Commentary Aristotle Metaphysics
Conclusion
180. Therefore, all these. Here he draws the conclusion at which he chiefly aims: the things established about the causes, both as to their number and their kinds, are correct. For the foregoing philosophers seem to bear witness to this in being unable to add another genus of cause to those discussed above. This is one of the useful things resulting from the account of the foregoing views.
Another is that evidently the principles of things must be investigated in this science, either all or some of those which the ancient philosophers posited and which have been established above. For this science considers chiefly the formal and final cause, and also in a sense the efficient cause. Now it is not only necessary that the above views be discussed, but after this examination it is also necessary to describe the way in which each of these men has spoken (both in what sense their statements are acceptable and in what sense not), and how the statements which have been made about the principles of things contain a problem.
Lecture 12. The number of material principles
Therefore, all those who hold that the whole is one and say that there is a certain single nature as matter, and that this is bodily and has measure, are clearly at fault in many ways. For they give only the elements of bodies and not those of incorporeal things, as if incorporeal things did not exist.
And in attempting to state the cause of generation and corruption, and in treating all things according to the method of natural philosophy, they do away with the cause of motion.
Furthermore, they did not claim that the substance or whatness of a thing is a cause of anything.
And they were wrong in holding that any of the simple bodies except earth is a principle, without considering how they are generated from each other.
I mean fire, earth, water and air; for some of these are generated from each other by combination and others by separation. Now it makes the greatest difference as to which of these is prior and which subsequent.
For in one way it would seem that the most basic element of all is that from which a thing first comes to be by combination. But such an element will be one which has the smallest parts and is the subtlest of bodies. Hence all those who posit fire as the first principle make statements that conform most closely to this theory. But each of the other thinkers admits that the primary element of bodies is something of this kind.
For none of the later thinkers, and none of those who spoke about the one, wanted earth to be an element, evidently because of the size of its particles. But each of the other three elements finds some supporter, for some say that this primary element is fire, others water, and others air. But why do they not say that it is earth, as in a sense most men do? For they say that everything is earth. And Hesiod says that earth is the first of bodies to be generated; for this happens to be the ancient and common view. Therefore, according to this theory, if anyone says that any of these bodies with the exception of fire is the primary element of things, or if anyone holds that it is something denser than air but rarer than water, he will not speak the truth.
However, if that which is later in generation is prior in nature, and if that which is condensed and compounded is later in generation, then the reverse will be true—water will be prior to air, and earth to water. Let these points suffice, then, regarding those who posit one cause such as we have described.
The same consequence will also be true if anyone posits many elements, as Empedocles says that the four bodies are the matter of things. For these same consequences must befall this man, as well as some which are peculiar to himself. For we see things being generated from each other in such a way that the same body does not always remain fire or earth. But we have spoken of these matters in our physical treatises.
And concerning the cause of things in motion, whether one or more than one must be posited, it must not be thought that what has been said is either entirely correct or reasonable.
And in general those who speak thus must do away with alteration, because the cold will not come from the hot, nor the hot from the cold. For what is it that undergoes these contraries and what is the one nature which becomes fire and water? Such a thing Empedocles does not admit.
But if anyone were to maintain that Anaxagoras speaks of two elements, they would acknowledge something fully in accord with a theory which he himself has not stated articulately, although he would have been forced to follow those who express this view.
For to say, as he did, that in the beginning all things are mixed together is absurd, both because it would be necessary to understand that things previously existed in an unmixed state, and because it is not fitting that anything should be mixed with just anything. Also because properties and accidents could be separated from substances (for there is both mixture and separation of the same things).
Yet, if anyone were to follow him up and articulate what he means, his statement would perhaps appear more astonishing. For when nothing was distinct from anything else, evidently nothing would be truly predicated of that substance. I mean that it would be neither white nor black nor tawny, nor have any color, but would necessarily be colorless; otherwise it would have one of these colors.
Similarly, it would be without humors. And for the same reason it would have no other similar attribute. For it could not have any quality or quantity or whatness, because, if it had, some of the attributes described as formal principles would inhere in it. But this is obviously impossible, since all things are mixed together; they would already be distinct from each other. But he said that all things are mixed together except intellect, and that this alone is unmixed and pure.
Now from these statements it follows for him that there are two principles, one being the intellect itself (for this is unmixed in an absolute sense), and the other being the kind of thing we suppose the indeterminate to be before it is limited and participates in a form. Hence, what he says is neither correct nor clear, although he intends something similar to what later thinkers said and what is now more apparent. But these thinkers are concerned only with theories proper to generation, corruption and motion, for usually it is only of this kind of substance that these men seek the principles and causes.
181. Having stated the opinions which the philosophers held about the principles of things, Aristotle begins here to criticize them. This is divided into two parts.
First, he criticizes each opinion.
Second, he summarizes his discussion and links it up with what follows, at from the foregoing.
First, he criticizes the opinions of those who have treated things according to the method of natural philosophy.
Second, he criticizes the opinions of those, Pythagoras and Plato, who have not treated things according to the method of natural philosophy because they posited higher principles than the natural philosophers did, at but all those.
First, he criticizes the opinions of those who posited one material cause;
and second, the opinions of those who posited many, at the same consequence.
First, he criticizes the foregoing opinions in a general way;
second, in a special way, at and they were wrong.
He criticizes these opinions in a general way by means of three arguments.
The first is this: in the world there are not only bodies but also certain incorporeal things, as is clear from On the Soul. But these men posited only bodily principles, which is clear from the fact that they maintained that the whole is one, that is, that the universe is one thing substantially, and that there is a single nature as matter, and that this is bodily and has measure, or dimension. But a body cannot be the cause of an incorporeal thing. Therefore, it is evident that they were at fault in this respect that they treated the principles of things inadequately. And they were at fault not only in this respect but in many others, as is clear from the following arguments.
182. And in attempting. Here he gives the second argument, which runs thus: whoever feels obliged to establish the truth about motion must posit a cause of motion. But these philosophers felt obliged to treat motion, which is clear for two reasons: first, because they tried to state the causes of generation and corruption in the world, which do not occur without motion; second, because they wanted to treat things according to the method of natural philosophy.