Rhetorica ad Herennium, Liber Tertius
Book Three
1 I. I believe it has been shown abundantly enough in the preceding books how the invention of matter is to be adapted to every judicial cause. Now I have transferred to this book the method of finding the matter that belongs to deliberative and demonstrative causes, so that the whole teaching on invention might be paid to you as soon as possible.
The remaining parts of the art were four. Three of them are treated in this book: arrangement, delivery and memory. Style, since it seemed to require more to be said, I have preferred to write up in the fourth book, which I shall send you, as I think, completed quickly, so that nothing of the art of rhetoric may be lacking to you. Meanwhile, pursue each earlier part, with me when you wish, and sometimes without me by reading, so that nothing may hinder you from advancing together with me toward this benefit. Now see that you give me your attention, and we shall go on to the teaching.
2 II. Deliberations are in part of such a kind that the question is which of two courses should rather be done, and in part of such a kind that one considers what is best of all to do. Which rather: for example, whether Carthage should be destroyed or left standing. What is best of all: for example, if Hannibal were taking counsel when he is summoned from Italy to Carthage. Again, some deliberations are to be consulted on for their own sake, as when the senate deliberates whether to ransom captives from the enemy or not; some come into deliberation and consultation because of some extraneous cause, as when the senate deliberates whether to release Scipio from the laws so that he may be made consul before the proper age; and some are to be deliberated both for their own sake and, still more, come into consultation because of an extraneous cause, as when the senate deliberates whether to give citizenship to the allies in the Italian war or not. In those causes where the nature of the matter itself makes the deliberation, the whole speech will be adapted to the matter itself; in those where an extraneous cause produces the deliberation, that very cause will have to be magnified or diminished.
It will be fitting for those who give an opinion to set before themselves advantage as the end of the whole speech, so that the whole plan of their speech is directed to it.
In civil deliberation advantage is divided into two parts: the safe and the honourable.
The safe is that which brings about the avoidance of present or approaching danger by any means. This is assigned to force and to craft, of which we shall take either one separately or both together. Force is shown in armies, fleets, arms, engines of war, levies of men, and other things of this kind. Craft is employed in money, promises, dissimulation, speed, falsehood, and other things which we shall speak of at a more suitable time, if ever we wish to write on military affairs or on the administration of the state.
The honourable is divided into the right and the praiseworthy. The right is what is done with virtue and duty. It is divided into prudence, justice, courage and moderation. Prudence is a shrewdness which by a certain reason can make a choice between good and evil. Prudence is also called the knowledge of a certain art; it is likewise called the memory of many things and experience in many affairs. Justice is equity giving to each thing its right according to the worth of each. Courage is the desire for great things, the contempt of lowly things, and the endurance of labour with a view to advantage. Moderation is a firm control of the mind over desire. 4 III. We shall use the parts of prudence in speaking if we compare advantages with disadvantages, urging that the one be pursued and the other avoided; or if in any matter we urge something in which we can have some training as to how or by what method each thing ought to be done; or if we advise something of which we can have a memory, either of present events or of things heard of; in which case we can easily persuade what we wish by bringing forward an example.
We shall use the parts of justice if we say that pity ought to be shown to the innocent and to suppliants; if we show that it is fitting to repay those who have deserved well; if we demonstrate that those who have deserved ill ought to be punished; if we hold that good faith must be strongly preserved; if we say that the laws and customs of the state ought to be admirably observed; if we say that alliances and friendships should be zealously cherished; if we show that the right which nature has established toward parents, gods and country must be religiously honoured; if we say that the ties of hospitality, clientage, kinship and marriage connection must be scrupulously kept; that we ought not to be swayed by price or favour; and if we say that equal right ought to be established for all. By these and like parts of justice, if we hold that some course in the assembly or in council ought to be taken, we shall show it to be just, and the contrary unjust. So it will happen that from the same topics we are prepared both to persuade and to dissuade. 5 But if we say that something is to be done in order to maintain courage, we shall show that great and lofty things ought to be pursued and sought; and likewise that brave men ought to despise lowly things unworthy of brave men, and judge them unsuited to their dignity. Also that they ought not to be turned from any honourable thing by the greatness of danger or toil; that death is to be held preferable to disgrace; that no pain should force a man to abandon duty; that no one should fear enmities for the truth of a matter; and that for country, parents, guests, friends, and the things which justice compels us to cherish, we ought to face any danger and undertake any labour.
We shall use the parts of moderation if we censure excessive desires for honour, money and the like; if we define each thing by a fixed limit of nature; if we show how far each has enough, dissuade from going too far, and fix a measure for each thing. Parts of this kind we shall urge to magnify virtue, and to diminish it if we dissuade from them, so that those things which I have shown above are diminished. For there will be no one who thinks that one should depart from virtue; but either the matter will be said not to be of a kind in which we can display outstanding virtue, or virtue will be said to consist in the contrary things rather than in these that are put forward. Likewise, if in any way we can, what the opponent will call justice we shall show to be cowardice, sloth and misplaced generosity; what they call prudence we shall say is foolish, garrulous and odious knowledge; what he will say is moderation, we shall say is inertia and dissolute negligence; what he has named courage, we shall call gladiatorial and thoughtless rashness.
7 IV. The praiseworthy is that which produces an honourable remembrance, both present and to come. We have separated this from the right, not because these four parts that are placed under the name of the right are not accustomed to give this remembrance of honour, but although the praiseworthy is born from the right, yet in speaking it must be treated apart from it. For it is not fitting to follow the right for the sake of praise alone, but if praise follows, the desire of seeking the right is doubled. When, therefore, it has been shown that a thing is right, we shall show it to be praiseworthy, either in the eyes of suitable men, as when something pleases the more honourable order which is disapproved by the baser order, or in the eyes of allies, or of all citizens, foreign nations, and our descendants.
Since the division of topics in deliberation is of this kind, the treatment of the whole cause will have to be explained briefly.
It will be permitted to begin either with the direct opening or with the subtle approach, or by the same methods as in a judicial cause. If any narrative of a matter occurs, it will have to be narrated in the same manner.
8 Since in causes of this kind the end is advantage, and it is divided into the safe and the honourable course, if we can show both, we shall promise in speaking that we will show both; if we are to show one, we shall state plainly what we are going to say. But if we say that our course is safe, we shall use the division into force and counsel. For what in teaching, to explain the matter clearly and impressively, we called craft, in speaking we shall call by the more honourable name of counsel. If we say that the reason for our opinion is right, and all the parts of the right occur, we shall use a fourfold division; if they do not occur, we shall set out in speaking as many as there are.
For confirmation and refutation we shall use our own topics, which we set out before, for confirming our points and refuting the contrary ones. The method of treating argumentation artfully will be sought from the second book. V. But if it should happen that in a deliberation one side speaks from the safe course and the other from the honourable opinion, as in the deliberation of those besieged by the Carthaginians who consider what to do, the man who advises the safe course will use these topics: that nothing is more useful than safety; that no one can exercise the virtues who has not placed his affairs in safety; that not even the gods help those who rashly send themselves into danger; 9 that nothing should be thought honourable which does not bring safety. The man who prefers the honourable to the safe will use these topics: that virtue must never be abandoned; that pain, if it is feared, or death, if it is dreaded, is lighter than disgrace and infamy; that one should consider what disgrace will follow; that, besides, one does not obtain immortality or everlasting safety, nor is it certain that by avoiding that danger one will not come into another; that it is glorious for virtue to go forth even beyond death; that fortune too is wont to help courage; that he lives safely who lives honourably, not he who is unharmed for the moment; and that he who lives disgracefully cannot remain safe forever.
In these and in judicial causes we are accustomed to use almost similar conclusions, except that here it is most helpful to bring forward as many examples of past deeds as possible. 10 VI. Now let us pass to the demonstrative kind of cause. Since this cause is divided into praise and blame, the things from which we establish praise will furnish blame from the contrary things. Praise, then, can concern external things, the body, and the mind.
External things are those which can befall by chance or by favourable or adverse fortune: birth, upbringing, wealth, powers, honours, citizenship, friendships, and the like, and their contraries. Of the body are those advantages or disadvantages which nature assigns to the body: swiftness, strength, beauty, health, and their contraries. Of the mind are those that rest on our judgment and thought: prudence, justice, courage, moderation, and their contraries. 11 The confirmation and refutation in a cause of this kind will therefore be this.
The opening is taken either from our own person, or from that of the man of whom we shall speak, or from that of those who will hear, or from the matter.
From our own person, if we praise: that we act from duty, because a bond of relationship intervenes; or from zeal, because his virtue is such that all ought to wish to commemorate it; or that it is right to show from the praise of others what kind of mind one has. If we blame: that we act deservedly, because we have been so treated; or from zeal, because we think it useful that his unique wickedness and worthlessness be known to all; or because it pleases us to show what pleases us by the blame of others.
From the person of him of whom we speak, if we praise: that we fear we may not be able to match his deeds with words; that all men ought to proclaim his virtues; that the deeds themselves surpass the eloquence of all who praise. If we blame, we shall say that what we have in view can be said in the contrary sense with a few words changed, as was shown a little above by way of example. 12 From the person of the hearers, if we praise: that since we do not praise before strangers, we shall say a few things merely by way of reminder; or if they are strangers, we shall ask that they wish to know such a man; that since those before whom we praise share the same zeal for virtue as he who is praised had or has, we hope we shall easily win their approval of his deeds. The blame is the contrary: that since they know him, we shall say little of his wickedness; but if they do not know, we shall ask that they come to know, so that they may be able to avoid wickedness; that since the hearers are unlike the man who is blamed, we hope they will strongly disapprove of his life.
From the matter itself: that we are uncertain what to praise most; that we fear that, when we have said much, we may omit more, and the like; and from these the contraries are taken for blame. As for the narrative, there will be none that necessarily follows; but if any occurs, when some deed of him of whom we speak must be narrated with praise or blame, the precept of narrating will be repeated from the first book.
We shall use this division: we shall set out what we are going to praise or blame; then we shall tell each thing in order as and when it was done, so that it may be understood what he did in each case safely and prudently. But it will be necessary to set out the virtues or vices of the mind; then to show how the advantages or disadvantages of the body or of external things were handled by the mind. We ought to use this order in setting out a life:
From external things: descent. In praise: from what ancestors he was born; if of good family, that he was equal or superior to them; if of humble family, that he found his protection in his own virtues, not in those of his ancestors. In blame: if of good family, that he was a disgrace to his ancestors; if of bad, that he was nevertheless a detriment even to these. Upbringing. In praise: that he was brought up well and honourably in good studies throughout his boyhood. In blame: . . . 14 Then one must pass to the advantages of the body: if nature gave him dignity and beauty, that it was an honour to him, not, as with others, a detriment and a disgrace; if he had outstanding strength and swiftness, we shall say these were acquired by honourable exercises and effort; if he had lasting health, by care and the restraint of desires. In blame, if he had these bodily advantages, we shall say he made bad use of what, like any gladiator, he had by chance and nature; if he had them not, we shall say that apart from beauty everything was lacking through his own fault and intemperance.
Then we shall return to external matters, and in these we shall consider what virtues or vices of mind there were; whether there was wealth or poverty, and what powers, what honours, what friendships, what enmities, and what he did bravely in carrying on enmities; for whose sake he undertook enmities; with what good faith, goodwill and duty he conducted his friendships; what sort of man he was in wealth or in poverty; what spirit he showed in exercising powers. If he has died, what kind of death was his, and what followed upon his death. 15 VIII. To all those matters in which a man’s mind is chiefly examined, those four virtues of the mind must be applied; so that, if we praise, we say that one thing was done justly, another bravely, another with moderation, another prudently; if we blame, we shall declare that one thing was done unjustly, another immoderately, another cowardly, another foolishly.
It is now clear from this arrangement how the threefold division of praise and blame is to be handled, if we add this too, that we need not apply all these parts to praise or blame, because often they do not occur at all, and often occur so slightly that they need not be mentioned. Therefore one should choose those parts which seem strongest.
We shall use brief conclusions, with an enumeration at the end of the cause; in the cause itself we shall interpose frequent short amplifications by means of commonplaces.
Nor should this kind of cause be treated more carelessly because it rarely occurs in life; for what may happen to have to be done some time, one ought still to wish to be able to do as suitably as possible; and even if this cause is less often handled by itself, yet in judicial and deliberative causes large parts often turn on praise or blame.
Therefore in this kind of cause too let us think that some effort should be spent.
Now, having finished the most difficult part of rhetoric, that is, invention, polished and adapted to every kind of cause, it is time to go on to the other parts. Next, therefore, we shall speak of arrangement.
16 IX. Since arrangement is that by which we reduce what we have invented into order, so that each thing is delivered in its fixed place, we must see what method it is fitting to follow in arranging. There are two kinds of arrangement: one proceeding from the institution of the art, the other adapted to the occasion of the moment.
We shall arrange from the institution of the art when we follow the precept which we set out in the first book, that is, when we use the opening, narrative, division, confirmation, refutation and conclusion, and follow this order in speaking as was prescribed above. Likewise, from the institution of the art we shall arrange not only whole causes throughout the speech, but also single arguments, as we taught in the second book: the proposition, the reason, the proof of the reason, the embellishment and the summing up.
17 This arrangement, then, is twofold: one through whole speeches, the other through arguments, proceeding from the institution of the art.
There is, however, another arrangement, which, when we must depart from the artificial order, is adapted to the occasion by the judgment of the orator; as if we should begin to speak from the narrative, or from some very strong argument, or from the reading of certain documents; or if we should use confirmation after the opening and then the narrative; or if we make any change of order of this kind; none of which should be done unless the cause demands it. For if the ears of the audience seem greatly dulled, and their minds wearied by the adversaries’ multitude of words, we can conveniently dispense with the opening and begin the cause either from the narrative or from some strong argument. Then, if it is convenient, which is not always necessary, we may return to the substance of the opening. X. If our cause seems to have such great difficulty that no one can hear an opening with a calm mind, we shall begin with the narrative and return to the substance of the opening. If the narrative is hardly credible, we shall begin with some strong argument. It is often necessary to use these changes and transpositions when the matter itself compels us to change the artificial arrangement artfully.
18 In the confirmation and refutation of arguments it is fitting to keep an arrangement of this kind: to place the strongest arguments in the first and last parts of the cause; to put in the middle the moderate ones, neither useless to say nor necessary to prove, which, if stated separately and singly, would be weak, but when joined with the rest become firm and probable. For immediately after the matter is narrated the mind of the hearer waits to see whether the cause can be confirmed in any way; therefore some strong argument must be brought in at once; and for the rest, since what has been said most recently is easily committed to memory, it is useful, when we cease speaking, to leave some fresh and very strong argument in the minds of the hearers. This arrangement of topics, like the drawing up of soldiers, can in speaking most easily bring victory, as the other does in fighting.
they have said it to be, and of the greatest force in persuading. We, for our part, would not readily say that one of the five things has the greatest power; but we would boldly affirm that there is outstanding great usefulness in delivery.
For apt inventions, elegant expressions of style, artful arrangements of the parts of the cause, and the careful memory of all these can avail no more without delivery than delivery alone can avail without them. Therefore, and because no one has written carefully on this matter (for all have thought it hardly possible to write clearly about voice, countenance and gesture, since these matters belong to our senses), and because we must strongly cultivate that part for speaking, the whole subject seems to need careful consideration.
Delivery, then, is divided into the form of the voice and the movement of the body. The form of the voice is that which has a certain character of its own, acquired by reason and effort. 20 It is divided into three parts: volume, stability and flexibility. Volume of voice is chiefly provided by nature; care increases it somewhat but chiefly preserves it. Stability of voice is chiefly provided by care; practice in declamation increases it somewhat and chiefly preserves it. Flexibility of voice, that is, that we may be able to turn it in speaking as suits us, will chiefly be produced by practice in declamation. Therefore, concerning volume of voice and the part of stability, since one is born of nature and the other acquired by care, it is not for us to advise anything, except that the method of caring for the voice should be sought from those who are not ignorant of that art. XII. It seems we must speak of that part of stability which is preserved by the method of declamation, and of flexibility of voice, which is most necessary to the orator, since this too is acquired by the regulation of declamation. 21 We can best preserve a firm voice in speaking if we deliver the openings in as calm and low a voice as possible. For the windpipe is injured if it is filled with sharp shouting before it has been soothed by a gentle voice. It is also fitting to use rather long intervals; for the voice is refreshed by breath and the windpipe rests in silence. In continuous shouting one must relax and pass to conversational tone; for changes make us unimpaired in every register of voice, since no kind of voice is exhausted. We ought also to avoid shrill exclamations; for a blow and wound to the windpipe is made by a shrill and overstrained cry, and all the brightness of the voice is used up in one shout. And toward the end of the speech it is fitting to say much continuously in one breath; for the throat is warmed, the windpipe is filled, and the voice, which has been handled in various ways, is brought back to a certain even and steady sound. How often a certain debt of gratitude is rightly owed to the nature of things, as happens in this matter! For what we say is useful for preserving the voice also bears on the pleasantness of delivery, so that what benefits our voice is also approved by the 22 goodwill of the hearer. A calm voice at the beginning is useful for stability. What is more unpleasant than shouting at the opening of a cause? Intervals strengthen the voice; they likewise make the thoughts more neat by dividing them and leave the hearer time to think. Relaxation from continuous shouting preserves the voice, and variety delights the hearer most, when it holds his attention by conversation or rouses it by shouting. A shrill exclamation wounds the voice; it also offends the hearer, for it has something unbecoming and suited rather to a woman’s screaming than to the dignity of a man speaking. Continuous voice at the end of the speech is a remedy for the voice. And does not this same thing most strongly warm the hearer’s mind at the conclusion of the whole cause? Since, then, the same things benefit the stability of the voice and the pleasantness of delivery, both matters will be spoken of together for the present: what seemed to bear on stability, and what was joined with pleasantness; the rest we shall say in its place a little later.
23 XIII. Flexibility of voice, since it wholly belongs to the orator’s training, must be considered by us more carefully. We divide it into conversation, debate and amplification. Conversation is relaxed speech and close to daily talk. Debate is sharp speech suited to proving and refuting. Amplification is speech which either leads the hearer’s mind to anger or draws it to pity.
Conversation is divided into four parts: dignity, explanation, narration and pleasantry. Dignity is speech with some gravity and a relaxed voice. Explanation is speech that teaches in a relaxed voice how something could or could not have been done. Narration is the setting out of things done, or of things as if done. Pleasantry is speech that can produce from some matter a modest and gentlemanly laughter.
Debate is divided into the sustained and the broken. The sustained is a noisy hastening of the delivery of the speech. The broken is, in debate, frequent speech with rare and brief pauses and sharp vociferation.
24 Amplification is divided into exhortation and complaint. Exhortation is speech which by magnifying some fault leads the hearer to anger. Complaint is speech which by magnifying misfortunes leads the hearer’s mind to pity.
Since, then, flexibility of voice is divided into three parts, and these parts are themselves distributed into eight others, it seems necessary to show what delivery is suitable to each of these eight.
XIV. When conversation is in the dignified style, one should use the full throat and a voice as calm and low as possible, yet in such a way that we do not pass from oratorical custom to the tragic. When it is in explanation, one should use a voice slightly thinned, with frequent pauses and divisions, so that in the very delivery we seem to plant and cut into the minds of the hearers the matters we explain. When conversation is in narration, varieties of voice are needed, so that we seem to narrate each thing as it was done. Whatever we wish to show was done vigorously, we shall change in all respects, now a little faster, now sharply, then gently, sadly, cheerfully, in the words as in the delivery. If sayings, questions, answers or expressions of wonder occur in the narrative, we shall carefully attend so as to express by the voice the feelings and minds of all the persons. 25 But if conversation is in pleasantry, with a lightly trembling voice, with a slight sign of laughter, without any suspicion of excessive guffawing, one should gently turn the words from serious talk to gentlemanly jest.
When we must debate, since this is to be done either by the sustained or by the broken manner: in the sustained, with the sound of the voice moderately increased, one must join the voice to the connected words and turn the sound, and finish the words quickly with a shout, so that the vociferation can keep pace with the rolling force of the speech. In the broken, one must give out an exclamation as clear as possible from the bottom of the throat, and we are told to spend as much space on each interval as we took on each exclamation.
In amplifications, with exhortation we shall use a very thin voice, a gentle shout, an even sound, frequent changes, and the greatest speed. In complaint we shall use a low voice, a falling sound, frequent pauses, long intervals and great changes.
XV. Enough has been said about the form of the voice; now it seems we must speak of the movement of the body. 26 Movement is a certain regulation of the gesture and countenance of the body which makes what is delivered more convincing. It is fitting, then, that there be modesty and keenness in the countenance, and in gesture neither elegance to be noticed nor ugliness, lest we seem to be actors or labourers. To the same parts into which the voice was divided, the scheme of bodily movement too seems to be adapted. For if the conversation is dignified, one must speak standing in place, with a light motion of the right hand, with cheerfulness, sadness or a moderate look of the face suited to the sense of what is said. If the conversation is in explanation, we shall lower the body slightly from the neck; for this is allowed, that we then bring our face as near as possible to the hearers when we wish to teach them something and urge them strongly. If the conversation is in narration, the same movement can be suitable which was shown a little before for dignity. If in pleasantry, we ought to show a certain cheerfulness in the face without change of gesture. 27 If we debate in the sustained manner, we shall use a swift arm, a mobile face and a sharp look. If the debate is in the broken manner, one should use a very swift stretching out of the arm, walking about, an occasional stamp of the right foot, and a sharp, fixed look.
If we use amplification by exhortation, it will be fitting to use a somewhat slower and more considered gesture, with the other things similar to those in debate by the sustained manner. If we use amplification by complaint, one should use slapping of the thighs and striking of the head, sometimes a calm and steady gesture, and a sad and troubled face.
I am not unaware how great a task I have undertaken in trying to express bodily movements in words and to imitate voices in writing. But I did not trust that it could be done, that matters of this kind could be written about conveniently enough, nor, if it could not be done, did I think what I have done would be useless, because here we wanted to advise what ought to be done; the rest we shall hand over to practice. This, however, one ought to know, that good delivery has this effect, that the matter seems to be spoken from the heart. 28 XVI. Now let us pass to memory, the treasury of things invented and the guardian of all the parts of rhetoric.
may all proceed from nature, another time more suitable for speaking will be given. For now, assuming that art and precept have much power in this matter, I shall speak of it accordingly. For it pleases us that there is an art; we shall disclose what sort it is.
There are, then, two memories: one natural, the other artificial. The natural is that which is implanted in our minds and born together with thought; the artificial is that which is strengthened by a certain training and the method of precept. But as in other matters goodness of natural talent often imitates teaching, and art in turn strengthens and increases the advantages of nature, so it happens in this matter that sometimes the natural memory, if it is given to anyone as 29 outstanding, resembles this artificial one, and in turn this artificial one retains the advantages of nature and enlarges them by the method of teaching. Therefore the natural memory too must be strengthened by precept so as to be outstanding, and this memory which is given by teaching needs talent. Nor does this happen more or less in this matter than in other arts, that talent shines through teaching and nature through precept. Therefore this training will be useful even to those who are naturally mindful, as you yourself will be able to understand a little later; and even if they, relying on talent, did not need us, there would still be just reason why we should wish to be a help to those who have less talent. Now we shall speak of the artificial memory.
XVII. Just as those who know letters can write what is dictated to them and recite what they have written, so those who have learned the art of memory can place in backgrounds what they have heard and deliver it from them from memory. For the backgrounds are very like wax tablets or paper, the images like letters, the arrangement and placing of the images like writing, and delivery like reading. If, then, we wish to remember many things, we must prepare many backgrounds for ourselves, so that we can place many images in many backgrounds. Likewise we think we ought to have these backgrounds in order, lest at any time by a disturbance of order we be hindered from following the images, at whatever background we please, whether from the upper or the lower part, and from delivering what has been entrusted to the backgrounds;
XVIII. for as, if we have seen a number of acquaintances standing in a row, it makes no difference to us whether we begin to say their names from the top, the bottom or the middle, so with backgrounds arranged in order it will happen that, prompted by the images, we can say in whatever direction and from whatever background we please what we have entrusted to the 31 backgrounds. Therefore it is advisable to prepare the backgrounds in order as well. The backgrounds which we have taken we must study thoroughly, so that they may stay with us permanently; for the images, like letters, are erased when we do not use them; the backgrounds, like wax, ought to remain. And lest by chance we be mistaken in the number of backgrounds, it is advisable to mark every fifth one; for example, if in the fifth we place a golden hand, and in the tenth some acquaintance whose first name is Decimus, then it will be easy to place similar marks in every fifth background thereafter.
XIX. It is also more convenient to prepare backgrounds in a deserted than in a crowded region, because the crowd and the walking about of people confuse and weaken the marks of the images, while solitude keeps the figures of the likenesses intact. Besides, backgrounds must be prepared that are unlike in form and nature, so that, being distinct, they can stand out; for if someone has taken many intercolumnar spaces, he will be confused by the similarity and not know what he placed in each background. Backgrounds should also be of moderate size and of medium kind; for those that are excessively large make the images vague, and those too narrow often do not seem able to hold the placing of images. 32 Then one should have backgrounds neither too brightly lit nor very dark, lest the images be blinded by darkness or glitter too much with splendour. It is advisable that the intervals between backgrounds be moderate, about thirty feet more or less; for like the sight, thought is less effective whether you remove what ought to be seen too far off or bring it very near.
But although it is easy for one who knows a little more to prepare as many suitable backgrounds as he likes, yet if anyone thinks he cannot find enough suitable ones, he may set up for himself as many as he wishes. For thought can embrace any region, and in it can build and design at its own pleasure the plan of some place. Therefore, if we are not content with this ready supply, we may establish for ourselves by our own thought a region, and prepare a most convenient arrangement of suitable backgrounds.
Enough has been said about backgrounds; now let us pass to the theory of images.
33 XX. Since, then, the images ought to be likenesses of things, we ought to select likenesses for ourselves from all things. Likenesses, then, are of two kinds. Likenesses of things are expressed when we prepare images that sum up the matters themselves; likenesses of words are established when the memory of each single name and word is marked by an image.
We often grasp the memory of a whole matter with one mark and a simple image; in this way, for example: if a prosecutor has said that a man was killed by poison by the accused, and has argued that it was done for the sake of an inheritance, and has said that there are many witnesses and accomplices in the matter. If we wish first to remember this, so that it may be ready for our defence, in the first background we shall form an image of the whole matter; we shall make the very man in question lie sick in bed, if we retain his appearance; if we have not known him, we shall take some sick man of no mean station, so that he may quickly come to mind. And we shall set the accused beside his bed, holding in his right hand a cup, in his left tablets, and on his fourth finger the testicles of a ram. In this way we can have the memory of the witnesses, of the inheritance and of the 34 man killed by poison. Likewise we shall place the other charges in order in the backgrounds one after another, and whenever we wish to remember the matter, if we use the arrangement of the forms and the careful marking of the images, we shall easily recover from memory what we want.
XXI. When we wish to express likenesses of words by images, we shall undertake more labour and exercise our talent more. We shall have to do it in this way: “Now the Atridae kings prepare their homeward journey.”
If we wish to remember this verse, it will be fitting to place in the first background Domitius raising his hands to heaven while he is beaten by the kings with rods of Marcus (Marcus Drusus); this will be “Now the kings prepare their homeward journey.” In the second background, Aesopus and Cimber are made up as for the Iphigenia, as Agamemnon and Menelaus; this will be “the Atridae prepare.” In this way all the words will be expressed. But this forming of images is effective when we have first roused the natural memory by this practice, that, after the verse is set down, we ourselves first run over it two or three times to ourselves, and then express the words by images. In this way teaching will be supplied to nature. For each, separated from the other, will be less firm, though in such a way that there is much more help in teaching and art. We should not be unwilling to teach this, if we did not fear that, were we to depart from our plan, this clear brevity of instruction would be less well preserved.
35 Now, since it usually happens that some images are strong, vivid and suited to prompting, and others weak and feeble, scarcely able to rouse the memory, we must consider the cause of each, so that, once the cause is known, we may know which images to avoid and which to follow.
XXII. Nature herself teaches us what ought to be done. For if we see things in life that are small, customary and daily, we are not accustomed to remember them, because the mind is moved by nothing new or wonderful; but if we see or hear something outstandingly base, dishonourable, unusual, great, incredible or ridiculous, we are accustomed to remember it for a long time. And so the things we see or hear before our eyes we mostly forget; what happened in boyhood we often remember best; and this can happen from no other cause than that customary things easily slip from memory, while striking 36 and new things stay longer in the mind. No one wonders at the rising, course and setting of the sun, because they happen often, but men wonder more at eclipses of the sun than of the moon, because the latter are more frequent. Nature thus teaches that she is not roused by the common and customary, but is moved by novelty and some striking matter. Let art, then, imitate nature, and find what she desires, and follow what she shows. For there is nothing that nature discovered last or teaching first; the beginnings of things proceed from talent, and their completions are acquired by discipline.
37 We must therefore set images of the kind that can stay longest in memory. This will happen if we establish likenesses as strongly marked as possible; if we place images that are not many or vague, but doing something; if we give them outstanding beauty or singular ugliness; if we adorn some, as with crowns or a purple robe, so that the likeness may be more marked for us; or if we disfigure them in some way, as if we introduce one bloodstained, or smeared with mud, or daubed with red paint, so that the form may be more striking; or if we assign some ridiculous features to the images, for this also will make us better able to remember. For things which we remember easily when real, it is not difficult to remember when invented and carefully marked. But it will be necessary to do this: to run over the first backgrounds quickly in the mind again and again, to renew the images.
XXIV. Now, lest you think the memory for words either too difficult or not useful enough, and be content with the memory for things alone, because it is both more useful and has more power, you must be told why we do not reject the memory for words. For we think that those who wish to do the easier things without labour and trouble should first be practised in the more difficult. Nor do we introduce this memory for words so that we may be able to remember verses, but so that by this exercise the memory for things, which bears upon real use, may be strengthened, and so that from this difficult habit we may pass without labour to that other faculty. But while in every discipline the teaching of the art is weak without the greatest constancy of practice, in mnemonics especially the doctrine avails least unless it is confirmed by industry, zeal, labour and diligence. You will be able to see to it that you have as many places as possible, and as well suited as possible to the precepts; it is fitting to practise daily in arranging the images. For we are not drawn away from this as we are sometimes drawn away from other studies by occupation; no cause can lead us away from it. For there is never a time when we do not wish to commit something to memory, and most of all when we are held back by some greater business. Therefore, since it is useful to remember easily, it does not escape you how useful it is, and with what labour it should be sought; which you will be able to judge once its usefulness is known. I do not intend to urge you to it in more words, lest we seem either to distrust your zeal or to have said less than the matter demands.
Of the fifth part of rhetoric we shall speak next. Meanwhile go over each of the earlier parts in your mind, and, what is most necessary, strengthen them by practice.