Part II, Chapter 2: Of the Verb
WE have borrowed thus far what we have said of nouns and pronouns, from a little book printed some time ago, under the title of a General Grammar, with the exception of some points, which we have explained in a different way; but in regard to the verb, of which that author treats in his 13th chapter, we shall merely transcribe what he has said, since it appears to us that nothing can be added to it.
" Men,” says he, " have not less need to invent words which may denote affirmation, which is the principal manner of our thoughts, than to invent those which may denote the objects of our thoughts.” And herein properly consists that which we call verb, which is nothing else than a word, the principal use of which is to express affirmation, that is to say, to denote that the discourse in which the word is employed is the discourse of a man who not only conceives things, but who judges and affirms of them, in which the verb is distinguished from other nouns, which also signify affirmation, as affirmans, affirmation because these signify it only so far as through a reflection of the mind it becomes an object of our thoughts, and thus they do not denote that he who employs these words affirms, but only that he conceives an affirmation. I said that the principal use of the verb was to signify affirmation, because, as we shall come to see further on, it is employed also to express other movements of the mind, as those of desiring, entreating, commanding, &c. But this is done only by the inflection of the mood, and thus we shall consider the verb, through the whole of this chapter, in its principal signification alone, which is that which it has in the indicative mood. According to this, we may say that the verb of itself ought to have no other use than that of marking the connection which we make in our mind between the two terms of the proposition; but there is only the verb to be, which we call substantive, which has remained in this simplicity, and even it, properly speaking, has only remained so in the third person present, is, and at certain times; for, as men naturally come to abbreviate their expressions, there are joined almost always to the affirmation other significations in a single word.
I. They have joined that of some attribute, so that when two words constitute a proposition, as when I say Petrus vivit, Peter lives, because the word vivit contains in itself the affirmation, and besides this, the attribute of being alive, thus it is the same thing to say, Peter lives, as it is to say, Peter is alive. Hence has arisen the great diversity of verbs in every language, whereas, if men had been satisfied with giving to the verb the general signification of affirmation, without joining to it any particular attribute, each language would have needed only a single verb, that, to wit, which is called substantive.
II. They have further joined to it, in certain cases, the subject of the proposition, so that then two words, and, indeed, a single word even, may make a complete proposition, two words, as when I say sum homo, since sum expresses not only affirmation, but includes the signification of the pronoun ego, which is the subject of this proposition, and which we always express in our language (je suis homme), I am a man. A single word, as when I say vivo, sedes, these verbs contain in themselves both the affirmation and the attribute, as we have already said, and being in the first person they contain also the subject, I am living, I am sitting, hence arises the difference of persons, which is commonly found in all verbs.
III. They have also added a relation to the time in regard to which we affirm, so that a single word, as coenasti, signifies that I affirm of him to whom I speak, the action of supping, not in relation to the present time, but to the past, and hence arises the diversity of times, which also is, for the most part, common to all verbs.
The diversity of these significations has prevented many persons, otherwise very able, from clearly understanding the nature of the verb, because they have not considered it in relation to that which is essential to it, which is affirmation, but according to other relations, which are accidental to it, qua verb. Thus Aristotle, dwelling on the third of the significations, added to that which is essential to the verb, defined it vox significans, cum tempore, a word which is significant with time.
Others, as Buxtorf, having added the second, have defined it, vox flexilis cum tempore, et persona, a word having various inflections with times and persons.
Others stopping at the first of these, added significations, and considering that the attributes which men have joined to the affirmation in a single word, are commonly actions and passions, have believed that the essence of the verb consists in expressing actions or passions. And finally, Julius Caesar Scaliger thought that he had found out a mystery, in his book on the Principles of the Latin language, in saying that the distinction of things, in permanentes et fluentes, into those which remain, and those which pass away, was the true origin of the distinction between nouns and verbs—the office of nouns being to express what remains—and verbs, what passes away.
But it may be easily seen, that all these definitions are false, and do not express the true nature of the verb. The manner in which the two first are conceived, sufficiently proves this, since it is not said what the verb signifies, but only what its signification is connected with, cum tempore, cum persona.
The two last are still worse; they have the two great vices of a definition, which is, that they belong neither to the whole thing defined, nor to it alone, neque omni, neque soli, for there are verbs which signify neither actions nor passions, nor that which passes away, as existit, quiescit, frigit, alget, tepet, calet, albet, viret, claret, &c. And there are words which are not verbs, which signify actions and passions, and even things which pass away, according to the definition of Scaliger, for it is certain that participles are true nouns, and that, nevertheless, those of active verbs do not signify actions less, and those of passives, passions less, than the verbs whence they are derived; and there is no reason at all for maintaining that fluens does not signify a thing which passes away, as well as fluit.
To which we may add, against the two first definitions of the verb, that the participles also signify time, since they are of the present, of the past, and of the future, especially in Greek; and those who believe, and not without reason, that the vocative is a true second person, especially when it has a different termination from the nominative, will hold that there is on that, in this point of view, only a difference, more or less, between the vocative and the verb.
And thus the essential reason why a participle is not a verb is this, that it does not express affirmation; whence it happens that it cannot make a proposition which it is the property of the verb to do, except by being joined to a verb; that is to say, by that being restored to it which had been taken away, in changing the verb into a participle; for how is it that Petrus vivit—Peter lives—is a proposition, and that Petrus vivens—Peter living—is not one unless you add est to it—Petrus est vivens—Peter is living;—except because the affirmation which is contained in vivit had been taken away in order to make the participle vivens; whence it appears, that the presence or absence of affirmation, in a word is that which constitutes it a verb, or not a verb.
On which you may further remark, by the way, that the infinitive, which is very often a noun, as when we say (le boire, le manger, to drink, to eat), is then different from the participles in this, that the participles are nouns adjective, while the infinitive is a noun substantive, made by abstraction of that adjective, in the same way as from candidus is made candor, and from white comes whiteness; thus the verb rubet expresses is red, including at once both the affirmation and the attribute rubens; whereas the participle signifies simply red, without any affirmation, and rubere is taken for a noun, signifying redness.
It ought, therefore, to be laid down as established, that considering simply what is essential in the verb, its only true definition is vox significans affirmationem—a word which signifies affirmation.
For we can find no word denoting affirmation which is not a verb, and no verb which does not denote it, at least in the indicative; and it is unquestionable, that if one had been invented, as est, always marking affirmation, without any difference of persons or of times, so that the diversity of persons be denoted only by nouns and pronouns, and diversity of times by adverbs, it would still, nevertheless have been a true verb. As, in fact, is the case in the propositions which philosophers term those of eternal truth: as, God is infinite; all body is divisible; the whole is greater than its part; the word est signifies, simply, affirmation alone without any relation to time, because these are in relation to all times, and without fixing the attention of the mind on any diversity of persons.
Thus the verb, in relation to what is essential to it, is a word which signifies affirmation. But if we wish to include in the definition of the verb its principal accidents, we may define it thus: vox significans affirmationem cum designatione personae, numeri et temporis,—(A word which signifies affirmation, with the designation of person, number, and time; which belongs specially to the substantive verb.
For in relation to the other verbs, in so far as they differ from the substantive verb, by the union which men have made of the affirmation with certain attributes, we may define them as follows: vox significans affirmationem alicujus attributi cum designatione personae, numeri, et temporis,—a word which denotes the affirmation of some attribute, together with the determination of person, number, and time.
We may remark, in passing, that since affirmation, as conceived, may also be the attribute of the verb, as in the verb affirmo, this verb signifies two affirmations, of which one regards the person who speaks, and the other the person who is spoken of, whether this be oneself or another. For when I say, Petrus affirmat, affirmat is the same thing as est affirmans; and it then makes my affirmation, or the judgment I make touching Peter, and affirmans, the affirmation which I conceive and attribute to Peter. The verb nego, on the contrary, contains an affirmation, and a negation, for the same reason.
It is, however, still necessary to remark, that though all our judgments are not affirmations, but some of them negations, yet, nevertheless, that verbs only signify of themselves affirmations,—the negations being expressed by the particles non, not, or by words involving nullus, nemo—none, no one, which, being united to verbs, change them from affirmative to negative: no man is immortal; no body is indivisible.