Rhetorica ad Herennium, Liber Primus
Book One
I. Although we are hindered by family business and can scarcely find enough leisure for study, and although we have been accustomed to spend what leisure is given us rather on philosophy, yet your wish, Gaius Herennius, has moved us to write on the theory of speaking, lest you should think that we had refused or shunned the labour on your account. And we have undertaken this task the more eagerly because we understood that you had good reason to wish to learn rhetoric; for a copious and ready delivery has not little profit in itself, if it is guided by right understanding and a well-defined control of the mind.
For this reason we have left aside what the Greek writers took up out of empty arrogance. For they, so as not to seem to know too little, gathered together matters that had no bearing, that the art might be thought harder to learn; we, however, have taken up what seemed to belong to the theory of speaking. For we have come to write not, like the rest, moved by hope of gain or glory, but to comply with your wish by our diligence. Now, lest the discourse grow too long, we shall begin on the subject, once we have given you this one warning, that art without constant practice in speaking helps little, so that you may understand that this method of instruction must be adapted to exercise.
II. The duty of the orator is to be able to speak on those matters which have been established by custom and law for the use of citizens, with the assent of the hearers so far as that can be achieved. There are three kinds of causes which the orator must take up: the demonstrative, the deliberative, the judicial. The demonstrative is that which is devoted to the praise or censure of some particular person. The deliberative is that in consultation, which involves persuasion and dissuasion. The judicial is that which rests on a controversy, and which involves accusation or claim together with defence.
Now we shall teach what things the orator ought to have, then we shall show how these causes should be handled.
The orator, then, must have invention, arrangement, style, memory, delivery. Invention is the devising of matters true, or like the truth, that make the cause probable. Arrangement is the order and distribution of matters, showing what is to be placed in which positions. Style is the adaptation of suitable words and sentences to the matter invented. Memory is the firm hold of the mind on matters, words and arrangement. Delivery is the graceful control of voice, countenance and gesture.
All these we shall be able to attain by three means: art, imitation, practice. Art is a body of precepts which Since, then, it has been shown what causes the orator takes up and what things he ought to have, it now seems that we should say how the speech can be adapted to the method of the orator’s duties. 4 III. Invention is employed on six parts of a speech: the introduction, the statement of facts, the division, the proof, the refutation, the conclusion. The introduction is the beginning of the speech, by which the hearer’s mind is made ready to listen. The statement of facts is an exposition of events that have occurred or as though they had occurred. The division is that by which we make clear what is agreed, what is in controversy, and by which we set out the matters we are going to treat. The proof is the exposition of our arguments with assertion of them. The refutation is the dissolving of the contrary arguments. The conclusion is the artful end of the speech.
Now since, together with the duties of the orator, we have been led on to speak of the parts of the speech, that the matter might be easier to learn, and to adapt them to the method of invention, it seems that we should speak first of the introduction. 5 The cause having been set out, the kind of cause must be considered, that we may begin more fittingly. There are four kinds of causes: honourable, disgraceful, doubtful, petty. A cause is thought of the honourable kind when either we defend what seems to be defended by all, or shall attack what seems to all to be a thing that ought to be attacked, as in behalf of a brave man, or against a parricide. The disgraceful kind is understood when either an honourable cause is attacked or a base one defended. The doubtful kind is when the cause has in it a part of honour and a part of baseness. The petty kind is when a matter is brought forward that is despised. 6 IV. Since this is so, the method of introductions should be adapted to the kind of cause. There are two kinds of introductions: the direct opening, which in Greek is called prooemium, and the insinuation, which is called ephodos.
The direct opening is when we at once make the hearer’s mind well disposed to listen. This is done so that we may have hearers attentive, receptive and well-disposed. If the kind of cause is doubtful, we must see that that element of baseness cannot harm us. But if the kind of cause is petty, we shall make them attentive. If the kind of cause is disgraceful, we must use insinuation, of which we shall speak later, unless we have found some means by which, by accusing our adversaries, we can win goodwill. But if the kind of cause is honourable, it will be permissible either to use or not to use the direct opening. If we wish to use it, we shall have to show either why the cause is honourable, or briefly set out the matters we are going to speak of. But if we do not wish to use the direct opening, we shall have to take our beginning from the law, from a document, or from some support of our cause.
Since, then, we wish to have a hearer receptive, well-disposed and attentive, we shall show how each of these can be achieved. We shall be able to have receptive hearers if we set out the sum of the cause briefly and if we make them attentive; for he is receptive who wishes to listen attentively. We shall have them attentive if we promise to speak of matters great, new, unusual, or of those that concern the commonwealth, or the hearers themselves, or the worship of the immortal gods; and if we ask them to listen attentively; and if we set out in number the matters on which we are going to speak. We can make hearers well-disposed in four ways: from our own person, from the person of our adversaries, from the person of the hearers, and from the facts themselves.
V. From our own person we shall draw goodwill if we praise our service without arrogance, and make plain what we have been toward the commonwealth, or toward our parents, or our friends, or those who are listening, and if we mention something. . . provided all this is suited to the very matter in hand; likewise if we bring forward our own misfortunes, want, loneliness, calamity, and if we pray that they may be a help to us, and at the same time show that we did not wish to place our hope in others.
From the person of the adversaries goodwill will be sought if we bring them into hatred, ill-will and contempt. We shall draw them into hatred if we bring forward anything of theirs done foully, arrogantly, treacherously, cruelly, presumptuously. We shall draw them into ill-will if we bring forward their violence, power, party, riches, lack of self-restraint, high birth, dependants, ties of hospitality, fellowship, relations by marriage, and show that they trust in these supports rather than in the truth. We shall bring them into contempt if we bring forward the idleness, cowardice, sloth and luxury of our adversaries.
From the person of the hearers goodwill is gathered if we bring forward their acts as judged with courage, wisdom, gentleness and magnificence; and if we make plain what esteem there is of them, what expectation of their judgment.
From the facts themselves we shall make the hearer well-disposed if we exalt our own cause by praising it, and depress that of our adversaries by contempt.
VI. Next we must explain insinuation. There are three occasions on which we cannot use the direct opening, and these must be carefully considered: either when we have a disgraceful cause, that is, when the matter itself estranges the hearer’s mind from us; or when the hearer’s mind seems to have been won over by those who have spoken against us before; or when he is wearied by listening to those who have spoken earlier.
If the cause has an element of baseness, we shall be able to begin by these methods: that the man, not the matter, ought to be regarded; that the deeds alleged by our adversaries are displeasing to us ourselves, and are unworthy or wicked. Then, when we have long magnified the matter, we shall show that nothing like it was done by us; or we shall bring forward the judgment of some persons on a similar case, or the same, or a lesser, or a greater, and then approach our own cause step by step and draw the comparison. Likewise if we say that we shall not speak about our adversaries or about some matter, and yet speak of it covertly by the interposition of words. 10 If the hearer has been won over, if the speech of the adversaries has produced belief in the hearers (and we shall easily be able to know this, since we are not ignorant by what means belief is usually produced), then, if we think belief has been produced, we shall insinuate ourselves into the cause by these means: we shall promise to speak first of that which the adversaries have regarded as their strongest support; we shall begin from the adversary’s statement, and especially from what he said most recently; we shall use hesitation as to what in particular we should say or to what point we should first reply, together with astonishment.
If they are wearied by listening, we shall begin from something that can move laughter: a fable, a probable tale, a distorted imitation, a reversal, an ambiguity, a suspicion, a mockery, a piece of folly, an exaggeration, a collection of things, a pun, novelty, a story, a verse, an interruption or smile from someone; if we promise that we shall speak otherwise than we were prepared to; that we shall not speak in the way that others usually do; we shall briefly set out what others usually do and what we are going to do.
VII. Between insinuation and the direct opening this is the difference. The direct opening ought to be such that at once, by the openly stated methods which we have prescribed, we make the hearer either well-disposed or attentive or receptive; the insinuation ought to be such that secretly, by dissimulation, we bring about all those same effects, so that we may come to the same advantage in the work of speaking. But although these three advantages are to be secured in the whole speech, that is, that the hearers show themselves throughout attentive, receptive and well-disposed to us, yet it is chiefly through the introduction of the cause that this must be secured.
Now, that we may never use a faulty introduction, I shall teach what faults are to be avoided. In beginning a cause we must see that the language is gentle and the diction of the usual kind, so that the speech may not seem prepared. An introduction is faulty which can be adapted to several causes; this is called common. Likewise faulty is one which the adversary can use no less, which is called common also; likewise one which the adversary can use in the contrary sense. Likewise faulty is one composed of excessively elaborate words, or one too long; and one which does not seem born of the cause itself so as to cohere properly with the statement of facts; and one which makes the hearer neither well-disposed nor receptive nor attentive. VIII. Enough has been said of the introduction; let us pass next to 12 the statement of facts. There are three kinds of statements of fact. One is when we set out a deed done and draw each point to our own advantage for the sake of winning, which belongs to those causes on which a judgment is to be given. The second kind of statement is that which comes in at times for the sake of credibility, or accusation, or transition, or some preparation. The third kind is that which is remote from civil cases, yet in which it is proper to practise, that we may handle those former statements the more easily in causes 13. This statement has two kinds: one which rests on events, the other on persons.
That which rests on the exposition of events has three parts: myth, history, fiction. Myth is that which contains matters neither true nor like the truth, such as those handed down in tragedies. History is a deed done, but remote from the memory of our own age. Fiction is an invented matter which yet could have happened, like the plots of comedies.
That kind of statement which rests on persons ought to have liveliness of conversation, contrast of characters, gravity and gentleness, hope and fear, suspicion and longing, dissimulation and pity, variety of events, change of fortune, unexpected misfortune, sudden joy, a pleasant outcome. But these will be dealt with in practice; as to what pertains to the truth, we shall explain how it should be handled. 14 IX. Three things the statement of facts should have: that it be brief, clear and probable; and since we know it ought to be so, we must learn how to make it so.
We shall be able to narrate a matter briefly if we begin where it is necessary to begin, and if we do not wish to go back to the remotest origin; and if we narrate summarily, not in detail; and if we follow it not to the very end, but only as far as will be needed; and if we use no transitions, and do not stray from what we have begun to set out; and if we place the outcomes of events so that what was done before can be known as well, even though we have kept silent about it: for instance, if I say I have returned from the province, it is understood that I also set out to the province. And in general it is better to pass over not only what harms, but also what neither harms nor helps. And we must take care not to say the same thing twice or oftener; and not to say again what we have just said, in this fashion:
Simo arrived at Megara from Athens in the evening; when he arrived at Megara, he laid a snare for a maiden; after he had laid the snare, he offered violence on the spot.
15 We shall narrate a matter clearly if we set out first whatever was done first, and preserve the order of events and times as the deeds were done, or as they seem to have been capable of being done; here we must take care not to say anything confusedly, nothing involved, nothing strange, not to pass to another matter, not to go back to the remotest beginning, not to pursue things at length, not to omit anything that pertains to the matter; and if we follow the precepts that have been given about brevity, for the briefer the narrative, the clearer it will be and the easier to follow.
Plautus, Miles Gloriosus 439: I who yesterday came in the evening from Athens to Ephesus.
16 The statement will be probable if we speak as custom, opinion and nature demand; if the intervals of time, the dignities of persons, the reasons for plans, the suitability of places are consistent, so that it cannot be refuted that there was too little time, or no motive, or that the place was unsuitable, or that the men themselves could not have done or suffered the thing. If the matter is true, all these things must nonetheless be preserved in the narration, for truth often cannot produce belief unless they are preserved; but if the matter is invented, they must be preserved all the more. In matters where a document or the firm authority of some person seems to have been involved, one must invent with caution.
So far, I think, I agree with the other writers of the art, except that we have devised new things about insinuations, because we alone beyond the rest have divided it into three occasions, so that we might have a plainly certain way and clear method of introductions. X. Now, as to what remains: since we must discuss the invention of matters, in which the singular skill of the orator is spent, we shall take pains that we may seem to have inquired with as much industry as the usefulness of the subject demands, if first we say a few things about the division of causes.
17 The division of causes is distributed into two parts. First, the statement of facts being finished, we ought to make clear what we agree on with the adversaries, if what agrees is useful to us, and what remains in controversy, in this way: “That the mother was killed by Orestes I agree with my adversaries. Whether he acted rightly and whether he was permitted to do it, that is in controversy.” Likewise on the other side: “They admit that Agamemnon was killed by Clytemnestra; since that is so, they deny that I ought to have avenged my parent.”
Then, when we have done this, we ought to use the distribution. It is divided into two parts: enumeration and exposition. We shall use enumeration when we state the number of the matters on which we are going to speak. It ought not to exceed three parts in number; for it is dangerous that we should at any time say more or less, and it brings the hearer a suspicion of premeditation and artifice, which takes away credit from the speech. Exposition is when we set out briefly and completely the matters on which we are going to speak.
18 Now let us pass to proof and refutation. The whole hope of winning and the method of persuading rests on proof and refutation. For when we have set out our supports and dissolved the contrary ones, we shall of course have completed the orator’s task in full. XI. We shall be able to do both, then, if we have learned the issue of the cause. Others have made four issues of causes; our teacher thought there were three, not to detract anything from their invention, but to show that what they ought to have taught simply and in a single way they had distributed twofold and in two parts. An issue is the first clash of the defendant’s plea joined with the accuser’s charge. The issues, then, as The conjectural issue is when the controversy is about a fact, in this way: Ajax, in the forest, after he realised what he had done in his madness, fell upon his sword. Ulysses came up, saw him slain, and drew the bloody weapon from the body. Teucer came up and saw his brother slain and his brother’s enemy with a bloody sword. He brings a capital charge. Here the truth is sought by conjecture. The controversy will be about the fact; hence the issue of the cause is called conjectural. 19 The legal issue is when some controversy arises in the written text or out of the written text. It is divided into six parts: letter and intent, contrary laws, ambiguity, definition, transference, reasoning from analogy.
A controversy arises from letter and intent when the writer’s wish seems to disagree with the letter itself, in this way: suppose there is a law which orders that those who have abandoned a ship because of a storm lose everything, and that the ship and the rest belong to those who remained in the ship, if the ship is saved. Terrified by the greatness of the storm, all abandoned the ship, into a small boat; a sick man was not able to leave and flee. By chance and luck the ship was carried safe into harbour; the sick man took possession of it. The man to whom it had belonged claims the ship. This issue is legal, from letter and intent. 20 A controversy rests on contrary laws when one law orders or permits something, another forbids it to be done, in this way: A law forbids one who has been condemned for extortion to make a speech in the assembly; another law orders an augur to name in the assembly the man who seeks the place of a deceased augur. A certain augur, condemned for extortion, named a man to the place of the deceased; a fine is sought from him. The issue is legal, from contrary laws.
XII. A controversy arises from ambiguity when the writing signifies two or more meanings, in this way: A father of a family, when making his son his heir, bequeathed silver vessels to his wife in his will: “Let my heir give to my wife thirty pounds’ weight of silver vessels, such as she shall wish.” After his death the woman asks for the costly and magnificently chased vessels. The son says that he owes her what he himself wishes, to the weight of thirty pounds. The issue is legal, from ambiguity.
21 The cause rests on definition when the controversy is by what name the deed should be called. It is of this kind: When Lucius Saturninus was about to bring in a corn law at a price of five-sixths and one-third of an as, Quintus Caepio, who was at that time urban quaestor, told the senate that the treasury could not bear so great a largess. The senate decreed that if he brought that law to the people, he would seem to be acting against the commonwealth. Saturninus began to bring it in. His colleagues interposed their veto; he nevertheless brought the voting urn forward. Caepio, seeing him bring in the law against the commonwealth, with the colleagues vetoing, made an attack with good men, broke down the bridges, threw down the ballot boxes, and hindered the law from being passed. Caepio is charged with treason. The issue is legal, from definition. For the term itself is defined when it is asked what it is to diminish the majesty of the state.
22 A controversy arises from transference when the defendant says that the time must be deferred, or the accuser changed, or the judges changed. This part of the issue the Greeks use in the courts, we mostly in matters of civil law. In the courts, however, we do use it somewhat, as in this way: If someone is accused of embezzlement because he is said to have taken public silver vessels from a private place, he can say, having used a definition of what theft is and what embezzlement is, that he ought to be proceeded against for theft, not for embezzlement. This division of the legal issue seldom comes into court, because in private actions there are the praetor’s exceptions and the party who brought the action loses unless he had a right of action, and in public trials the laws provide that first, if it suits the defendant, a judgment be given on the accuser, whether he is permitted to accuse or not. 23 XIII. A controversy rests on reasoning from analogy when a matter comes to trial for which there is no law of its own, yet which is caught by some similarity from other laws. It is of this kind: Law: “If a man becomes insane, let the power over him and his property belong to his agnates and clansmen.” And a law: “He who is judged to have killed a parent, let him be carried, wrapped and bound in leather, into the flowing river.” And a law: “As the father of a family shall bequeath concerning his household or property, so let it be law.” And a law: “If the father of a family dies intestate, let his household and property belong to his agnates and clansmen.” Malleolus was judged to have killed his mother. When he was condemned, his head was at once wrapped in a wolf-skin bag and wooden shoes were put on his feet; he was led into prison. Those who defended him bring tablets into the prison and write a will in his presence, the witnesses were duly present; the penalty is exacted of him. Those who were heirs under the will enter upon the inheritance. The younger brother of Malleolus, who had attacked him in his peril, claims the inheritance by the law of agnation. Here no definite law on the matter is brought forward, and yet many are brought forward, from which reasoning arises as to why he could or could not make a will lawfully. The issue is legal, from reasoning from analogy.
We have shown what the parts of the legal issue are; now let us speak of the juridical issue. 24 XIV. The juridical issue is when the deed is agreed, but it is asked whether it was done rightly or wrongly. This issue has two parts, one of which is called absolute, the other assumptive.
The absolute is when we say that the very thing which was done was rightly done, with nothing else taken in from outside, of this kind: A certain mime-actor named the poet Accius by name on the stage. Accius brings an action for injury against him. He defends nothing else but that it is permitted to name him in whose name writings are given to be performed.
The assumptive part is when the defence is weak by itself and is made good by taking in an extraneous matter. The assumptive parts are four: concession, removal of the charge, transference of the charge, comparison.
Concession is when the defendant asks to be pardoned. It is divided into excuse and entreaty. Excuse is when the defendant denies that he did it deliberately. It is divided into inadvertence, chance, necessity: chance, as Caepio before the tribunes of the plebs about the loss of his army; inadvertence, as the man who punished a slave who had killed his master, whose brother he was, before he opened the tablets of the will, when that slave had been freed by the will; necessity, as the man who did not come on the day his leave expired because rivers had cut off the roads. Entreaty is when he confesses both that he has done wrong and that he did it deliberately, and yet asks that they take pity on him. This can hardly happen in a trial, except when we speak on behalf of one whose many good deeds are on record, in this way—we shall bring it in at a commonplace by amplification: “Even if he had done this, yet it would be fitting that he be pardoned for his former benefits; but he asks no pardon.” So it does not come into court, but such a cause can come before the senate, a general, or a council. 25 XV. A cause rests on transference of the charge when we do not deny that we did it, but say we were forced to do it by the wrongdoings of others; as Orestes when he defends himself, throwing the charge on his mother.
A cause rests on removal of the charge when we remove from ourselves not the charge but the very blame, and either transfer it to a man or lay it on some thing. It is transferred to a man, as if one were accused who admitted that he had killed Publius Sulpicius, and defended it as done by order of the consuls, and said that they had not only commanded it but also showed the reason why it was lawful to do it. It is laid on a thing, as if someone were forbidden by a decree of the plebs to do what he had been ordered to do under a will.
A cause rests on comparison when we say that it was necessary to do one or the other, and that what we did was the better to do. A cause of this kind is: Gaius Popilius, when he was besieged by the Gauls and could not flee in any way, came to a parley with the enemy’s leaders; he departed on terms that he leave the baggage and lead out the army. He judged it better to lose the baggage than the army. He led out the army, left the baggage. He is charged with treason.
XVI. I seem to have shown what the issues are and what the parts of the issues are. Now it must be shown in what manner and by what way they ought to be handled, if we first make clear what ought to be fixed upon by both sides in the cause, to which the whole method of the entire speech is to be directed.
26 When the issue has been found, the reason must at once be sought. The reason is that which makes the cause and holds the defence, in this way—that we may stay, for the sake of teaching, upon this cause especially: Orestes confesses that he killed his mother; unless he brings a reason for the deed, he will have overturned his defence. So he brings one which, if it were not present, there would not even be a cause. “For she,” he says, “had killed my father.” Therefore, as I showed, the reason is that which holds the defence, without which not even a slight doubt can stay a condemnation.
When the reason has been found, the support must be sought, that is, what holds the accusation, what is brought against the reason of the defence of which we have spoken. It will be set out in this way: When Orestes has used the reason thus, “I killed her rightly, for she had killed my father,” the accuser will use the support, thus: “But she ought not to have been killed by you, nor to pay the penalty uncondemned.”
We have taken careful pains to say briefly and clearly what had thus far to be said. Now since the size of this volume has grown enough, it is more convenient to set out the remaining matters in turn in a second book, lest weariness, because of the number of pages, hinder your mind. If these matters are completed more slowly than you desire, you will have to assign the cause to yourself. Nevertheless we shall hasten, and make up by industry what has been lost to business, so that in return for your kindness to us and our zeal for you we may most abundantly fulfil this task for your wish.