Part III, Chapter 18: Division of Places into those of Grammar, of Logic, and of Metaphysics
THOSE who have treated of places have divided them in a different way. That which is followed by Cicero, in his Books of Invention, and in the second book of the Orator, and by Quintilian, in the fifth book of his Institutes, is less methodical, but it is also better adapted for speeches at the bar, to which these books specially relate; that of Ramus is too embarrassed with subdivisions.
The following division, which appears a very convenient one, is that of a very solid and judicious German philosopher, named Claubergius, whose Logic fell into our hands after the printing of this had been begun. The places are taken either from grammar, or from logic, or from metaphysics.
The places of grammar are, etymology, and words derived from the same root, which are called in Latin conjugata, and in Greek παρώνυμα.
We argue from etymology when we say, for example, that many people in the world never divert themselves, properly speaking; because to divert oneself is to desist from serious occupation, and they are never occupied seriously.
Words derived from the same root also help in finding out thoughts: —
Homo sum; humani nil a me alienum puto.
Mortali urgemur ab hoste, mortales.
Quid tam dignum misericordia quam miser?
Quid tam indignum misericordia quam superbus miser? What is more worthy of our compassion than a miserable man? and what is less worthy of our compassion than a miserable man who is proud?
The places of logic are the universal terms—genus, species, difference, property, accident, definition, division; but as all these points have been explained before, it is not necessary to treat of them further here.
It is only necessary to remark that there are commonly joined to these places certain general maxims, which it is well to know, not because they are of any great use, but because they are common. We have already noticed some of these under other terms, but it is well to know them under the ordinary terms: —
1. What is affirmed or denied, of the genus, is affirmed or denied of the species:—What belongs to all men, belongs to the great; but they cannot pretend to advantages which are above humanity.
2. In destroying the genus, the species is also destroyed:—He who does not judge at all, cannot judge wrongly; he who does not speak at all, can never speak indiscreetly.
3. In destroying all the species, the genus is destroyed:—The forms which are called substantial (excepting the reasonable soul) are neither body nor spirit; therefore they are not substances.
4. If we can affirm or deny of anything the whole difference, we may affirm or deny the species:—Extension does not belong to thought; therefore it is not matter.
5. If we can affirm or deny of anything the property, we may affirm or deny the species:—Since we cannot figure to ourselves the half of a thought, or a round or square thought, it cannot be body.
6. We may affirm or deny the thing defined, of that in relation to which we may affirm or deny the definition:—There are few just persons, since there are few who have the firm and abiding purpose of rendering to each what belongs to him.
The places of metaphysics are certain general terms belonging to all beings, to which many arguments are referred,—as causes, effects, wholes, parts, opposed terms.
The definitions which are given in the schools of causes in general, in saying that a cause is that which produces an effect, or that through which a thing is, are so vague, and it is so difficult to see how they agree to all kinds of causes, that it would be much better to leave this word amongst those which are not defined, since our idea of it is as clear as the definitions.
But the division of causes into four kinds, that is, into final, efficient, material, and formal, is so celebrated, that it must be known.
The FINAL CAUSE is the end for which a thing is.
There are principal ends—those, to wit, which are mainly regarded,—and accessory ends, which are only indirectly considered.
That which we undertake to do or obtain is called finis cujus gratia. Thus health is the end of medicine, since it undertakes to procure it.
He for whom we labour is called finis cui. Man is the end of medicine in this sense, since it is for him that it seeks to obtain a cure.
There is nothing more common than to derive arguments from the consideration of the end, either for the purpose of showing that a thing is imperfect, as, that a speech is a bad one, since it is not adapted to persuade; or in order to show that a man has done, or will do, some action, because it is conformed to the end which he is accustomed to propose to himself: whence came that celebrated maxim of a Roman judge, that we ought to inquire before all things else, Cui bono? that is to say, what interest a man would have in doing such a thing, since men commonly act according to their interest; or to show, on the contrary, that we ought not to suspect a man of such an action, since it would have been contrary to his purpose.
There are still many other ways of reasoning from the end, which good sense will discover better than all precepts, which is also true of the other places.
The EFFICIENT CAUSE is that which produces another thing,—we may derive arguments from it, by showing that an effect is not, since there has not been a sufficient cause, or that it is, or will be, by allowing that all the causes are present. If these causes are necessary, the argument is necessary if they are contingent and free, it is only probable.
There are different kinds of efficient causes, of which it is useful to know the names.
God, in creating Adam, was the total cause, since nothing had co-operated with Him; but the father and mother are each only partial causes, in relation to their child, since both are needed.
The sun is a proper cause of light, but it is only an accidental cause of the death of a man killed by its heat, since he was weak before.
The father is the proximate cause of his son.
The grandfather is only the remote cause.
The mother is a producing cause.
The nurse is only a preserving cause.
The father is a universal cause, in relation to his children, because they are of the same nature with him.
God is only an equivocal cause, in relation to creatures, because they are not of the divine nature.
A workman is the principal cause of his work; his instruments are only the instrumental causes.
The air which fills an organ is the universal cause of the harmony of the organ.
The particular disposition of each pipe, and he who plays, are the particular causes which determine the universal.
The sun is a natural cause.
Man is an intellectual cause, in relation to that which he does with judgment.
The fire which burns the wood is a necessary cause.
A man who walks is a free cause.
The sun shining into a room is the proper cause of its light; the unbarring of the window is only a cause or condition, without which the effect would not be conditio sine qua non.
The fire which burns a house is the physical cause of the conflagration; the man who set it on fire is the moral cause.
We may also bring under efficient cause the exemplary cause, which is the model according to which a work is made, as the plan by which an architect erects a building; or, in general, that which is the cause of the objective existence of an idea, or of any other image whatever: as the king, Louis XIV., is the exemplary cause of his portrait.
The MATERIAL CAUSE is that of which things are formed, as gold is the matter of which a golden vase is made; what belongs, or does not belong, to the matter, belongs, or does not belong, to the things which are composed of it.
The FORM is that which renders a thing what it is, and distinguishes it from others, whether it be a thing really distinguished from matter, according to the opinion of the schools, or simply the arrangement of its parts. It is by the knowledge of this form that we are able to explain its properties.
There are as many different effects as there are causes, these words being reciprocal. The common way of arguing from them is to show that if the effect is, the cause is, since there can be nothing without a cause. We prove, also, that a cause is good or bad, when its effects are good or bad. This, however, is not always true in accidental causes.
We have said enough of the whole and its parts in the chapter on Division, and it is not necessary, therefore, to add anything further here.
There are four kinds of opposed terms: —
Relatives: as, father, son, master, servant.
Contraries: as, cold and heat, health and sickness.
Privatives: as, life, death; sight, blindness; hearing, deafness; knowledge, ignorance.
Contradictories, which consist in a term of the simple negation of that term—seeing, not seeing. The difference which there is between the two last kind of opposites, is, that the privative terms express the negation of a form in a subject which is capable of it, whereas the negatives do not indicate that capacity. Hence, we do not say that a stone is blind or dead, because it is not capable of either seeing or living.
As these terms are opposed, we employ the one in order to deny the other. Contradictory terms have this property, that in taking away one we establish the other.
There are many kinds of comparisons; for we compare things either equal or unequal, similar or dissimilar. “We prove that what belongs, or does not belong, to an equal or similar thing, belongs, or does not belong, to another thing to which it is equal or similar.
In unequal things, we prove, negatively, that if that which is more probable is not, that which is less probable is not, for a stronger reason; or, affirmatively, that if that which is less probable is, that which is more probable, is also. We commonly employ differences, or dissimilitudes, in order to destroy that which others have wished to establish by these similitudes, as we destroy the argument which is derived from a judgment, by showing that it was given in another case.
This is, roughly, a part of what is said on the places. There are some things which it is more useful to know only in this way. Those who wish to know more may find it in the authors who have treated this subject more at large. We cannot, however, advise any one to look into the topics of Aristotle, since there is strange confusion in those books; but there are some things very pertinent to this subject in the First Book of his Rhetoric, in which he sets forth various ways of finding out that a thing is useful, pleasing, greater, or smaller. It is nevertheless true, that we cannot attain, in that way, any very valuable knowledge.