Part I, Chapter 14: Of another Sort of Definition of Names, through which their Ordinary Signification is denoted
ALL that we have said about the definition of names is to be understood only of those in which an author defines the words which he especially employs; and it is this which renders them free and arbitrary, since it is allowed to every one to employ whatever sound he pleases to express his ideas, provided he explains beforehand the use of them. But as men are only masters of their own language, and not of that of others, each has, indeed, the right to make a dictionary for himself; but he has no right either to make one for others, or to explain their language by the peculiar signification which he has attached to words. Thus, when we undertake to explain, not simply in what sense we take a word, but also that in which it is commonly taken, the definitions which we give of it are by no means arbitrary; they are bound and restricted to represent, not the truth of the things but the truth of the custom; and they are to be reckoned false if they do not faithfully express this custom—that is to say, if they do not join to sounds the same ideas which are connected with them, in the ordinary meaning of those who employ them. And this shows, also, that these definitions are by no means free from being contested, since disputes continually arise touching the signification which custom gives to terms.
Now, although this species of verbal definitions seems to belong to grammarians, since it is their office to compile dictionaries, which are nothing but an explanation of the ideas which men have agreed to connect with certain sounds; we may, nevertheless, make several reflections in reference to this subject, which are very important to the exactness of our judgments.
The first, which may serve as a foundation for others is, that men very often do not consider the entire signification of words,—that is to say, that words often express more than they seem to do; and when we would explain the signification of them, we do not represent the whole impression which they make on the mind. For to signify, in relation to a sound uttered or written is only to excite an idea connected with that sound in our mind, by striking our ears or our eyes. Now it often happens that a word, besides the principal idea which we regard as the proper signification of that word, excites many other ideas, which may be termed accessory, to which we pay but little attention, though the mind receives the impression of them.
For example, if one says to another, You lied there, and we regard only the principal signification of that expression, is the same thing as if he had said to him, You know the contrary of what you say. But, besides this principal signification, these words convey an idea of contempt and outrage; and they inspire the belief that he who uttered them would not hesitate to do us harm, which renders them offensive and injurious.
Sometimes these accessory ideas are not attached to words by common custom, but are joined to them only by him who uses them. And these are properly those which are excited by the tone of the voice, by the expression of the countenance, by gestures, and other natural signs, which attach to our words a multitude of ideas, which diversify, change, diminish, and augment their signification, by joining to them the image of the emotions, the judgments, and the opinions of him who speaks.
Wherefore, if he who said that it was necessary to modulate the tone of our voice to the ears of him who listens, meant to say that it was enough, if we only spoke loud enough to be heard, he knew not a great part of the use of the voice, since the tone signifies often as much as the words themselves. There is a voice for instruction, flattery, and for reproof; and often it is, indeed, not only to reach the ears of him to whom it is spoken, but to strike them, and pierce them. No one would take it well, for instance, if a servant, whom he was reproving somewhat sharply, should answer, Speak lower, sir, I hear you well enough; since the tone constitutes part of the reproof, and it is necessary to convey to the mind the idea you wish to impress on it.
But sometimes these accessory ideas are attached to the words themselves, since they are excited commonly by all those who pronounce them. And this constitutes the difference between expressions which appear to signify the same thing: some being offensive, others kind; some modest, others impudent; some virtuous, others vicious;—since, besides the principal idea to which they belong, men attach to them other ideas, which is the cause of this diversity.
This remark will enable us to point out an injustice, very common among those who complain of the reproaches which they have received,—which is that of changing substantives into adjectives; so that, if they have been accused of ignorance or imposture, they say that they have been called ignorant men, or impostors, which is unreasonable, since these words do not signify the same thing; for the adjective words, ignorant, or impostor, besides the signification of blame which they denote, involve also the idea of contempt; whereas those of ignorance, or imposture, denote the thing just as it is, without aggravation or palliation. We may find others which signify the same thing, in a way that would involve a softening idea, and which would evince a desire to spare the feelings of him against whom the reproaches were made. And these are the ways which the wise and moral will choose, at least when they have no special reason to act with greater severity. Hence, we may perceive the difference between a simple style and a figurative style, and how the same thoughts appear to us much more lively when they are expressed by a figure, than when they are contained in expressions quite simple. For this happens, because the figurative expressions signify, besides the principal thing, the emotion and passion of him who speaks, and thus impress both ideas upon the mind; whereas a simple expression denotes the naked truth alone. For example, if this half verse of Virgil, Usque adeone mori miserum est?—were expressed simply, and without a figure, thus—Non est usque adeo mori miserum,—it cannot be doubted that it would have much less force. And the reason is, that the first expression signifies much more than the second; for it expresses not only the thought that death is not so great an evil as it is supposed to be, but it represents, further, the idea of a man who challenges death, and who looks it fearlessly in the face,—an image much more lively than the thought itself with which it is connected. Thus it is not wonderful that it strikes us more, since the mind is instructed by the images of truths, while it is rarely excited, except by the image of emotions.
" Si vis me flere, dolendum est Primum ipsi tibi.”
But since the figurative style commonly expresses, with the things, the emotions which we experience, in conceiving or speaking of them, we may judge the use which ought to be made of it, and what are the subjects to which it is adapted. It is clear that it is ridiculous to employ it in matters purely speculative, which are regarded with a tranquil eye, and which produce no emotion in the mind.
For, since figures express the emotions of our soul, those which are introduced into subjects, where the mind is not moved, are emotions contrary to nature, and a species of convulsions. This is why there are few things so disagreeable, as to hear certain preachers who declaim indifferently on everything, and who are as much excited in philosophic arguments as in truths the most awakening, and the most necessary to salvation.
While, on the contrary, when the matter of which we treat is such, that we ought properly to be affected, it is a defect to speak of it in a dry and cold manner, and without emotion, since it is a defect not to be touched by that which ought to affect us.
Thus divine truths, being propounded, not simply for the purpose of being known, but also much more, in order that they may be loved, revered, and adored by men,—the noble, exalted, and figurative style in which the holy fathers have treated of them, is, without doubt, much better adapted to them than the bare, unfigurative style of the scholastics; since it not only teaches us these truths, but represents to us also the feelings of love and of reverence with which the fathers spoke of them; and which, conveying thus to our minds the image of that holy disposition, may contribute much towards impressing the like on us; whereas the scholastic style being simple, and recognising only ideas of the naked truth, is less capable of producing in the soul the emotions of love and respect which we ought to have for Christian truths, and renders them in this respect, not only less useful, but also less agreeable,—the pleasure of the soul consisting more in feeling emotions than acquiring knowledges.
Finally, the same remark will enable us to answer that celebrated question of the ancient philosophers, Whether there be unchaste words? and to refute the reasons of the Stoics, who maintained that we might employ, indifferently, expressions which are commonly reckoned obscene and impudent.
They maintain, says Cicero, in a letter which he wrote on this subject, that there are no words either lewd or shameful. For the infamy, say they, either comes from the things, or is in the words. It does not arise exclusively from the things, since we may express them in other words, which are not considered unchaste. Neither is in the words, considered as sounds; since it often happens as Cicero shows, that the same sound signifies different things, and is considered unchaste in one signification and not so in another.
But all this is but a vain subtilety, which arises solely from these philosophers not having considered sufficiently those accessory ideas which the mind joins to the principal ideas of things, for hence it comes to pass, that the same thing may be expressed chastely by one sound, and unchastely by another, if one of these sounds joins to it some other idea, which hides the infamy of it, and if another, on the contrary, presents it to the mind in a shameless manner. Thus the words adultery, incest, abominable sin, are not infamous, though they represent actions which are very infamous, since they represent them only as covered with a veil of horror, which causes them to be regarded exclusively as crimes; so that these words signify rather the crime of these actions than these actions themselves; whereas there are certain other words which express them, without exciting horror, and rather as pleasant than as criminal, which even connect with them an idea of impudence and effrontery. And these are those which are called unchaste and infamous.
It is the same also with certain circumstances by which we express, chastely, certain actions, which, though lawful, partake somewhat of the corruption of nature. For these circumlocutions are, in reality, chaste, since they express not only the things, but also the disposition of him who speaks of them in this way, and who shows by his reserve, that he hides them as much as possible, both from himself and others; whereas those who should speak of them in another manner, would show that they delighted in considering these kind of objects: and that delight being infamous, it is not wonderful that the words which express that idea should be considered unchaste.
Hence it sometimes happens also, that the same word is reckoned chaste at one time, and immodest at another. This obliged the Hebrew doctors to substitute, in certain parts of the Bible, Hebrew words in the margin, to be used by those who read it in place of those which the Scriptures use. For this arose from the fact that these words, when the prophets employed them, were not unchaste, as they were connected with some idea which caused these objects to be regarded with modesty and reserve; but afterwards, that idea having been separated from them, and custom having joined to them another of impudence and effrontery, they became immodest; and it is with reason, in order that bad idea might not strike the mind, that the Rabbins wished others to be pronounced instead of them, in reading the Bible, although they did not, on that account, change the text.
Thus it was a bad defence made by an author, who was bound to a strict modesty by his religious profession, and who was reproached, with reason, for having employed an unchaste word to express an infamous place, to allege that the fathers had not scrupled to employ the term lupanar, and that we often find in their writings meretrix, leno, and others, which would hardly be endured in our language; for the freedom with which the fathers employed these words, ought to have taught him that they were not reckoned shameful in their time, that is to say, there was not then connected with them that idea of effrontery which renders them infamous now; and he did wrong to conclude thence, that he might be allowed to employ those which are reckoned immodest in our language, because these words do not signify, in fact, the same thing as those which the fathers used, since, beside the principal idea which belongs to them, they involve also the image of a bad inclination of the mind, and one which partakes, to some extent, of libertinism and impudence.
These accessory ideas being therefore so important, and diversifying so widely the principal significations, it would be useful for the authors of dictionaries to indicate them, and to make known, for example, the words which are offensive, polite, abusive, chaste, unchaste; or rather, that they should throw aside these last altogether, since it is always better to be ignorant of them, than to know them.