolated from all being is impossible.
TheaetetusImpossible.
StrangerYou mean by assenting to imply that he who says something must say some one thing?
StrangerSome in the singular (ti) you would say is the sign of one, some in the dual (tine) of two, some in the plural (tines) of many?
StrangerThen he who says ‘not something’ must say absolutely nothing.
TheaetetusMost assuredly.
StrangerAnd as we cannot admit that a man speaks and says nothing, he who says ‘not-being’ does not speak at all.
TheaetetusThe difficulty of the argument can no further go.
StrangerNot yet, my friend, is the time for such a word; for there still remains of all perplexities the first and greatest, touching the very foundation of the matter.
TheaetetusWhat do you mean? Do not be afraid to speak.
StrangerTo that which is, may be attributed some other thing which is?
StrangerBut can anything which is, be attributed to that which is not?
TheaetetusImpossible.
StrangerAnd all number is to be reckoned among things which are?
TheaetetusYes, surely number, if anything, has a real existence.
StrangerThen we must not attempt to attribute to not-being number either in the singular or plural?
TheaetetusThe argument implies that we should be wrong in doing so.
StrangerBut how can a man either express in words or even conceive in thought things which are not or a thing which is not without number?
TheaetetusHow indeed?
StrangerWhen we speak of things which are not, are we not attributing plurality to not-being?
StrangerBut, on the other hand, when we say ‘what is not,’ do we not attribute unity?
TheaetetusManifestly.
StrangerNevertheless, we maintain that you may not and ought not to attribute being to not-being?
StrangerDo you see, then, that not-being in itself can neither be spoken, uttered, or thought, but that it is unthinkable, unutterable, unspeakable, indescribable?
StrangerBut, if so, I was wrong in telling you just now that the difficulty which was coming is the greatest of all.
TheaetetusWhat! is there a greater still behind?
StrangerWell, I am surprised, after what has been said already, that you do not see the difficulty in which he who would refute the notion of not-being is involved. For he is compelled to contradict himself as soon as he makes the attempt.
TheaetetusWhat do you mean? Speak more clearly.
StrangerDo not expect clearness from me. For I, who maintain that not-being has no part either in the one or many, just now spoke and am still speaking of not-being as one; for I say ‘not-being.’ Do you understand?
StrangerAnd a little while ago I said that not-being is unutterable, unspeakable, indescribable: do you follow?
TheaetetusI do after a fashion.
StrangerWhen I introduced the word ’is,’ did I not contradict what I said before?
TheaetetusClearly.
StrangerAnd in using the singular verb, did I not speak of not-being as one?
StrangerAnd when I spoke of not-being as indescribable and unspeakable and unutterable, in using each of these words in the singular, did I not refer to not-being as one?
StrangerAnd yet we say that, strictly speaking, it should not be defined as one or many, and should not even be called ‘it,’ for the use of the word ‘it’ would imply a form of unity.
StrangerHow, then, can any one put any faith in me? For now, as always, I am unequal to the refutation of not-being. And therefore, as I was saying, do not look to me for the right way of speaking about not-being; but come, let us try the experiment with you.
TheaetetusWhat do you mean?
StrangerMake a noble effort, as becomes youth, and endeavour with all your might to speak of not-being in a right manner, without introducing into it either existence or unity or plurality.
TheaetetusIt would be a strange boldness in me which would attempt the task when I see you thus discomfited.
StrangerSay no more of ourselves; but until we find some one or other who can speak of not-being without number, we must acknowledge that the Sophist is a clever rogue who will not be got out of his hole.
StrangerAnd if we say to him that he professes an art of making appearances, he will grapple with us and retort our argument upon ourselves; and when we call him an image-maker he will say, ‘Pray what do you mean at all by an image?’—and I should like to know, Theaetetus, how we can possibly answer the younker’s question?
TheaetetusWe shall doubtless tell him of the images which are reflected in water or in mirrors; also of sculptures, pictures, and other duplicates.
StrangerI see, Theaetetus, that you have never made the acquaintance of the Sophist.
TheaetetusWhy do you think so?
StrangerHe will make believe to have his eyes shut, or to have none.
TheaetetusWhat do you mean?
StrangerWhen you tell him of something existing in a mirror, or in sculpture, and address him as though he had eyes, he will laugh you to scorn, and will pretend that he knows nothing of mirrors and streams, or of sight at all; he will say that he is asking about an idea.
TheaetetusWhat can he mean?
StrangerThe common notion pervading all these objects, which you speak of as many, and yet call by the single name of image, as though it were the unity under which they were all included. How will you maintain your ground against him?
TheaetetusHow, Stranger, can I describe an image except as something fashioned in the likeness of the true?
StrangerAnd do you mean this something to be some other true thing, or what do you mean?
TheaetetusCertainly not another true thing, but only a resemblance.
StrangerAnd you mean by true that which really is?
StrangerAnd the not true is that which is the opposite of the true?
StrangerA resemblance, then, is not really real, if, as you say, not true?
TheaetetusNay, but it is in a certain sense.
StrangerYou mean to say, not in a true sense?
TheaetetusYes; it is in reality only an image.
StrangerThen what we call an image is in reality really unreal.
TheaetetusIn what a strange complication of being and not-being we are involved!
StrangerStrange! I should think so. See how, by his reciprocation of opposites, the many-headed Sophist has compelled us, quite against our will, to admit the existence of not-being.
TheaetetusYes, indeed, I see.
StrangerThe difficulty is how to define his art without falling into a contradiction.
TheaetetusHow do you mean? And where does the danger lie?
StrangerWhen we say that he deceives us with an illusion, and that his art is illusory, do we mean that our soul is led by his art to think falsely, or what do we mean?
TheaetetusThere is nothing else to be said.
StrangerAgain, false opinion is that form of opinion which thinks the opposite of the truth:—You would assent?
StrangerYou mean to say that false opinion thinks what is not?
StrangerDoes false opinion think that things which are not are not, or that in a certain sense they are?
TheaetetusThings that are not must be imagined to exist in a certain sense, if any degree of falsehood is to be possible.