The Philosophy of Law: General Divisions of the Metaphysic of Morals, II: Division of the Metaphysic of Morals according to Relations of Obligation
General Divisions of the Metaphysic of Morals, II: Division of the Metaphysic of Morals according to Relations of Obligation
As the Subjects between whom a relation of Ei«ht Duty is apprehended—whether it actually existor -admit of being conceived in various juridical itions to each other, another Division may be proposed from this point of view, as follows :—
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be put under Obligation by them.
3. 4.
The juridical Relation of Man The juridical Relation of Manto Beings who have only Duties to a Being who has only Rights and no Rights. and no Duties—(Goo).
VACAT.—There is no such Re- VACAT.—There is no such Relation. For such Beings would lation in mere Philosophy, because be Men without juridical Person- such a Being is not an object of ality, as Slaves or Bondsmen. possible experience.
A real relation between Right and Duty is therefore found, in this scheme, only in No. 2. The reason why such is not likewise found in No. 4 is, because it would constitute a transcendent Duty, that is, one to which no corresponding subject can be given that is external and capable of imposing Obligation. Consequently the Relation from the theoretical point of view is here merely ideal; that is, it is a Relation to an object of thought which we form for ourselves. But the conception of this, object is not entirely empty. On the contrary, it is a fruitful conception in relation to ourselves and the maxims of our inner morality, and therefore in relation: to practice generally. And it is in this bearing, that all V the Duty involved and practicable for us in such a merely ideal relation lies.