Commentary Aristotle Metaphysics
But since a treatment of things according to this method involves motion (because nature is a principle of motion and rest, as is clear in Physics 2), they should therefore have dealt with that cause which is the source of motion. And since they did away with the cause of motion by saying nothing about it, obviously they were also at fault in this respect.
183. Furthermore, they did not. Here he gives the third argument: every natural being has a substance, that is, a form of the part, and whatness, or quiddity, which is the form of the whole. He says “form” inasmuch as it is a principle of subsistence, and “whatness” inasmuch as it is a principle of knowing, because “what a thing is” is known by means of this. But the foregoing philosophers did not claim that form is a cause of anything. They treated things inadequately, then, and were also at fault in neglecting the formal cause.
184. For none of the later. Here he criticizes their opinions in a special way; and he does this with respect to two things.
First, he criticizes them for maintaining that all the elements with the exception of fire are the principles of things.
Second, he criticizes them for omitting earth, at however, if.
First, he takes up once more the position of those who claimed that each of the simple bodies except earth is the primary element of things. The reason which he gives for this position is that these men saw that the simple bodies are generated from each other in such a way that some come from others by combination or compacting, as grosser things come from more refined ones.
185. He also explains how to proceed against their opinions from their own arguments. For they claimed that one of these elements is the principle of things by arguing that other things are generated from it either by combination or by separation. Now it makes the greatest difference as to which of these two ways is prior and which subsequent, for on this depends the priority or posteriority of that from which something is generated. For, on the one hand, that seems to be prior from which something is produced by combination. And he gives this argument first. Yet, on the other hand, that seems to be prior from which something is produced by rarefaction. And he bases his second argument on this.
186. For the fact that the primary element is that from which something is produced by combination supports the opinion which is now held, that the most basic element is that from which other things are produced by combination. This in fact is evident both from reason and from the things that they held. It is evident from reason because that from which other things are produced by combination is the most refined type of body, and the one having the smallest parts: this seems to be the simpler body. Hence, if the simple is prior to the composite, this body seems to be first. It is also evident from the things that they held, because all those who posited fire as the principle of things asserted that it is the first principle. Similarly, others have been seen to follow this argument, for they thought that the primary element of bodies is the one having the finest parts. This is evident from the fact that none of the later philosophers followed the theological poets, who said that earth is the primary element of things. Evidently they refused to do this because of the size of its parts, that is, because of the coarseness of its parts. However, it is a fact that each of the other three elements finds some philosopher who judges it to be the principle of things. But their refusal to make earth a principle is not to be explained by a refusal to reject a common opinion, for many men thought that earth is the substance of things. Hesiod, who was one of the theological poets, also said that earth is the first of all bodies to come into being. Thus the opinion that earth is the principle of things is evidently an ancient one, because it was maintained by the theological poets, who preceded the philosophers of nature. It was also the common opinion, because many men accepted it. It follows, then, that the later philosophers avoided the position that earth is a principle only because of the coarseness of its parts. But it is certain that earth has coarser parts than water, and water than air, and air than fire; if there is any intermediate element, it is evident that it is grosser than fire. Hence by following this argument it is clear that none of them spoke correctly, except he who held that fire is the first principle. For as soon as some element is held to be a principle by reason of its minuteness, the most minute element must be held to be the first principle of things.
187. However, if that which. Here he gives another argument, and according to it the opposite seems to be true, namely, that earth is the most basic element of things. For it is evident that whatever is subsequent in generation is prior in nature, because nature tends to the goal of generation as the first thing in its intention. But the denser and more composite something is, the later it appears in the process of generation; for the process of generation proceeds from simple things to composite ones, just as mixed bodies come from the elements, and the humors and members of a living body from mixed bodies. Hence, whatever is more composite and condensed is prior in nature. In this way a conclusion is reached which is the opposite of that following from the first argument: water is now prior to air and earth to water as the first principle of things.
188. It should be noted, however, that it is a different thing to look for what is prior in one and the same entity and for what is prior without qualification. For if one seeks what is prior without qualification, the perfect must be prior to the imperfect, just as act is prior to potency. For a thing is brought from a state of imperfection to one of perfection, or from potency to act, only by something completely actual. Therefore, if we speak of what is first in the whole universe, it must be the most perfect thing.
But in the case of one particular thing which goes from potency to complete act, potency is prior to act in time, although it is subsequent in nature. It is also clear that the first of all things must be one that is simplest, for the composite depends on the simple, and not the reverse. It was necessary, then, that the ancient philosophers should attribute both of these properties (the greatest perfection along with the greatest simplicity) to the first principle of the whole universe.
However, these two properties cannot be attributed simultaneously to any bodily principle, for in bodies subject to generation and corruption the simplest entities are imperfect. They were compelled, then, as by contrary arguments, to posit different principles. Yet they preferred the argument of simplicity, because they considered things only insofar as something passes from potency to act, and in this order it is not necessary that anything which is a principle should be more perfect. But this kind of opposition can be resolved only by maintaining that the first principle of things is incorporeal, because this principle will be the simplest one, as Aristotle will prove below.
189. Last of all he concludes that for the purpose of the present discussion enough has been said about the positions of those who affirm one material cause.
190. The same consequence. Here he gives the arguments against those who posited many material causes.
First, he argues against Empedocles;
second, against Anaxagoras, but if anyone.
First, he says that the same consequence faces Empedocles, who held that the four bodies are the matter of things, because he experienced the same difficulty with regard to the above contrariety. For according to the argument of simplicity fire would seem to be the most basic principle of bodies; according to the other argument, earth would seem to be such, as has been stated.
And while Empedocles faced some of the same absurd conclusions as the preceding philosophers (namely, he did not posit either a formal cause or the aforesaid contrariety of simplicity and perfection in bodily things), there is no argument against him for doing away with the cause of motion. But he did face certain other absurd conclusions besides those that confronted the philosophers who posited one material cause.
191. This is shown by three arguments, of which the first is as follows. First principles are not generated from each other, because a principle must always remain in existence, as is pointed out in Physics 1. But we perceive that the four elements are generated from each other, and for this reason their generation is dealt with in natural philosophy. Hence his position that the four elements are the first principles of things is untenable.