Part II, Chapter 7: Of the Falsity that may be met with in Complex Terms and Incidental Propositions
WHAT we have said may enable us to resolve a celebrated question, which is, Whether falsehood is to be found only in propositions, or whether it does not also enter into ideas and simple terms?
I speak of falsehood rather than of truth, because there is a truth which is in things in relation to the mind of God, whether men think it, or whether they do not; but falsehood can only be in relation to the mind of man or to some mind subject to error, which judges falsely that a thing is that which it is not.
It is asked, then, whether this falseness is only found in propositions and in judgments? We reply commonly no,—which is true in a sense; but this does not secure that there shall not be sometimes falsehood, not in simple ideas but in complex terms, since it is enough for this that there be some judgment and affirmation, either expressed or understood.
We shall understand this better by considering in detail two sorts of complex terms, in one of which the who is explicative—in the other, determinative.
We need not wonder that falsehood is to be found in the first kind of complex terms, since here the attribute of the incidental proposition is affirmed of the subject to which the relative refers. Alexander, who was the son of Philip: I affirm of Alexander, although incidentally, that he was the son of Philip; and, consequently, if it be not so, there is falsehood in this.
But two or three things, which are important, must be remarked here: —
1. That the falsehood of the incidental proposition does not commonly affect the truth of the principal proposition; for example, Alexander, who was the son of Philip, conquered the Persians. This proposition ought to be considered true, though Alexander be not the son of Philip; since the affirmation of the principal proposition falls only on Alexander, and that which is incidentally connected with it, though false, does not prevent it being true, that Alexander conquered the Persians. If, however, the attribute of the principal proposition be related to the incidental proposition, as if I were to say, Alexander, the son of Philip, was the grandson of Amyntas; in this case only would the falsehood of the incidental proposition make the principal proposition false.
2d, The titles which are commonly given to certain dignitaries may be given to all those who possess these dignities, though that which is signified by the title may not belong to them at all. Thus, because formerly the title of holy, and of very holy, was given to all bishops, we see that the Catholic bishops, in the Council of Carthage, did not hesitate to bestow that name on Donatist bishops: Sanctissimus Petillianus dixit, although they knew well that holiness could not belong to a schismatic bishop. We see also that Paul, in the Acts, gives the title of very excellent to Festus, governor of Judea, because that was the title commonly given to these governors.
3d, The case is different when a man is the author of the title which he gives to another, and which he gives to him, not according to the opinion of others, or according to popular error, but for himself alone; for we may then, with justice, impute to him the falsehood of these propositions. Thus, when a man says, Aristotle, who is the prince of philosophers, or simply, the prince of philosophers, believed that the origin of the nerves was in the heart, we ought not to tell him that this is false, because Aristotle is not the best of philosophers; for it is enough that he followed, in this, the common opinion, though false. But if any one said, Gassendi, who was the most able of philosophers, believes that there was a void in nature, we might dispute with such a man the quality which he wished to bestow on Gassendi, and make him responsible for the falsehood which we might maintain was to be found in that incidental proposition. He may, therefore, be accused of falsehood in giving to the same person a title which does not belong to him, and we cannot be accused of it in giving to him another which belongs to him still less in truth. For example, the pope, John XII., was neither holy, chaste, nor pious, as Baronius allows; and yet those who should call him very holy could not be accused of falsehood, and those who called him very chaste, or very pious, were great liars, although they may only have done this by incidental propositions, as if they were to say, John XII., a very chaste pontiff, ordained such a thing.
So much touching the first kind of incidental propositions, in which the relative (who, which) is explicative.
In relation to the others, where the relative is determinative, as a man who is pious,—kings who love their people,—it is certain that, in general, they are not susceptible of falsehood; since the attribute of the incidental proposition is not affirmed of the subject to which the relative refers. For if we say, for example, that judges who never do anything by request or favour are worthy of praise, we do not say, on that account, that there is any judge in the world who has attained to that perfection; nevertheless I believe that there is always in these propositions a tacit or virtual affirmation, not of the actual agreement of the attribute with the subject to which the who refers, but of its possible agreement. And if an error be committed here, I believe we shall have reason to hold that there may be falsehood in these incidental propositions, as if, for example, it were said, Minds which are square are more solid than those which are round; the idea of square and round being incompatible with the idea of mind, taken for the principle of thought, I hold that such incidental propositions ought to be reckoned false.
We may even say that a greater number of errors spring from this; for, having the idea of a thing, we often join to it another idea which is incompatible with it, although, through error, we believed it compatible, which leads us to attribute to this idea that which never belonged to it.
Thus, finding in ourselves two ideas, that of a substance which thinks, and that of a substance extended, it often happens, that when we consider our soul, which is a substance which thinks, we mingle insensibly with it something of the idea of a substance extended, as when we imagine that our soul must fill a space as the body does, and that it could not exist if it had no parts,—things which belong exclusively to the body; and hence has arisen the impious error of those who believe the soul to be mortal. We may see an excellent discourse on this subject by St Augustine, in the Tenth Book of the Trinity, where he shows that there is nothing which may be known more easily than the nature of the soul. But that which perplexes men is this, that, wishing to know it, they are not satisfied with that which they may know without difficulty, that it is a substance which thinks, wills, doubts, knows, but they join to what it is, that which it is not, striving to imagine it under some of those forms through which they are accustomed to conceive of corporeal things. When, on the other hand, we consider body, we find very great difficulty in consequence of mingling with it some thing of the idea of that which thinks, which leads us to say of heavy bodies, they incline towards a centre; of plants, that they seek the nourishment which is proper for them; of the crisis of a malady, that it is nature which is striving to get rid of that which offends it; and of a thousand other things especially in our body, that nature wishes to do this or that, though we are well assured that we have not willed it, nor thought anything about it; and it is ridiculous to imagine that there is in us anything else beside ourselves which knows what is suitable or hurtful, which seeks the one and avoids the other.
I believe that it is to this mixture we may attribute all the complaints which men make against God; for it would be impossible to murmur against God if we conceived of him truly as he is—all-powerful, all-wise, and all-good. But wicked men, conceiving of him as all-powerful, and as the sovereign ruler of all the world, attribute to him all the evils which happen to them, wherein they are right. And since, at the same time, they conceive him cruel and unjust, which is incompatible with his goodness, they rail against him, as though he had done them wrong in laying upon them the evils which they suffer.