Commentary Aristotle Metaphysics
Accordingly, in the first part, he says that the life of animals is ruled by imagination and memory: by imagination in the case of imperfect animals, and by memory in the case of perfect animals. For even though the latter also have imagination, still each thing is said to be ruled by that [power] which holds the highest place within it. Now in this discussion life does not mean the being of a living thing, as it is understood in On the Soul 2, when he says that for living things to live is to be; for the life of an animal in this sense is not a result of memory or imagination but is prior to both of these. But “life” is taken to mean “vital activity,” just as we are also accustomed to speak of association as the life of men. But by the fact that he establishes the truth about the cognition of animals with reference to the management of life, we are given to understand that knowing belongs to these animals not for the sake of knowing, but because of the need for action.
15. Now, as is stated below, in men the next thing above memory is experience, which some animals have only to a small degree. For an experience arises from the association of many singular [intentions] received in memory. And this kind of association is proper to man, and pertains to the cogitative power (also called particular reason), which associates particular intentions just as universal reason associates universal ones. Now since animals are accustomed to pursue or avoid certain things as a result of many sensations and memory, they seem to share something of experience, even though it be slight. But above experience, which belongs to particular reason, men have as their chief power a universal reason by means of which they live.
16. And just as experience is related to particular reason [in men], and customary activity to memory in animals, in a similar way art is related to universal reason. Therefore, just as the life of animals is ruled in a perfect way by memory together with activity that has become habitual through training, or in any other way whatsoever, in a similar way man is ruled perfectly by reason perfected by art. Some men, however, are ruled by reason without art; but this rule is imperfect.
17. Now in men. Here he explains the different levels of human knowing. And in regard to this he does two things.
First, he compares art with experience;
second, he compares speculative art with practical art, at it is only fitting.
He treats the first point in two ways.
First, he explains how art and experience originate.
Second, he explains how one is superior to the other, at in practical matters.
First, he explains how each of the above originates.
Second, he makes this clear by means of an example, at for to judge.
First, he describes how experience originates;
and second, how art originates, at but in men science.
He says first, then, that in men experience is caused by memory. This is the way in which it is caused: from several memories of a single thing a man acquires experience about some matter, and by means of this experience he is able to act easily and correctly. Therefore, because experience provides us with the ability to act easily and correctly, it seems to be almost the same as science and art. For they are alike inasmuch as in either case from many instances a single view of a thing is obtained. But they differ inasmuch as universals are grasped by art and singular things by experience, as is stated later.
18. But in men science and art. Here he describes the way in which art arises. He says that in men science and art come from experience, and he proves this on the authority of Polus, who says that experience causes art and inexperience causes luck. For when an inexperienced person acts correctly, this happens by chance. Furthermore, the way in which art arises from experience is the same as the way spoken of above in which experience arises from memory. Just as one experiential cognition comes from many memories of a thing, so does one universal judgment about all similar things come from the apprehension of many experiences. Hence art has this more than does experience, because experience is concerned only with singulars while art is concerned with universals.
19. Next, he makes this clear by means of examples, at for to judge. When a man has learned that this medicine has been beneficial to Socrates, and to Plato, and to many other individuals who were suffering from some particular disease (whatever it may be), this is a matter of experience. But when a man learns that this particular treatment is beneficial to men who have some particular kind of disease and some particular kind of physical constitution, as it has benefited the feverish, the phlegmatic, and the bilious, it is now a matter of art.
20. In practical matters. He compares art to experience from the viewpoint of preeminence; and in regard to this he does two things.
First, he compares them from the viewpoint of action;
second, from the viewpoint of knowledge, at yet we think.
He says, then, that in practical matters experience seems to differ in no way from art: when it comes to acting, the difference between experience and art (which is a difference between the universal and the singular) disappears, because art operates with reference to singulars just as experience does. Therefore, the aforesaid difference pertains only to the way in which they come to know. But even though art and experience do not differ in the way in which they act, because both act on singular things, nevertheless they differ in the effectiveness of their action. For men of experience act more effectively than those who have the universal knowledge of an art but lack experience.
21. This is because actions have to do with singular things, and all processes of generation belong to singular things. For universals are neither generated nor moved except accidentally, inasmuch as this belongs to singular things. For man is generated when this man is generated. Hence a physician heals man only accidentally, but properly he heals Plato or Socrates, or some man that can be individually named, to whom the nature of man belongs—or rather to whom it is accidental inasmuch as he is the one healed. For even though the nature of man belongs to Socrates per se, still it belongs only accidentally to the one healed or cured. The proposition “Socrates is a man” is a per se one, because, if Socrates were defined, man would be given in his definition, as will be said below in book 4. But the proposition “What is healed or cured is man” is an accidental one.
22. Hence, since art has to do with universals and experience with singulars, if anyone has the theoretical knowledge of an art but lacks experience, he will be perfect insofar as he knows the universal, but since he does not know the singular (since he lacks experience), he will very often make mistakes in healing. For healing belongs to the realm of the singular rather than to that of the universal, because it belongs to the former per se and to the latter accidentally.
23. Yet we think. Here he compares art with experience from the viewpoint of knowing. In regard to this he does two things.
First, he states how art is superior to experience;
and second, he proves this at now this is because.
He claims that art and science are superior to experience in three respects.
First, they are superior from the viewpoint of scientific knowledge, which we think is attained by art rather than by experience.
Second, they are superior from the viewpoint of meeting objections, which occurs in disputes. For in a dispute the one who has an art is able to meet the objections raised against that art, but one who has only experience cannot do this.
Third, they are superior from this point of view. Those who have an art come nearer to the goal of wisdom than men of experience, as it is, that is, it happens to be, more to know if one’s wisdom pursues all things, insofar as it pursues universals. For one who has an art is judged wiser than one who has experience, because he considers universals.
Or in another version: as it is more according to wisdom to know as one pursuing all things, that is, universals.
Another reading has: as more conformable to knowing, since wisdom pursues all things, as if to say: as more dependent upon knowing than upon doing, since wisdom pursues all things, that is, it seeks to reach each single thing, so that those are rather called wise who are more knowing, not those who are more men of action.
Hence another reading expresses this meaning more clearly, saying: as all pursue wisdom more with respect to knowing.
24. Now this is because. Then he proves the superiority of art and science mentioned above, and he does this by means of three arguments.
The first runs thus. Those who know the cause and reason why a thing is so are more knowing and wiser than those who merely know that it is so but do not know why. Now men of experience know that something is so but do not know the reason, whereas men who have an art not only know that something is so but also know its cause and reason. Hence those who have an art are wiser and more knowing than those who have experience.
25. For this reason, too. Here he proves the first aspect of superiority, and this runs as follows. Those who know the cause and reason why a thing is so are compared to those who merely know that it is as the architectonic arts are to the arts of manual laborers. But the architectonic arts are nobler. In a similar way, then, those who know the causes and reasons of things are more knowing than those who merely know that things are so.