Part II, Chapter 1: Of Words in their relation to Propositions
As it is our design to explain here the various reflections which men have made on their judgments, and as these judgments are propositions which are composed of various parts, it is necessary to begin with the explanation of these parts, which are principally nouns, pronouns, and verbs.
It is of little importance to examine whether it belongs to grammar or to logic to treat of these things; it is enough to say, that everything which is of use to the end of any art, belongs to it, whether that knowledge be special to it, or whether it be common also to other arts and sciences which contribute to it.
Now, it is certainly of some use to the end which logic contemplates—that of thinking well—to understand the different uses of the sounds which are devoted to the expression of our ideas, and which the mind is accustomed to connect so thoroughly, that it scarcely conceives the one without the other; so that the idea of the thing excites the idea of the sound, and the idea of sound, that of the thing.
We may say, in general, on this subject, that WORDS are sounds distinct and articulate, when men have taken as signs to express what passes in their mind; and since that which passes there may be reduced to conceiving, judging, reasoning, and disposing, as we have already said; words serve to indicate all these operations, and those which have been invented for this purpose, are principally of three kinds, which are essential, and of which it will be sufficient to speak. These are nouns, pronouns, and verbs, which take the place of nouns, but in a different way. It will be here necessary to explain this more in detail.
The objects of our thoughts being, as we have already said, either things, or modes of things, the words set apart to signify both things and modes are called nouns.
Those which signify things are called NOUNS SUBSTANTIVE, as earth, sun. Those which signify modes—marking, however, at the same time, the subject, of which they are the modes—are called NOUNS ADJECTIVE, as good, just, round.
This is why—when, by mental abstraction, we conceive these modes without connecting them with any subject, since they then subsist in some sort by themselves, in the mind—they are expressed by a substantive word, as wisdom, whiteness, colour.
And, on the contrary, when that which is of itself the substance of a thing, comes to be conceived in relation to another subject, the words which express it in this relation become adjectives, as human, carnal; and, taking away from these adjectives formed from nouns of substance, their relation to these, they are made substantives anew. Thus, after having formed from the substantive word homo (homme), the adjective human, we form from the adjective human, the substantive humanity. But the reason why we do not express the substantive to which they are related is, that it is a general substantive, which comprehends all the subjects of these modes, and is hence unique in that generality. Thus, red is everything red; white, everything white; or, as it is said in geometry, any red thing [rubrum quodcunque]. These adjectives have, therefore, essentially two significations: the one distinct, which is that of a mode or manner; the other confused, which is that of the subject. But though the signification of mode may be more distinct, it is nevertheless indirect; and, on the contrary, that of subject, though confused, is direct. The word white (eandidum) signifies directly, but confusedly, the subject, and indirectly, though distinctly, whiteness.
The use of pronouns is to occupy the place of nouns, and thus enable us to avoid a too tedious repetition; but we are not to imagine that, in taking the place of nouns, they produce entirely the same effect on the mind. This is by no means true; on the contrary, they remove the disgust felt at repetition only because they represent nouns, but in a confused manner. Nouns disclose, in some sort, the things to the mind; pronouns present them, as it were, veiled, though the mind perceives, nevertheless, that they are the same things as those signified by the nouns. This is why no inconvenience arises from the noun and the pronoun being joined together: Tu Phaedria, Ecce ego Joannes.
Men perceiving that it was often useless and ungraceful to name themselves, introduced the pronoun of the first person to supply the place of him who speaks, ego (moi, je). And in order that they may not be obliged to name the person to whom they spoke, they have thought good to denote him by a word, which they have called the pronoun of the second person, thou, or you; while, in order that they might not be obliged to repeat the names of other persons and things of which they speak, they have invented pronouns of the third person—ille, illa, illud. Among these, there are some which point out, as with a finger, the thing spoken of, and are hence called demonstratives—hic, iste—this, that; there are also some which are called reciprocal, because they denote the relation of a thing to itself, as the pronoun—sui, sibi, se—Cato slew himself.
All the pronouns have, as we already said, this in common: they mark confusedly the noun whose place they occupy; but there is this specially in the neuter of these pronouns, illud, hoc, when it is taken absolutely, that is to say, without a noun expressed: that whereas the other kinds are often, indeed almost always, related to distinct ideas, which they, nevertheless, denote only confusedly—illum irantem flammas, that is to say—illum Ajacem: His ego nec metas rerum nec tempora ponam, that is to say, Romanis: the neuter, on the contrary, is always related to a word generally, and confused; hoc erat in votis, that is to say, haec res, hoc negotium erat in votis: hoc erat alma parens, &c. Thus, there is a double confusion in the neuter—to wit, that of the pronoun, the signification of which is always confused, and that of the word negotium, thing, which is also general, and confused.
There is yet another pronoun which is called relative—qui, quae, quod—who, which, that. This relative pronoun has something in common with the other pronouns, and something peculiar to itself. It has this in common, that it takes the place of a noun, and excites a confused idea. It has this peculiar, that the proposition into which it enters may be made part of the subject, or predicate of a proposition, and thus form one of those added or incidental propositions, of which we shall speak more at large: God who is good, the world which is visible (We presume here that these terms, subject and predicate are known, until the place where their meaning is explained.)
We are, hence, able to resolve this question: What is the precise meaning of the word that when it follows a verb and appears to be related to nothing?—John answered that he was not the Christ; Pilate said that he found no guilt in Jesus Christ. There are some who would make of that an adverb, as well as of the word quod, which the Latins sometimes, though rarely, take in the same sense as our that (quod). Non tibi objicio quod hominem spoliasti, says Cicero
But the truth is, that the word that (quod) is nothing more than the relative pronoun, and it preserves its meaning; thus, in that proposition, John answered that he was not the Christ, the that retains the office of connecting another proposition, to wit, was not the Christ, with the attribute contained in the word answered, which signifies futi respondent. The other use, which is, to supply the place of the noun, appears here with much less truth, which has led some able men to say, that this that was entirely without it in this case. We may, however, say, that it retains it here also; for, in saying that John answered, we understand that he made an answer; and it is to this confused idea of answer that this that refers. In the same way, when Cicero says, Non tibi objicio quod hominem spoliasti, the quod refers to the confused idea of a thing objected termed by the word objicio; and that thing objected, conceived before obscurely, is then particularised by the incidental proposition, connected by the quod—quod hominem spoliasti. The same thing may be remarked in these questions—
1 suppose that you will be wise—I say that you are wrong.
The term I say causes us at once to conceive confusedly a thing said; and it is to this thing said that the that refers. I say that, that is to say, / say a thing which is. And, in the same way, he who says, / suppose, gives a confused idea of a thing supposed; for / suppose means, / make a supposition; and it is to this idea of thing supposed that the that refers. / suppose that, that is to say, / make a supposition which is.
We may place in the rank of pronouns the Greek article, ὁ, ἡ, τό, when it is placed after, instead of before, the noun; τοῦτό ἐστι τὸ σῶμά μου τὸ ὑπὲρ ὑμῶν διδόμενον, says St Luke, for the τό, the, represents to the mind the body, σῶμα, in a confused manner. Thus it has the office of a pronoun; and the only difference there is between the article, employed in this manner, and the relative, is, that though the article occupies the place of the noun, it joins, notwithstanding, the attribute which follows it to the noun which precedes; but the relative makes, with the attribute following, a separate proposition, though joined to the first—ὃ δίδοται, quod datur,—that is to say, quod datum est.
From this use of the article, we may judge that there is little solidity in the remark which has been lately made by a minister on the manner in which these words of the evangelist, St Luke, to which we have referred above, ought to be translated, because, in the Greek text, there is not a relative pronoun, but an article—this is my body, given for you,—and not which is given for you.
This pretension is founded solely on the imperfect manner in which that author has penetrated into the true nature of the relative pronoun, and of the article; for it is certain, that as the relative pronoun, qui, quce, quod, in taking the place of the noun, only represents it in a confused manner, so also the article, ὁ, ἡ, τό, only represents confusedly the noun to which it refers; so that this confused representation, being specially designed to avoid the distinct repetition of the same word, which is offensive, we in some sort destroy the end of the article, in translating it, by an express repetition of the same word—this is my body—my body given for you,—the article being introduced for the express purpose of avoiding this repetition; whereas, when we translate it by the relative pronoun, we preserve that essential condition of the article, which is of representing the noun only in a confused manner, and thus of not presenting the same image to the mind twice, and fail only to preserve another, which would seem less essential, that the article so takes the place of the noun that the adjective which is connected with it does not make a new proposition—τὸ ὑπὲρ ὑμῶν: whereas the relative pronoun, qui, quae, quod, divides it somewhat more, and becomes the subject of a new proposition—ὃ ὑπὲρ ὑμῶν δίδοται. Thus, in truth, neither of these translations, This is my body, which is given for you,—This is my body, my body given for you,—is quite perfect; the one changing the confused signification of the article to a signification distinct, contrary to the nature of the article; and the other, which preserves that confused signification, separating the sentence into two propositions by means of the relative pronoun, which would have been avoided by the article. But if we are necessarily obliged to use the one or the other, we have no right to condemn the first in choosing the second, as that author professed to do by his remark.