Commentary Aristotle Metaphysics
26. The first part of this proof becomes clear from the fact that architects know the causes of the things that are done. In order to understand this we must note that architect means chief artist, from ἄρχος meaning chief, and τέχνη meaning art. Now that art is said to be a chief art which performs a more important operation. Indeed, the operations of artists are distinguished in this way, for some operations are directed to disposing the material of the artifact. Carpenters, for example, by cutting and planing the wood, dispose matter for the form of a ship. Another operation is directed to introducing this form into the matter—for example, when someone builds a ship out of wood that has been disposed and prepared. A third operation is directed to the use of the finished product, and this is the highest operation. But the first operation is the lowest because it is directed to the second and the second to the third. Hence the shipbuilder is a superior artist compared with the one who prepares the wood; the navigator, who uses the completed ship, is a superior artist compared with the shipbuilder.
27. Further, since matter exists for the sake of form, and ought to be such as to befit the form, the shipbuilder knows the reason why the wood should be shaped in some particular way; but those who prepare the wood do not know this. And in a similar way, since the completed ship exists in order to be used, the one who uses the ship knows why it should have some particular form; for the form should be one that befits its use. Thus it is evident that the reason for the operations that dispose the matter is taken from the design of the product in the artist’s mind, and the reason for the operations that produce the form of the artifact is taken from its use.
28. It is evident, then, that the architects know the causes of the things that are done. In fact, we judge and speak about the others—the manual laborers—as we do about certain inanimate things. This is not because they do not perform artful operations, but because they do things without knowing the cause; they know that something is to be done but not why it is, just as fire burns without knowing why. Hence there is a likeness between inanimate things and manual laborers from this point of view: just as inanimate things act without knowing the causes, inasmuch as they are directed to their proper end by a superior intellect, so also do manual laborers. But they differ in this respect: inanimate things perform each of their operations as a result of their nature, whereas manual laborers perform theirs through habit. And while habit is practically the same as nature inasmuch as it is inclined to one definite effect, still habit differs from nature inasmuch as it is open to opposites by reason of human knowledge. For we do not habituate natural bodies, as is stated in Ethics 2. Indeed, it is impossible to cause habits in things that lack knowledge. Now the statements that have been made—as is evident from the statements themselves—must be interpreted as meaning that some men are wiser not insofar as they are practical men of action, as befits men of experience. Rather, they are wiser insofar as they have a plan for things to be done and know their causes, which are the basis of such a plan, as befits architects.
29. In general, a sign of scientific knowledge. Here he gives the second argument, which is as follows: a sign of knowledge is the ability to teach, and this is so because each thing is perfect in its activity when it can produce another thing similar to itself, as is said in Meteorology 4. Therefore, just as the possession of heat is indicated by the fact that a thing can heat something else, the possession of knowledge is indicated by the fact that one can teach (that is, cause knowledge in another).
But men who have an art can teach, for since they know causes they can demonstrate from these; and demonstration is a syllogism that produces knowledge, as is said in Posterior Analytics 1. But men who have experience alone cannot teach; since they do not know the causes, they cannot cause knowledge in someone else. And if they do teach others the things that they know by experience, these things are not learned after the manner of scientific knowledge, but after that of opinion or belief. Hence, it is clear that men who have an art are wiser and more knowing than those who have experience.
30. Furthermore, we do not hold. Here he gives the third argument, which is as follows. Knowing singular things is proper to the senses rather than to any other type of knowing, since our entire knowledge of singular things originates with the senses. Yet we do not hold that any one (that is, any one of the senses) is wisdom, because even though each sense knows that a thing is so, it does not know why it is so. Touch judges that fire is hot but does not know why it is hot. Therefore, men of experience, who have a knowledge of singular things but do not know their causes, cannot be called wise men.
31. It is only fitting. Here he compares practical art with speculative art; and in regard to this he does two things.
First, he shows that a speculative art is wisdom to a greater degree than a practical art.
Second, he answers an objection, at the difference.
He proves his first statement by this argument. In any of the sciences or arts we find that men with scientific knowledge are more admired and are held in higher esteem than all other men, because their knowledge is held to be nobler and more worthy of the name of wisdom. Now the discoverer of any art at all is admired because he perceives, judges, and discerns a cause beyond the perceptions of other men, and not because of the usefulness of his discoveries. We admire him rather as one who is wise and as distinguishing from others. As being wise, indeed, in the subtle way in which he investigates the causes of his discoveries, and as distinguishing from others insofar as he investigates the ways in which one thing differs from another. Or, according to another interpretation, as distinguishing from others is to be read passively, as being distinguished in this respect from others. Hence another text has one who is different. Some sciences, then, are more admirable and worthy of the name of wisdom because their observations are more outstanding, not because they are useful.
32. Therefore, since many useful arts have been discovered (some to provide the necessities of life, as the mechanical arts, and others to introduce us to the sciences, as the logical disciplines), those artists must be said to be wiser whose sciences were discovered not for the sake of utility but merely for the sake of knowing. These are the speculative sciences.
33. That the speculative sciences were not discovered for the sake of utility is made clear by this fact: after all sciences had already been developed (that is, acquired or discovered) which can serve as introductions to the other sciences, or provide the necessities of life, or give pleasure (as those arts whose object is to delight man), the speculative sciences were discovered not for this kind of end, but for their own sake. The fact that they were not discovered for the sake of utility becomes evident from the place in which they were discovered. For they originated in those places where men first applied themselves to such things.
Another version reads, and first in those places where men had leisure, that is, they had time for study because they were released from other occupations as a result of the abundance of necessary things. Hence the mathematical arts, which are speculative in the highest degree, were first discovered in Egypt by the priests, who were given time for study, and whose expenses were defrayed by the community, as we also read in Genesis 47:22.
34. But because the names “wisdom,” “science,” and “art” have been used indifferently, lest someone should think that these terms are synonymous, he excludes this opinion and refers to Ethics 6, where he has explained the difference between art, wisdom, science, prudence, and understanding. To give the distinction briefly, wisdom, science, and understanding pertain to the speculative part of the soul, which he speaks of in that work as the scientific part of the soul. But they differ in that understanding is the habit of the first principles of demonstration, whereas science has to do with conclusions drawn from subordinate causes, and wisdom with first causes. This is the reason it is spoken of there as the chief science. But prudence and art belong to the practical part of the soul, which reasons about our contingent courses of action. And these also differ, for prudence directs us in actions that do not pass over into some external matter but are perfections of the one acting—this is why prudence is defined in that work as the right reason of things to be done. But art directs us in those productive actions, such as building and cutting, which pass over into external matter—this is why art is defined as the right reason of things to be made.
Wisdom deals with causes
35. Now the reason. From what has been said he proves his major thesis: wisdom deals with the causes of things. He says that the reason for undertaking this investigation, that is, the above piece of reasoning, is that the science which is called wisdom seems to be about first causes and principles. This is evident from the foregoing, for the more a man attains to a knowledge of the cause, the wiser he is. This is also evident from the foregoing because the man of experience is wiser than one who has sensation alone without experience; because the artist is wiser than any man of experience; and because among artists the architect is wiser than the manual laborer. And similarly among the arts and sciences the speculative are more scientific than the practical. All these things are clear from the foregoing remarks. It follows, then, that that science which is wisdom in an absolute sense is concerned with the causes of things. The method of arguing would be similar if we were to say that that which is hotter is more afire, and therefore that that which is afire in an absolute sense is hot in an absolute sense.