Part I, Chapter 8: Of Complex Terms, and their Universality or Particularity
WE sometimes join to a term various other terms, which, together, constitute in our minds a total idea; and it often happens that we can affirm or deny of the whole, what we could not affirm or deny of the terms taken separately: Examples of complex terms are—a prudent man, a transparent body, Alexander the son of Philip.
This addition is often made by the relative pronoun, as if I say:—A body WHICH is transparent; Alexander, WHO is the son of Philip; the Pope, who is the vicar of Jesus Christ. We may, indeed, say, that though the relative be not always expressed, it is always in some sort understood, since it may be expressed, if we will, without changing the proposition; for it is the same thing to say,—a body transparent, or a body which is transparent.
What is most worthy of remark in these complex terms is, that the addition which we make to a term is of two kinds,—one which we call explicative; the other, determinative.
This addition may be termed simply explicative, when it only develops what is involved in the comprehension of the idea of the first term, or, at least, what agrees with it as one of its accidents, provided it agrees with it generally, and in the whole of its extension: as when I say, Man, who is an animal endowed with reason; or, Man who naturally desires to be happy; or, Man, who is mortal. These additions are only explicatives, since they do not change at all the total idea of the word man, or restrict it to signify only a part of man, but mark only what belongs to all men.
All the additions which are made to names, which distinctly mark out an individual, are of this sort; as when we say, Paris, which is the largest city of Europe; Julius Caesar, who was the greatest commander the world ever saw; Aristotle, the prince of philosophers; Louis XIV., King of France. For individual terms, distinctly expressed, are always taken in all their extension, having been determined as far as possible.
Another kind of addition, which may be called determinative, is, when that which is added to a general word restricts its signification, and causes that general word to be taken no longer in all its extension, but only in some part of that extension: as when I say transparent bodies, learned men, reasonable animal. These additions are not simply explications, but determinations, since they restrict the extension of the first term, causing the word body to signify only some part of bodies; the word man, only some part of men; the word animal, only a part of animals.
And these additions are sometimes such, that they render a general word individual, when there are added to it individual conditions: as, when I say. The Pope who now is, this determines the general word pope to the single person of Alexander VII.
We may distinguish two kinds of complex terms,—one in the expression, and the other in the meaning alone. The first are those whose addition is expressed, such as all the examples to which we have heretofore referred. The last are those, one of whose terms is not expressed, but understood simply: as when we say, in France, the king, it is a complex term in meaning, because we have in our minds, in pronouncing the word king, not only the general idea which answers to that term, but we mentally add thereto the idea of Louis XIV., who is now king of France. There are a multitude of terms in the ordinary discourse of men which are complex in this way,—as the name of master in each family, &c.
There are words, even, which are complex in expression on one account, and also in meaning on another: as when we say, The prince of philosophers, there is a complex term in the expression, since the word prince is determined by that of philosopher; but in relation to Aristotle, who is denoted in the schools by this word, it is complex in meaning only, since the idea of Aristotle is in the mind alone, without being expressed by any sound which distinguishes him in particular.
All connotative or adjective terms are either parts of a complex term, when their substantive is expressed or are complex in meaning, when it is understood; for, as was said in Chapter II., these connotative terms denote, directly, though more confusedly, a subject,—and indirectly, though more distinctly, the form or mode; and thus the subject is only an idea very general and confused, sometimes of a being, sometimes of a body, which is more commonly determined by a distinct idea of the form which is joined to it: as, Album signifies a thing which has whiteness, which determines the confused idea of a thing to represent those only which have that quality.
But what is more remarkable in these complex terms is, that there are some which are determined, in reality, to a single individual, and which still preserve a certain equivocal universality, which may be called an equivocation through mistake, because men, still agreeing that the term signifies only a single thing, for want of clearly discriminating what that single thing really is, apply it, some to one thing, some to another, which makes it necessary for it to be still determined, either by various circumstances or by what follows, in order that we may know exactly what it means. Thus the word true religion signifies a single and unique religion, which is in reality the Catholic, it being the only one which is true. But since each body and each sect believes that its own religion is the true one, this word is very equivocal, though by mistake, in the mouths of men. And when we read in a history that a prince was zealous for the true religion, we cannot say what was intended thereby, unless we know what was the religion of the historian; for, if he was a Protestant, it would mean the Protestant religion; if it was a Mohammedan Arab, who spoke thus of his prince, it would refer to the Mohammedan religion; and we could not determine that it was the Catholic religion unless we knew that the historian was a Catholic.
The complex terms which are thus equivocal through mistake, are principally those which involve qualities of which the senses do not judge, but the mind only, on which men may easily have different opinions. If I say, for example, that only men of six feet high were enrolled in the army of Marius, the complex term, men of six feet, is not liable to the equivocation through mistake, since it is very easy to measure men, in order to determine if they are six feet; but if it had been said that only valiant men should be enrolled, the term valiant men would have been more subject to the equivocation through mistake, that is to say, to be attributed to those men who were thought to be valiant, and were really not so.
The terms of comparison are also very subject to become equivocations through mistake:—the greatest geometer of Paris—the most learned man—the most dexterous—the richest; for though these terms may be determined by individual conditions, there being only one man who is the greatest geometer in Paris, that word may, nevertheless, be easily attributed to many, though it belongs only in reality to one, because it is very easy for men to be divided in opinion on this subject, and that thus each will give that name to the man whom he believes to be superior to the others.
The words, meaning of an author—doctrine of an author on such a subject—are also of this number, especially when an author has been so wanting in clearness, as to render it a matter of dispute what his opinion was, as we see the philosophers continually dispute about the opinions of Aristotle, each dragging him to his own side; for though Aristotle had only a single and unique sense on a given subject, nevertheless, as he is differently understood, these words, opinion of Aristotle, are equivocations through mistake, because each calls the opinion of Aristotle that which he understands to be his true opinion; and thus, one understanding one thing, and another, the terms opinion of Aristotle on such a subject, however individual they may be in themselves, will belong to many things, viz., to all the different opinions which may be attributed to him,—and they will express in the mouth of each person that which each may conceive to be the opinion of that philosopher.
But in order to understand better in what consists the equivocations in these terms, which we have called equivocations through mistake, it must be remarked that these words are connotatives, either expressly or in signification. Now, as we have already said, we ought to consider, in connotative words, the subject which is directly, but confusedly expressed, and the form or mode which is distinctly, though indirectly, expressed. Thus white signifies a body confusedly; and whiteness, distinctly. Opinion of Aristotle signifies, confusedly, some opinion, some thought, some doctrine; and distinctly, the relation of that thought to Aristotle, to whom it is attributed. Now when there happens any equivocation in these words, it is not properly because of this form or mode, which, being distinct, is invariable; nor is it because of the subject confused, when it remains in that confusion. For example, the expression prince of philosophers can never be equivocal, so long as this idea—-prince of philosophers—is not applied to any individual distinctly known; but the equivocation happens solely because the mind, in the place of that subject confused, often substitutes a subject distinct and determinate, to which it attributes the form and mode; for, since men have different opinions on this subject, they may give that quality to different persons, and denote them afterwards by this word, which they believe belongs to them, as formerly Plato was known by the name of prince of philosophers, and now Aristotle.
The expression, true religion, not being connected with the distinct idea of any particular religion, and remaining in its confused idea, is not equivocal, since it signifies only that which is in fact the true religion. But when the mind has joined that idea of true religion to a distinct idea of a given particular form of worship distinctly known, that expression becomes very equivocal, and signifies, in the mouth of each body, the form of worship which it considers as the true.
It is the same, also, with these words—opinion of such a philosopher on such a subject—for, remaining in their general idea, they signify, simply and generally, the doctrine which this philosopher had taught on that subject, as that which Aristotle taught on the nature of the soul—id quod sensU talis scriptor—and this id, that is to say, this doctrine, remaining in its confused idea, without being applied to a distinct idea, these words are not at all equivocal; but when, in place of that id confused, of that doctrine confusedly conceived, the mind substitutes a distinct doctrine and a distinct subject, then that term will become equivocal, according to the various distinct ideas which may be substituted for it. Thus the opinion of Aristotle, touching the nature of the soul, is an equivocal expression in the mouth of Pomponacius, who maintained that he believed it mortal; and in the mouths of many other interpreters of that philosopher, who maintained, on the contrary, that he believed it immortal, as well as his masters, Plato and Socrates. And hence it happens that these kind of words may often express a thing to which the form, indirectly expressed, does not belong. Supposing, for example, that Philip had not been really the father of Alexander, as Alexander himself wished to have it believed, the expression, son of Philip, which signifies, generally, one who was begotten by Philip, being applied through mistake to Alexander, would signify a person who was not truly the son of Philip.
The expression, sense of Scripture, being applied by a heretic to an error contrary to Scripture, would signify, in his mouth, that error which he believes to be the sense of Scripture, and which he will, in that opinion, call sense of Scripture. Hence the Calvinists are not more Catholic for protesting that they follow only the Word of God, for these words—Word of God—signify, in their mouth, all the errors which they falsely take to be the Word of God.