Enneads VI.2: The Categories of Plotinos
The Soul Is a Definite Essence as Particular Being
But what is the soul considered apart from all action, if we examine in her the part which does not work at formation of the bodies? Will not a plurality of powers still be found therein? As to world-Essence, nobody even thinks of depriving the soul of it. But is her acknowledged essence the same as that predicated of a stone? Surely not. Besides, even in the essence of the stone, “being” and “being a stone” are inseparable concepts, just as “being” and “being a soul” are, in the soul, but one and the same thing. Must we then regard as different in her essence on one side, and on the other the remainder (what constitutes the being); so that it would be the difference (proper to being) which, by being added to her, constituted the soul? No: the soul is no doubt a determinate essence; not as a “white man,” but only as a particular being; in other words, she has what she has by her very being.
THE ESSENCE OF THE SOUL DERIVES FROM ITS BEING; ADDING LIFE TO ESSENCE.
6. However, could we not say that the soul does not have all that she has through her being, in this sense, that in her we must distinguish on one hand essence, and on the other some kind of essence? If the soul possess such a kind of essence, and if this kind of essence come to her from without, the whole will no longer be the being of the soul so far as she is soul; only partially will it be the being of the soul, and not in totality. Besides, what would be the essence of the soul without the other things which constitute her being? Will the essence be the same for the soul as for the stone? Will we not rather have to insist that this essence of the soul derives from her very being; that this essence is her source and principle; or rather, that it is all that the soul is, and consequently is life; and finally that in the soul life and essence fuse?
SOUL UNITY DOES NOT RESEMBLE THE UNITY OF A REASON, INCLUDING PLURALITY.
Shall we say that this unity resembles that of a “reason” (of a form)? No. The substance of the soul is one; but such unity does not exclude duality or even plurality; for it admits of all the attributes essential to the soul.