Part IV, Chapter 13: Some Rules for the right direction of Reason in the belief of things which depend on Human Testimony
THE most common use of good sense, and of that power of the soul which enables us to discriminate truth from falsehood, is not in the speculative sciences, to which so few are obliged to devote themselves; but there is scarcely any occasion on which we more frequently employ it, and on which it is more necessary, than in the judgments which we form about every-day affairs.
I do not speak of the judgment which we form as to whether an action is good or bad, worthy of praise or of blame, since it belongs to morality to regulate this, but simply that which we make touching the truth or falsehood of human events, which alone is regarded by logic: whether we consider them as past, as when we seek to know whether we ought to believe them or not; or whether we consider them as future, as when we dread or desire that they will happen, which regulates our hopes and fears.
Some reflections may be made on this subject, which, perhaps, may not be without their use, and which may at least help us to avoid the faults into which many fall, from not having sufficiently regarded the rules of reasoning.
The first reflection is, that a wide difference must be made between two kinds of truths: one, which relates simply to the nature of things, and their unchangeable essence, independently of their existence; the others, which relate to things existing, and especially to human accidents and events, which may or may not be, when we inquire about the future, but which cannot be otherwise, when we inquire about the past. All this is to be understood in relation to their proximate causes, apart from their order immutable in the providence of God,—since, on the one hand, this does not prevent contingency, and, on the other, being unknown, it cannot at all contribute to our belief of things.
In the first kind of truths, since everything is necessary, nothing is true which is not true universally; and thus we may conclude that a thing is false, if it is false in a single case.
But if we think of following the same rules in the belief of human events, we shall always, except by accident, judge falsely, and make a thousand false reasonings about them.
For these events being contingent in their nature, it would be ridiculous to seek in them necessary truth: thus a man would be altogether unreasonable who should believe nothing, except we were to prove to him that it was absolutely necessary that the thing should have happened in that way.
And he would be no less unreasonable who should endeavour to make us believe anything—as, for instance, that the king of China was converted to the Christian religion—for this reason alone, that it was not impossible; for another who should assert the contrary might employ the very same reason, and it is clear, therefore, that this could not determine us to believe one rather than the other.
It must, therefore, be laid down as a certain and indubitable maxim on this subject, that the simple possibility of an event is no sufficient reason for our belief of it,—and that we may also have reason to believe it, although we do not judge it to be impossible for the contrary to have happened; so that, of two events, I may have ground for believing the one, and disbelieving the other, although I believe both possible.
But what, then, shall determine me to believe the one rather than the other, if I judge both possible? It will be according to the following maxim: —
In order for me to judge of the truth of an event, and for me to believe it or not to believe it, it is not necessary to consider it abstractly, and in itself, as we should consider a proposition in geometry, but it is necessary to pay attention to all the circumstances which accompany it, internal as well as external. I call internal circumstances those which belong to the fact itself, and external, those which belong to the persons by whose testimony we are led to believe it. This being done, if all the circumstances are such, that it never or rarely happens that the like circumstances are the concomitants of falsehood, our mind is led, naturally, to believe that it is true; and it is right to do so, especially in the conduct of life, which does not demand greater certainty, and which must often rest satisfied in many circumstances with the greatest probability.
And if, on the contrary, these circumstances are such as we very often find in connection with falsehood, reason determines, either that we remain in suspense, or that we consider as false what has been told us, when there is no appearance of its being true, although it may not be an utter impossibility.
It is asked, for example, whether the history of the baptism of Constantine by St Sylvester is true or false. Baronius believes it to be true; Cardinal Perron, Bishop Spondanus, Father Petau, Father Morin, and the most able portion of the church, believe it to be false. If we confine ourselves to its simple impossibility, we have no right to reject it, for it contains nothing absolutely impossible; and it is possible, indeed, speaking absolutely, that Eusebius, who testifies to the contrary, lied in order to favour the Arians, and that the fathers who followed were deceived by his testimony; but if the rule be employed which we have established, which is, to consider what are the circumstances of the one or the other, and which of these have the most marks of truth, we shall find that they are those of the last; for, on the one hand, we cannot rely on the testimony of such a fabulous writer as the author of the acts of St Sylvester, who is the only ancient authority we have for the baptism of Constantine at Rome; and, on the other, it is not at all probable that a man so able as Eusebius would have ventured to utter a falsehood in relating a thing so celebrated as the baptism of the first emperor who had given liberty to the church, and which would have been known to all the world when he wrote, since this was only four or five years after the death of that emperor.
There is, nevertheless, an exception to this rule, in which we ought to be contented with possibility and probability. This is, when a fact, which is otherwise sufficiently attested, is opposed by the disagreements and apparently conflicting statements of other histories; for in this case it is sufficient that the explanations which we give of these contrarieties be possible and probable; and we should act against reason were we to demand positive proofs of it, because the fact itself being sufficiently proved, it is not just to require that all its circumstances be proved in the same way, otherwise we might doubt a thousand well-established histories, which we cannot reconcile with others which are not less so, except by conjectures which it is impossible to prove positively.
We cannot, for example, reconcile what is related in the books of the Kings, and in those of the Chronicles, of the years of the reigns of the different kings of Judah and Israel, except by giving to some of these kings two commencements of their reign—the one during the life, and the other after the death, of their fathers; and if it is asked what proof we have that such a king reigned some time with his father, it must be confessed that we have no positive proof of this, but it is enough that it is a very possible thing, and that it often happened on other occasions, to justify us in supposing it as a circumstance to reconcile histories otherwise very true.
Hence, there is nothing more absurd than the efforts which have been made by some heretics, in this last age, to prove that St Peter was never at Rome. They cannot deny that this truth is attested by all ecclesiastical authors, and even the most ancient—as Papias, St Dennis of Corinth, Caius, St Irenaius, Tertullian—without being able to find any who have denied it; and they imagine, nevertheless, that they can destroy it by conjectures—as, for example, that St Paul has not mentioned St Peter in his epistles written from Rome. We may reply to them that St Peter might have been then away from Rome, because it is not maintained that he was so settled there but that he might often leave it to go and preach the gospel in other places. They reply that this is utterly without proof. This is irrelevant, because the fact which they dispute being one of the most assured truths of ecclesiastical history, it is for those who dispute it to show that it is contrary to the Scripture, and it is for those who maintain it to resolve these pretended contrarieties as we do those of Scripture itself, in which we have shown that the possibility suffices.