Part IV, Chapter 15: Another Remark on the subject of the Belief of Events
THERE is still another very important remark to be made on the belief of events. It is, that amongst the circumstances which we must consider, in order to determine whether we ought to believe them or not, there are some which may be called common circumstances, because they are such as in the greater number of facts are found far more often connected with truth than with falsehood; and then, if these are not counterbalanced by other particular circumstances, which weaken or destroy in our minds the motives of belief derived from these common circumstances, we have reason to believe that these events are, if not certainly true, at least very probably so, which is sufficient when we are obliged to judge of them; for, as we ought to be contented with moral certainty in things which are not susceptible of metaphysical certainty, so, also, when we are not able to obtain complete moral certainty, the best thing we can do, when we are obliged to take some side, is to embrace the most probable, since it would be an outrage on reason to do otherwise.
And if, on the contrary, these common circumstances are found connected with other particular circumstances, which destroy in our mind, as we have said, the motives of belief derived from these common circumstances, either because they are themselves such that the like are very rarely accompanied with falsehood, we have then no longer the same reason to believe that event, but either our mind remains in suspense if the particular circumstances only lessen the weight of the common circumstances, or we are led to believe that the fact is false, if they are such as are commonly the marks of falsehood. The following example may explain this remark.
It is a common circumstance for most deeds to be signed by two notaries, that is to say, by two public persons who have generally great interest in not being guilty of falsehood, inasmuch as they have not only their conscience and their honour, but their fortune and their livelihood, at stake. This consideration alone is sufficient, if we know no other particulars about a contract, to believe that it is not ante-dated, not that it may not have been ante-dated, but because it is certain, that of a thousand contracts there are nine hundred and ninety-nine which are not so; so that it is incomparably more probable that the contract which we suspect, is one of the nine hundred and ninety-nine, than that it is the solitary one among the thousand which may be found ante-dated. That if the probity of the notaries who have signed it is perfectly well known to me, I may conclude, then, most certainly, that they have not committed a forgery.
But if to this common circumstance of being signed by two notaries, which is a sufficient reason, when it is not opposed by others, for trusting in the date of the contract, other particular circumstances are added, as that these notaries were notorious for being without honour and conscience, and that they might have had considerable interest in that falsification; this, though it may not lead me to conclude that the contract is ante-dated, will, nevertheless diminish the weight which, without this, the signature of the two notaries would have had on my mind to induce me to believe that it is not so. And if, beyond this, I am able to discover other positive proofs of this ante-dating, either by witnesses, or very strong arguments,—such as would be the inability of a man to lend twenty thousand crowns, from the fact of his not having a hundred when he engaged to do so,—I should then be determined to believe that there was falsity in the contract, and it would then be most unreasonable to attempt to compel me either to believe that the contract was not ante-dated, or to confess that I had been wrong in supposing that others in which I had not seen the same marks of falsity were not so, since they might have been like that one.
We may apply all this to subjects which often give rise to disputes among the doctors. A question arises as to whether a book has been really written by the author whose name it has always borne, or whether the acts of a council are true or suppositious.
It is plain that the presumption is in favour of an author who has for a long time held possession of a work, and of the truth of the acts of a council, which we have always read of, and that the reasons must be considerable which should induce us to believe the contrary, notwithstanding that presumption.
Hence, a very able man of our time, having endeavoured to show that the letter of St Cyprian to Pope Stephen on the subject of Martin, bishop of Arles, was not written by that holy martyr, has not been able to convince the learned, his conjectures not having appeared strong enough to take away from St Cyprian the piece which has always borne his name, which perfectly resembles in style his other works.
It is in vain, also, that Blondel and Saumaisius, not being able to reply to the argument derived from the letters of St Ignatius for the superiority of the bishop over the priests from the commencement of the church, have endeavoured to maintain that all these letters are suppositions, as they have even been printed by Isaac Vossius and Usher from an ancient Greek manuscript in the library of Florence, and they have been refuted by those even of their own party, since, avowing as they do, that we have the very letters which were cited by Eusebius, by St Jerome, by Theodoret and Origen, there is no likelihood of the letters of St Ignatius having been received by St Polycarp, that these true letters should have disappeared, and false ones have supplied their places in the time which elapsed between St Polycarp and Origen, or Eusebius; besides which, these letters of St Ignatius which we now have, have a certain character of holiness and simplicity so in harmony with those apostolic times, that they vindicate themselves against all these vain accusations of fabrication and falsehood.
Again, all the difficulties which Cardinal Perron has proposed against the letter of the council of Africa, touching the appellations of the holy see, have not prevented any from believing now, as formerly, that it was truly written by that council.
But there are, nevertheless, other occasions on which the particular reasons avail against that general reason of long possession.
Thus, although the letter of St Clement to St James, bishop of Jerusalem, was translated by Ruffinus, nearly thirteen centuries ago, and was alleged to have been written by St Clement by a council of France, more than twelve centuries ago, it is difficult to avoid the conclusion that it is suppositious, since that holy bishop of Jerusalem having suffered martyrdom before St Peter, it is impossible that St Clement could have written to him after the death of St Peter, as that letter supposes.
So, again, though the Commentaries on St Paul, attributed to St Ambrose, were quoted under his name by a vast number of authors, and the imperfect work on St Matthew under that of St Chrysostom; every one, nevertheless, is convinced now that they were not by these saints, but by other ancient authors, involved in many errors.
Finally, the acts which we have of the council of Sinuessa, under Marcellinus, of the two or three of Rome, under St Sylvester, and of another at Rome, under Sextus the Third, would be sufficient to convince us of the reality of these councils if they contained nothing but what was probable and in harmony with the time at which they were said to have been held; but they contain so much that is unreasonable, that does not agree with those times, that the probability of their being false and suppositious is great.
Such are some of the remarks which may be made in relation to these kinds of judgments; but it must not be imagined that they will avail to preserve us always from being deceived. All that they can do, at most, is to enable us to avoid the more obvious errors, and to accustom the mind not to allow itself to be carried away by common places, which, while embodying some general truth, are, nevertheless, false on many particular occasions, which is one of the most considerable sources of the errors of men.