De nuptiis Philologiae et Mercurii, Book V (De rhetorica), part 4 of 4 (about §§ 536-565)
Klimax is climbing, as in Cicero’s speech for Milo: “Nor did he commit himself to the people only but also to the senate, nor to the senate only but also to the public garrisons and arms, nor to these only but also to the power of him to whom the senate had entrusted the whole republic.” Asyndeton is the loosened style, when, the conjunctions by which words or nouns are joined being removed, we utter each one singly, as: “I await the force of the edict, the severity of the praetor, I favor the farmer, I desire [I pray] that Apronius be condemned to eightfold.” Diezeugmenon we call the disjoined, when with different renderings of words we disjoin the cola, whether two or more, in this way: “Having led colonists to Capua they will occupy it, they will fortify Atella with a garrison, Nuceria and Cumae they will hold with a multitude of their own, the other towns they will bind with garrisons.” Epezeugmenon is the joined. This figure differs from the former in that there single different things are rendered to single members, here we join several in one, as: “whose rank shrinks from the humble, whose fortune from the sordid, whose nature from the base reckoning.” For this last, “shrinks from,” has joined the aforesaid. Pleonasmos is the more than necessary, when we add certain words not necessary for stating the matter but for heaping up greatness, as if you say “that Cato,” when it would have sufficed to say the name, to the amplitude we add “that.” Ellipsis is the taking away, contrary to the former figure, when with some word left unsaid we leave the matter rather to be felt, most pleasing by its very speed. These are the figures of elocution, which, however, ought not, as if zealously joined, to be heaped together into the sentence of one conception.
Now the order supplies the precepts of MEMORY, which indeed is agreed to be natural, but it is no doubt that it can also be helped by art. This art is formed by brief precepts but by great exercise. The task of this part is that things and words be grasped not only firmly but also quickly. Not only those things are to be held which have been found by us but also those which have been handled by the adversary in his pleading. Simonides, poet and also philosopher, is said to have found the precepts of this matter. For when the jest of a banquet had suddenly collapsed, and the relatives could not recognize the crushed, he supplied from memory the order of the guests and their names. Admonished by this, he understood that there is an order which confers the precepts of memory. This must be practised in illustrious places, in which the images of things and sentences are to be placed, as, for instance, you may keep in mind the bride veiled with the flame-colored veil, or the murderer’s sword or arms, which images the place, as though deposited there, gives back. For what is written is held in wax and letters; what is committed to memory is marked in places as in wax and page. By images, as by letters, the recollection of things is contained. But, as we said, the matter demands great exercise and labor, in which it is found that this should be observed: that we write ourselves what we wish to keep easily; then, that if what is to be learned is rather long, being divided into parts it will stick more easily; then it will be fitting to put marks on single things, those we most wish to retain; and they are not to be read in a loud voice but rather meditated in a murmur, and it is clear that memory is roused earlier at night than by day, since silence helps widely and attention is not called away outside from the senses. There is indeed a memory of things and of words, but the words are not always to be learned by heart unless the span of time grants room for meditating; it will be enough to have held the things themselves in mind, especially if nothing has come of its natural office.
ACTION the ancients called what is now commonly called, as I know, DELIVERY. It provides that [the oration] conciliate the hearer, that he be led to belief by persuasion, that he grow warm with motions of mind. Its parts are three: voice, face, gesture. To these, as most think, are added the cultivation or bearing of the face. The voice both consists in nature and is preserved modulated by a certain knowledge. In nature the quality and quantity of the voice are dispensed. Knowledge, however, follows how you should use it and what you ought to observe. The goodness of the voice consists in clearness, firmness, sweetness. All these are nourished by observance in food, drink and intercourse, and especially that the body be moved by walking about within a short space with the return hastened. This motion, since it affords easy digestion, without doubt purges the voice too. Too much excursion or long walking weakens and tires. After this walk let us betake ourselves at once to our studies and, before we must speak, color the voice by reading. Nor should one begin by shouting but begin with a thin murmur, by which you can gradually bring out the voice. For the care of the voice, many have said it is pertinent that sitting they utter very few verses in a slow and grave voice, then raise the sound little by little by steps, and by the same steps the speech be drawn back, so that without damage it arrives as far as a murmur. The face must be changed according to the dignity of the sentence, but not as is the custom of actors, who by twisting their faces give spectators ridiculous motions. For these things, which action and the face commend, are to be signified, not to be stared at. But in this part great moderation belongs to the eyes, which are moved now with cheerfulness, now with intentness, now with a threatening look. Nor are the eyes to be pressed by too heavy brows, nor bared by seeking the forehead, which Tully bitterly censures in Piso. Nor are the gestures to be too softly agitated, nor the sides to be drawn down in a womanish way. Nor is the neck to be thrown about unbecomingly, lest one be led into those allurements of Hortensius, which, though used gracefully, he seemed not to use manfully. In sum, the orator is not to hold that gesture by which actors seem to please the stage. The hand should be spread rather extended in contentions, contracted in conversation or narration, and especially in this part one must provide that everything be becoming, which is preserved by prudence rather than by any art of this teaching.
Now the order of promises reminds me to run through the parts of the ORATION, which some more subtly have said are two, others five, some more. Those who assert two note one by which we teach the judges, another by which we move them, and in teaching they ascribe both narration and confirmation as parts, but in moving they have joined the exordium and epilogue, because both at the beginning the hearer must be prepared, and at the end moved, who is going to deliver his sentence. Those who say five parts follow the rational order. For there are exordium, narration, proposition, argumentation, peroration. The EXORDIUM is a speech preparing the hearer for learning the cause. Its virtues are three: that it make the hearer attentive, docile, benevolent. We make him attentive if we say that a great matter is being done, a new one, a public one or one concerning very many; docile if something about the cause is briefly put forth by which we instruct the judge; benevolent we make either from the matter or from the person, from the person either ours or the judges’ or the adversaries’. From ours, if we commend something favorable that we have done, or if we dissolve or lessen something that hurts the cause; from the judges’, if we conciliate them to us either from the blandishments of the cause itself or from outside; from the adversaries’ person in three ways, if we bring them into hatred, envy, contempt: into hatred, if we show them wicked or cruel; into envy, if we show them powerful; into contempt, if base. But the kinds of exordia are two: the beginning and the insinuation. The BEGINNING is that by which at once simply and openly we conciliate the hearers to ourselves; INSINUATION when with an insidious exordium we circumvent the judge. In it there are four modes: the first when the matter itself is bad; the second when the judge has presumed something against us by a contrary opinion or is wearied, or some outcry or derision intervenes.
Before all it must be discussed what is the form of the matter. For there are five: honorable, base, doubtful, humble, obscure. If it is honorable, either the beginning is not to be used or the exordium is to be concluded with amplification; if base, insinuation is to be used; if doubtful, the hearer must be made benevolent; if humble, attentive; if obscure, docile. Insinuation is set out in four ways, when we change either the person by subjoining the matter, or the matter by the person, or the matter by the matter, or the person by the person. For if we must plead in the cause of a courtesan, we say that the matter is rather to be looked at by the judges. Or if a freedman or client of someone pleads, we admonish that the person of the patron, not of this man, is to be considered, and so on. The faults of exordia are these: the vulgar, which can fall upon all causes; the common, which the adversary also can use; the contrary, which the adversary would use better; the affected, which is brought forth with unusual words or foreign matters; the superfluous, which makes the hearer neither attentive nor docile nor benevolent. Further, one must flee what is too long and obscure.
The kinds of NARRATIONS are four: history, fable, argument, and the business-case (_negotialis_) or judicial assertion. HISTORY is such as Livy’s. FABLE is neither true nor like truth, as “Daphne turned into a tree.” ARGUMENT is that which contains not things done but things that could have been done, as in comedies “a father to be feared” and “a courtesan loved.” The JUDICIAL narration is the exposition of things done or like truth. The virtues of narration are three: that it be lucid, that it be probable, that it be brief; and the contrary faults are called by those names. A narration is lucid if it is not confused, if true, if with usual meanings, if we do not show the thing by a long circuit. Probable, if we seem to expound nothing affectedly and as if from nature. Brief, if the assertion is not poured out beyond what the matter demands and at length. Of narrations some belong to the cause and business itself, others are incidental. Those of the cause itself are those without which the matter in hand cannot be understood. Incidental are those which are brought in from outside either for the sake of proof or of example or of amplifying or of envy or of pleasure. Some have said there are five species of narration, as Theodore of Byzantium distinguishes in Greek: prodiegesin, hypodiegesin, paradiegesin, antidiegesin and katadiegesin. The elements of narration also are six: person, cause, place, time, matter, deed. Likewise some narrations are called continuous, others partial. Continuous are those told in a perpetual context without any interruption. Partial are those into which an argument or some digression is interposed. We narrate in six ways: magnifying, lessening, passing over, admonishing, teaching, comparing favor or envy. After the narration it is fitting to add a digression, which they call parekbasis, by which we either rouse the judges or soothe them. But since it is not a part of the oration and is not always to be taken up, it has pleased us to pass it over.
The PROPOSITION is either ours or the adversaries’ or common. Ours: “I charge murder.” The adversaries’: “he says that I committed murder.” Common: “it is asked whether one of ours committed the murder.” Propositions are either of principal questions or of incidental ones, either simple or conjoined. Simple is [luxurious], as “you love a courtesan.” Conjoined are chiefly proposed by partition, which is done in two ways. For either we simply show what we are going to say, or, beforehand, we declare what is agreed between us and the adversary and what is called into doubt. Propositions are either bare or with a reason subjoined. Bare: “you aim at tyranny.” With reason subjoined: “you aim at tyranny. For you have arms at home.” All are taken either simply or by induction. Simply, as if you say, “I shall show a traitor.” By induction, as if we recall the earlier and introduce the following, as if you say, “since I have shown the law unjust, I shall show it useless.” We propose either by concession or by omission. By concession, when, making grace of what we first said, we introduce something, as if you say, “I concede for the moment that he was killed, but I deny that he was slain by this man.” By omission, when we thus pass to the second proposition so as not to concede the earlier in the meantime, as if you say, “now, since I have shown that action is denied to a disgraced person only in private matters, I shall show that it is not denied for the crime of treason.”
PARTITION is that which briefly comprehends the order of the whole division, as in the speech for Quinctius: “we deny that you took possession of the goods of Publius Quinctius by the praetor’s edict.” And first he begins thus: “that there was no cause for demanding the proscription.” To this he subjoins: “nor could he have taken possession by the edict,” and at the end, “nor were they possessed. When I have shown these three,” he says, “I shall conclude.” You observe that the body of the whole oration is arranged through these outlines. Such ought the partition to be that its single parts contain several questions in themselves. For if they are also derived through incidental little questions, the partition itself will be burdened, and from this the judges will think that abundance of matters is to be fled. Therefore Tully too in the same Quinctian speech so partitioned that single heads contained several articles of questions. For see how much the first, “that there was no cause for demanding the proscription,” contains: “that money was not owed to Sextus Naevius and that action ought to have been taken otherwise, that Quinctius had not deserted his bail; second, that he could not take possession by the edict, that he had both a procurator and was defended in his absence and did not hide, and that the other creditors were quiet; and that before it was ordered he was expelled from the common estate before his proscription was commanded, and that he was driven out of the glade by force, contrary to what the praetor had ordered.” From these it is manifest that within the partition the questions are to be placed which are to be published in the execution, so that the judge becomes attentive to us and is not burdened by the abundance of the promises. This too must be looked at: what is agreed between us and the other side, what is called into controversy, and the things agreed are to be enumerated then, if they profit us, as Cicero says in the speech for Marcus Tullius: “that Marcus Tullius suffered loss is agreed between me and the adversary. That the thing was done with force and armed men they do not deny. That it was committed by the slaves of Publius Fabius they dare not deny. Whether it was done with malice is in question.” You see, then, that here in the partition he drew from the conceded what profited him.
ARGUMENTATION is the elocution by which we follow out the arguments themselves in words; ARGUMENTS are those by which the cause is proved. Argumentation is divided into two parts: confirmation and refutation. There are two kinds of arguments: artificial and inartificial. But the artificial has four principal places: before the thing, in the thing, about the thing, after the thing. Before the thing is divided into seven places: from the person, from the thing, from the cause, from the time, from the place, from the manner, from the matter. In the thing the places are twelve: from the whole, from the part, from the genus, from the species, from the difference, through the seven circumstances, which place takes into itself also from the greater to the less, and from the less to the greater, from the property, from the definition, from the name, from the manifold appellation, from the beginning, from the progress or advance, from the perfection or consummation. About the thing the places are ten: from the like, of which the species are five: example, similitude, fable, image [that is, the probable, which is taken from comedy]. Some add also the apologues, such as those of Aesop. Then about the thing I shall follow the places which are from the unlike, from the equal, from the contrary by position and negation, toward something, which is figured by four cases, genitive, dative, accusative, ablative; from those that clash among themselves by having and losing, from the greater to the less, from the less to the greater, from the preceding, from that which is at the same time or from conjuncts, from consequents.
After the thing the places are two: from the outcome and from the judged. There are other places apo tes syzygias, that is, from conjugation or from conjugates, which is as it were joined to the quality of the person, as if we say that he who thinks hostile things is an enemy. Likewise from quality, as: “if he acted angrily, he acted without reason.” From quantity: “if he is a slave, let it be done in the same way.” From conjuncts, that is, apo ton symplokon, as the fasces and toga, the curule chair are the ornaments of magistrates. Likewise there is partition, that is, diairesis, through all the circumstances, that is, when we divide by persons, times and the rest, a variety which pleasantly distinguishes. INARTIFICIAL ARGUMENTS are divided into prejudgments, rumors, tortures, documents, oaths, witnesses. These the orator handles similarly as the artificial. In arguments, however, we must beware lest in some part they hurt us, lest they disagree with each other, lest they be vulgar, lest common with the adversary, lest far-fetched, or above or below the dignity of the cause. Of confirmation I have briefly spoken. Now let us look at the precepts of REFUTATION. For the adversary’s action is refuted either by disproving, when we show that either the whole argument or its parts make against him; or by resisting, when we teach that false things have been assumed for true or that those do not follow from these; or by compensating, if against the argument that is adverse to us we oppose another.
Of QUESTIONS there are two kinds. That which is brought in by us to be confirmed is called prohegoumene (preferred). That which is brought in by the adversaries and must be repelled is called anankaia (necessary). But the former question, which is brought in by us, is made in two ways, so that either separate ones are introduced singly or several jointly. We introduce them in various ways: either by simple proposition or by partition or by figures, which they call dianoiai. This place is manifold. For almost as many are the occasions of introducing a question in this kind as there are figures of sentences. It is made either by solution, that is, kat’ analysin, or by addition or by omission or by concession or by reprehension or by separation, that is, aphorismos, or by admonition or by dissembled proposition or by repeated or by prepared or by partitioned, or by the likeness of the former question or response, or by inversion, that is, when we treat that first question which is second, then that which is first.
That question also which the adversaries have brought in we can refute by the same modes, and we are wont to add when the adversary has put something obscurely or has said it rather for the sake of amplifying than of proving, or when by hypophora we make a step of our proposition, or when we turn the adversary’s proposition to our own side, which we call peristrophe, or when, the second question being proposed, we treat the first. And this is to be done either when we affect the elegance of variety or when the first question tells strongly against us and is not to be put in the first place. In hypophora one must beware lest it be put fully and copiously, although sometimes, for the sake of mocking the adversary, if it increases that about which there is no question, it must be magnified by us, or that we may show what is discrepant. Hypophorae are diminished in three ways: by adding words, by changing, by taking away. Hypophora is the charge of the opposite party; anthypophora its answer.
ANACEPHALAEOSIS is, as it were, a brief repetition of the questions from the head of the cause. Anacephalaeosis is not always to be used, but when we have made a partition or when the cause has proceeded into many questions, yet so that we re-weave the sum of each, not the parts of the parts. We shall use it also in another part of the oration, when the judge’s memory perhaps fails, which is then called epimerismos. Anacephalaeosis, however, is no part of the oration but a certain portion of the epilogue. The EPILOGUE has three parts: the enumeration mentioned, the indignation which we call deinosis, the pity which we call oiktos or eleos. But deinosis is taken from the places of arguments. For with these we not only prove matters but also magnify them. But the complaint, that is, pity, is taken from the same places of arguments from which indignation is taken. The peroration, however, is to be used not at the end of the oration only but where the matter permits, that is, in the digression of the beginnings or of an assiduous narration, and sometimes of the questions too. In the epilogue it must generally be observed that it be brief, since a judge who is moved is at once to be dismissed to deliver his sentence, while he is either angry at the adversaries or pities your tears or is moved by the afflictions of the accused. As she was still speaking, Cyllenius himself nodded to her to pass to the company of the betrothed and the service of the bride. Seeing this, she, determining her assertions, with readier confidence went on to the session of Philology and, kissing her head with a sound—for she did nothing silently, as if she wished—she mingled herself with the fellowship and company of the sisters. At length the assertions of the loquacious page are quickly ended, which yet scarcely sewed the navel of the volume, covered with a mass of bandage, fat with swelling, reddish. If this is approved and lacks disdain, it will bring forth some things which it has woven new, and things will be made known that antiquity passed over; but if with the sneer of pride you twist the bottom of your nose, it will pain the heavenly ones to have shuddered at arms, and then a place will be moved for fear, Silvanus, when you seek Saturn’s sickle. But you, crying out against the crowd of rhetoricians, with the trumpet’s clangor turned, resounding Tullian things, will go away into the camp where neither a hating envier nor black spite may follow you, glorious.