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Summa Theologica Suppl, q. 45: Of the Marriage Consent Considered in Itself

SUMMA THEOLOGICA — Supplement to Part III (compiled after Aquinas’s death from his Commentary on the Sentences) Matrimony
In the next place we have to consider the consent; and the first point to discuss is the consent considered in itself; the second is the consent confirmed by oath or by carnal intercourse; the third is compulsory consent and conditional consent; and the fourth is the object of the consent.
Under the first head there are five points of inquiry:
(1) Whether the consent is the efficient cause of matrimony?
(2) Whether the consent needs to be expressed in words?
(3) Whether consent given in words expressive of the future makes a marriage?
(4) Whether consent given in words expressive of the present, without inward consent, makes a true marriage outwardly?
(5) Whether consent given secretly in words expressive of the present makes a marriage?

Article 1. Whether consent is the efficient cause of matrimony?

Objection 1It would seem that consent is not the efficient cause of matrimony. For the sacraments depend not on the human will but on the Divine institution, as shown above (Sent. iv, D, 2; TP, Q[64], A[2]). But consent belongs to the human will. Therefore it is no more the cause of matrimony than of the other sacraments.
Objection 2Further, nothing is its own cause. But seemingly matrimony is nothing else than the consent, since it is the consent which signifies the union of Christ with the Church.
Objection 3Further, of one thing there should be one cause. Now there is one marriage between two persons, as stated above (Q[44], A[1]); whereas the consents of the two parties are distinct, for they are given by different persons and to different things, since on the one hand there is consent to take a husband, and on the other hand consent to take a wife. Therefore mutual consent is not the cause of matrimony.
On the contraryChrysostom [*Hom. xxxii in the Opus Imperfectum, falsely ascribed to St. John Chrysostom] says: "It is not coition but consent that makes a marriage."
Further, one person does not receive power over that which is at the free disposal of another, without the latter's consent. Now by marriage each of the married parties receives power over the other's body (1 Cor. 7:4), whereas hitherto each had free power over his own body. Therefore consent makes a marriage.
I answer thatIn every sacrament there is a spiritual operation by means of a material operation which signifies it; thus in Baptism the inward spiritual cleansing is effected by a bodily cleansing. Wherefore, since in matrimony there is a kind of spiritual joining together, in so far as matrimony is a sacrament, and a certain material joining together, in so far as it is directed to an office of nature and of civil life, it follows that the spiritual joining is the effect of the Divine power by means of the material joining. Therefore seeing that the joinings of material contracts are effected by mutual consent, it follows that the joining together of marriage is effected in the same way.
Reply to Objection 1The first cause of the sacraments is the Divine power which works in them the welfare of the soul; but the second or instrumental causes are material operations deriving their efficacy from the Divine institution, and thus consent is the cause in matrimony.
Reply to Objection 2Matrimony is not the consent itself, but the union of persons directed to one purpose, as stated above (Q[44], A[1]), and this union is the effect of the consent. Moreover, the consent, properly speaking, signifies not the union of Christ with the Church, but His will whereby His union with the Church was brought about.
Reply to Objection 3Just as marriage is one on the part of the object to which the union is directed, whereas it is more than one on the part of the persons united, so too the consent is one on the part of the thing consented to, namely the aforesaid union, whereas it is more than one on the part of the persons consenting. Nor is the direct object of consent a husband but union with a husband on the part of the wife, even as it is union with a wife on the part of the husband.