Part II, Chapter 14: Of Propositions in which the Name of Things is given to Signs
WE have said, in the First Part, that of ideas some have things for their objects, others signs. Now, since these ideas of signs attached to words enter into the composition of propositions, a circumstance happens which it is important to examine in this place, and which properly belongs to logic—it is, that we sometimes affirm of them the thing signified. And it is important to know when it is right to do this, principally in relation to the signs of institution; for, in relation to natural signs, there is no difficulty, since the visible connection there is between such signs and things, indicates clearly that when we affirm of the sign the thing signified, we mean not that sign is really this thing, but that it is so in intent, and figuratively. And thus we might say, without any introduction, and without ceremony, of a portrait of Caesar, this is Caesar, and of a map of Italy, this is Italy.
It is only necessary, therefore, that we examine the rule which allows us to affirm of things signified their signs, in relation to instituted signs, which do not make known, by any visible relation, the sense in which these propositions are to be understood; and this has given rise to many disputes.
For it appears to some that this may be done indifferently, and that it is sufficient, in order to prove that a proposition is reasonable, when taken in a figurative sense, and in the sense of sign, to say that it is common to give to the sign the name of the thing signified. And yet this is not true, for there are a multitude of propositions which would be extravagant, if we were to give to signs the name of the thing signified, which is never done, because they are extravagant. Thus a man who has settled it in his mind that certain things should signify others, would be ridiculous, if, without having previously explained it to any one, he should take the liberty of giving to these fanciful signs the names of things, and should say, for instance, that a stone was a horse, and an ass was the king of Persia, because he had established these signs in his mind. Thus the first rule that ought to be followed on this subject, is, that we are not allowed to give indifferently the names of things to signs.
The second, which is a consequence of the first, is, that the simple manifest incompatibility of the terms is not a sufficient reason to lead the mind to the figurative sense, and to conclude that, since the proposition cannot be taken literally, it must, therefore, be explained in a figurative sense; otherwise there would be none of these extravagant propositions; and the more impossible they were in their literal sense, the more easily should we fall into their figurative sense, which, nevertheless, must not be; for who would allow, and without any previous explanation, but solely and virtually of a secret determination, that one should say that the sea is heaven, that the earth is the moon, that a tree is a king. Who does not see that it would be the shortest way to acquire the reputation of folly to pretend to introduce this language into the world? It is necessary, therefore, that he to whom we speak be prepared, in a certain way, before we have a right to employ such propositions; and it must be remarked, that of these explanations there are some which are certainly insufficient, and others which are certainly sufficient.
1st, Distant relations, which do not present themselves to the senses, nor, at first sight, to the mind, and which are only discovered by meditation, are by no means sufficient to give at once to signs the names of things signified, for there are scarcely any things between which we may not find such relations; and it is clear, that relations which are not seen at once, are not sufficient to lead us to the figurative sense.
2d, It is not sufficient to give to a sign the name of the thing signified, in the first establishment which is made of it, to know that those to whom we speak have hitherto considered it as a sign of another thing altogether different. We know, for example, that the laurel was the sign of victory, and the olive of peace; but this knowledge by no means prepares the mind to find what is meant, if we, who chose to make the laurel the sign of the king of China, and the olive that of the Grand Seigneur, should say without ceremony, in walking in a garden, do you see that laurel? it is the king of China; and that olive? it is the Grand Turk.
3d, Any previous explanation, which only prepares the mind to expect some great thing, without preparing it to consider, in particular, the thing as a sign, does not at all afford sufficient ground for attributing to this sign the name of the thing signified at its first institution. The reason of this is clear, since there is no direct and natural connection between the idea of greatness and the idea of a sign, and thus the one does not at all lead to the other.
But it is certainly a sufficient ground for giving to signs the names of things, when we see in the minds of those to whom we speak, that, considering certain things as signs, they are in difficulty only as to what they signify.
Thus Joseph might reply to Pharaoh, that the seven fat kine and the seven full sheaves which he had seen in his dream were seven years of plenty, and the seven lean kine and the seven thin sheaves were seven years of famine, since he saw that Pharaoh was in trouble only on this point, and that he inwardly asked himself this question—What do these seven fat and lean kine, these seven full and empty sheaves, represent?
Thus Daniel answered very appropriately to Nebuchadnezzar—that he was the head of gold, because he had proposed to him a dream which he had of a statue with a golden head, and required from him its interpretation.
Thus, when we utter a parable, and proceed to explain it (those to whom it was spoken, considering already all that composed it as signs), we have a right, in the explanation of every part, to give to the sign the name of the thing signified.
Thus God having shown to the prophet Ezekiel in a vision, in spiritu, a field full of dead men; and the prophet distinguishing visions from realities, and being accustomed to consider them as signs, God spoke very intelligibly when he told him that these bones were the house of Israel, that is to say, they represented the house of Israel.
These are certain and sufficient preparations; and as we see no other examples in which it is agreed that there should be given to the sign the name of the thing signified, we derive this maxim from common sense,—that we may give to signs the name of things only, when we have grounds for supposing that they are already considered as signs, and when we see that the minds of others are in doubt, not about what they are, but about what they represent. But as the greater part of moral rules have exceptions, it may be doubted whether we ought not to make one here in favour of a single case, viz., when the thing signified is such, that it requires in some sort to be denoted by a sign, so that, as soon as the name of that thing is pronounced, the mind conceives immediately that the subject to which it is united is intended to designate it.
Thus, as covenants are commonly denoted by outward signs, if we affirm the word covenant, or any outward thing, the mind will be immediately led to conceive that it is affirmed of it as of its sign; so that, when we find in Scripture that circumcision is the covenant, it may be that there is nothing to surprise where covenant fixes the idea of sign on that to which it is united. And thus, as he who hears a proposition conceives the attribute, and qualities of the attribute, before he unites it with the subject, we may suppose that he who hears this proposition, that circumcision is the covenant, is sufficiently prepared to conceive that circumcision is only figuratively the covenant, the word covenant having led him to form this idea, not before it was pronounced, but before it was joined in his mind with the word circumcision.
I have said, that it might be thought that the things which require, by a fitness of reasoning, to be denoted by signs, should form an exception to the established rule, which demands a preliminary preparation, through which we might be led to regard the sign as a sign, in order that we might affirm of it the thing signified, because the contrary might also be believed. For, 1st, this proposition,—Circumcision is the covenant, is not in the Scripture, which runs simply thus, Behold the covenant which you shall observe between you, your posterity, and me, Every male among you shall be circumcised. Now it is not said in these words that circumcision is the covenant, but circumcision is in them commanded as a condition of the covenant. It is true that God required that condition in order that circumcision might be a sign of the covenant, as it is said in the following verse, ut sit in signum foederis; but, in order that it might be a sign, it was necessary that its observance be commanded, and made a condition of the covenant, which is contained in the preceding verse.
2d, These words in St Luke, This cup is the new covenant of my blood, which, it is alleged, have still less evidence for confirming this exception, for, when translated literally, these are St Luke’s words, This cup is the new testament in my blood. Now, as the word testament signifies not only the last will of the testator, but still more appropriately the instrument which represents it, there is nothing figurative in calling the cup—the blood of Jesus Christ—the testament, since it is peculiarly the mark, the pledge and sign, of the last will of Jesus Christ,—the instrument of the new covenant.
But, be that as it may, this exception being, on the one hand, doubtful, and on the other, very rare, and there being few things which require of themselves to be denoted by signs, these do not hinder the use and application of the rule in relation to all other things which have not this quality, and which men are accustomed to represent by instituted signs. For this principle of equity must be remembered, that the majority of rules having exceptions, remain, nevertheless, in all their force in the things which are not comprised in these exceptions.
It is by these principles that we must decide this important question, whether we are to give to these words, This is my body, a figurative sense; or, rather, it is by these principles that all the world has decided,—all the nations of the earth having been naturally led to take them in a literal sense, and to exclude the figurative. For the apostles, not regarding the bread as a sign, and being in no difficulty about what it signified, Jesus Christ could not have given to the signs the names of things without speaking contrary to the custom of all men, and without deceiving them. They might, perhaps, regard what was done as something great, but that is not sufficient.
We have nothing more to remark on the subject of those signs to which the names of things are given, except that it is extremely necessary to distinguish between the expressions in which we use the name of a thing to denote the sign, as when we call a picture of Alexander by the name of Alexander; and those in which the sign being denoted by its own name, or by a pronoun, we affirm of it the thing signified. For this rule—that it is necessary that the minds of those to whom we speak already consider the sign as a sign, and are in doubt as to what it signifies—applies by no means to the first kind of expressions, but solely to the second, in which we affirm expressly of the sign the thing signified. For we employ these expressions only to teach those to whom we speak what the sign signifies; and we do this only when they are sufficiently prepared to conceive that the sign is the thing signified, only figuratively, and by representation.