Commentaria in Deuteronomium
In like manner among the Gentiles, by common and natural consent, all things pertaining to the political government were ruled by the judgment of priests, as Strabo testifies of the Ethiopians (book xvii), Aelian of the Egyptians (Various History, book xiv, chap. xxxiv); of the Persians and their Magi, Eusebius in his Chronology, Agathias, book ii, and others; of the Athenians and the Areopagites, Josephus, Antiquities, book xiv, chap. xix; of the Gauls and the Druids, Caesar, Gallic War, book vi; of the Romans and their augurs, Cicero, On the Laws, book i, and others. If therefore (as Socrates says in Xenophon, Memorabilia, book iv) what has been observed by all nations is not sanctioned except by God, it must be said that, even if no law concerning these things appeared in the divine Scriptures, yet the judicial power of the priests, granted by divine instinct and right, would be held sufficiently proved from what has been said. Hence also in the beginning the Bishops of the Church were judges of causes, even civil ones, which were agitated among Christians, as in causes. I say therefore: God here ordains that the lesser judges of towns, in causes both sacred and political, namely in doubts, not so much of fact as of law and of the divine law, have recourse to the priests and to the high priest, who, explaining the sense and mind of the law, may decide the cause according to it.
For the laws, not only ceremonial but also judicial, which regarded the government of the commonwealth and polity, were prescribed by God, and set down in these sacred books, the explanation of which therefore belonged to the priests.
It was otherwise in causes and doubts of fact, or merely civil ones, namely such as were to be resolved not from the law of God but from right, either natural or positive human, and from reason; in these it was not needful to consult the priests (though they could, and often in fact did consult them), but either wise men, or secular judges and princes, such as were Othoniel, Gedeon, Jephte, etc.
Hence it follows that by “judge” here is understood either the high priest, as Vatablus will have, or his vicar, as Abulensis will have; or rather (as is gathered from vers. 12) the secular judge, say Cajetan, Lyranus, Sigonius and Oleaster, who had to follow the sentence of the priests and of the high priest, and was only its approver and executor: hence here the judgment of the priests and of the judge is joined, as if it were one and the same; and because otherwise the judge might have differed from the sentence of the priests, and so the litigants might have followed the sentence of the judge, leaving that of the priests and the high priest, which yet is here forbidden. Again, if the high priest and the judge disagreed between themselves, which was easy and likely, the suit could not have been ended and decided. Such lay judges, namely heads of families, King Josaphat joined to the priests in judging, as is plain from 2 Paralipomenon xix, 8. I except Samuel and any others who were judges and prophets at once. For these ruled and judged the people by the gift of prophecy, and so needed not the council of the priests. Hence the Hebrews refer this verse to the Sanhedrin, which was the supreme court, like a parliament, and judged concerning king, law and prophet, and that was the last appeal. Moreover the Sanhedrin consisted of seventy men, who were taken both from the priests and from the principal men of each tribe, as if these were here understood by “judge,” that is, judges, as the Chaldee renders it; as if to say: Thou shalt come to the priests and to the judges, that is, to the council of the Sanhedrin, in which are priests and secular judges, over all of whom the high priest presides. See Sigonius, book vi On the Republic of the Hebrews, chap. vii.
Vers. 10. 10. AND THOU SHALT DO WHATSOEVER THEY SHALL SAY THAT PRESIDE IN THE PLACE WHICH THE LORD SHALL CHOOSE.—In Hebrew it is: and thou shalt do according to the mouth of the word which they shall announce to thee from that place which Jehovah shall choose. Which Cajetan takes as if the law here commanded, in doubtful matters, to consult the oracle of God residing on the mercy-seat. But the words that follow signify that it belongs not to the oracle but to the knowledge and interpretation of the priests; for it follows: “And shall teach thee according to his law.” I confess, however, that if the pontiffs could not resolve these doubts from the law and from their own knowledge, they would have recurred to and consulted the oracle of God, as is plain from Numbers xxvii, 21.
Not as though the judgment of the priests is to be acquiesced in on this condition, namely, if it seem to the litigant, or to anyone else, to be according to the law of God: for thus this their judgment would be vain and void, and God would command in vain that recourse be had to them. For the party condemned by the priests could always say that they had not judged according to the law, and appeal to the law itself, and consequently a further judge and censor would have to be appointed, to judge whether the priests had rightly judged according to the law or not. Again, of this censor it could be doubted whether he had passed a true censure, and consequently it would have to be examined again by another, and this again by another, and this anew by yet another; thus there would be an appeal and progress to infinity, and causes would remain undecided, and suits be eternal and immortal.
These words, therefore, are to be taken assertively, as if to say: Subjects must acquiesce, and presuppose that the judgment of the priests and of the pontiff is given according to the law of God; for, as Malachias says, chap. ii, vers. 7: “The lips of the priest shall keep knowledge, and they shall seek the law at his mouth, because he is the angel of the Lord of hosts”; understand, unless the contrary is manifestly seen, namely that the pontiff judges expressly against the law and perverts the law; for then not he, but the law of God was to be obeyed. This sense is plain from the Hebrew, the Chaldee and the Septuagint, which read thus: Thou shalt do what they shall teach according to the mouth of the law (that is, according to the law, from the law) which they shall teach thee, and according to the judgment which they shall tell thee, thou shalt do.
12. REFUSE TO OBEY THE COMMANDMENT OF THE PRIEST (the high priest), WHO MINISTERETH AT THAT TIME TO THE LORD,—who, namely, at that time holds the pontificate.
AND THE DECREE OF THE JUDGE HE SHALL DIE.—For “ex,” correct to “et,” as the Roman editions correct; but the Hebrew, Chaldee and Greek have for “and” the word “or,” as if to say: He that will not obey the commandment of the pontiff, or the decree of the judge, shall die: hence Lyranus proves from this place that these must be taken disjunctively, as if: He who will not obey either the sentence of the pontiff in a sacred matter, or the decree of the lay judge in a civil, let him be punished with death, without any other cause or question. But this sense I refuted above.
I say therefore that the Hebrew au, “or,” is taken for “and,” both here and elsewhere, as Proverbs xxx, 31; Leviticus iv, 23 and 28; Numbers xxxv, 6. For here the words correspond and are to be referred to vers. 9: for those whom he there commands to be approached, he here commands to be heard and obeyed; but in vers. 9 it says: “Thou shalt come to the priests and to the judge,” where all the Hebrew, Greek and Latin codices have “and,” not “or”: therefore the Hebrew au, “or,” which is here, must likewise be taken for “and,” as if to say: He that will not obey the decree of the pontiff and judge, let him die; for the judgment of the pontiff and of the judge was the same, either because the pontiff and the judge were then the same person, as Vatablus and Abulensis will have; or because the secular judge was bound to conform his sentence to the sentence and decree of the priests and the pontiff, and ought to follow and execute it, as I said on vers. 9.
15. OUT OF THE NUMBER OF THY BRETHREN,—that is, of thy nation, of the Hebrews.
16. HE SHALL NOT MULTIPLY HORSES TO HIMSELF,—lest he trust in war to the multitude and strength of horses, because “a horse is a vain thing for safety: neither shall he be saved by the abundance of his strength,” Psalm xxxii; and lest he be lifted up to pride, and walk with great haughtiness and pomp, and so wish to lord it over the people, and lay heavy burdens and tributes on them to maintain his pomp, as Solomon did and sinned, who had forty thousand horses in stables, and twelve thousand chariots and horsemen. Whence many, and with reason, fear for the salvation of Solomon, and think him damned; for God seems to have granted him earthly glory in order to deprive him of heavenly and eternal glory. Let kings and princes note this.