Commentary Aristotle Metaphysics
Lecture 11
Do corruptible and incorruptible things have the same principles?
Again, there is a problem which has been neglected no less by the moderns than by their predecessors: whether the principles of corruptible and incorruptible things are the same or different.
For if they are the same, how is it that some things are incorruptible and others corruptible? And what is the cause?
The followers of Hesiod and all those who were called theologians paid attention only to what was plausible to themselves and have neglected us. For making the principles of things to be gods or generated from the gods, they say that whatever has not tasted nectar and ambrosia became mortal.
And it is clear that they are using these terms in a way known to themselves, but what they have said about the application of these causes is beyond our understanding.
For if it is for the sake of pleasure that the gods partake of these things, nectar and ambrosia are not the cause of their being. But if they partake of them to preserve their being, how will the gods be eternal in requiring food?
But with regard to those who have philosophized by using fables, it is not worth our while to pay any serious attention to them.
However, from those who make assertions by demonstration it is necessary to find out, by questioning them, why some things derived from the same principles are eternal in nature and others are corrupted. But since they mention no cause, and it is unreasonable that things should be as they say, it is clear that the principles and causes of these things will not be the same.
For the explanation which one will consider to say something most to the point is that of Empedocles, who has been subject to the same error. For he posits a certain principle, hate, which is the cause of corruption.
Yet even hate would seem to generate everything except the one. For all things except God are derived from this. Hence he says: From which have blossomed forth all that was and is—trees, and men and women, and beasts and flying things, and water-nourished fish, and the long-lived gods. And apart from these things it is evident that, if hate did not exist in the world, all things would be one, as he says: For when they have come together, then hate will stand last of all.
For this reason too it turns out that God, who is most happy, is less wise than other beings. For he does not know all the elements, because hate he does not have, and knowledge is of like by like. For one knows earth by earth, water by water, and affection by affection, and hate by mournful hate.
But it is also clear (and this is where our discussion began) that hate no more turns out to be the cause of corruption than of being.
Nor, similarly, is love the cause of existence, for in blending things together into a unity it corrupts other things.
Moreover, he does not speak of the cause of change itself, except to say that it was naturally disposed to be so.
But thus mighty hate was nourished among the members and rose to a position of honor when the time was fulfilled, which, being changeable, dissolved the bond. Hence change is a necessity, but he gives no reason for its necessity.
Yet he alone speaks expressly to this extent. For he does not make some beings corruptible and others incorruptible, but makes all things corruptible except the elements.
But the problem that has been stated is why some things are corruptible and others are not, if they come from the same principles. To this extent, then, it has been said that the principles of things will not be the same.
But if the principles are different, one problem is whether they will be incorruptible or corruptible. For if they are corruptible, it is evident that they must come from something, since all corrupted things are dissolved into the elements from which they come.
Hence it follows that there are other principles prior to these principles. But this is also unreasonable, whether the process stops or goes on to infinity. Further, how will corruptible things exist if their principles are destroyed?
But if they are incorruptible, why will corruptible things come from incorruptible principles, and incorruptible things from others? For this is unreasonable, and is either impossible or requires a great deal of reasoning.
Further, no one has attempted to say that these things have different principles, but all thinkers say that all things have the same principles. But they admit the first problem, considering it a trifling matter.
466. Having investigated in a general way whether all principles belonging to one species are numerically the same, the Philosopher inquires here whether the principles of corruptible and incorruptible things are numerically the same. In regard to this he does three things.
First, he raises the question.
Second, he introduces an argument to show that the principles of corruptible things and those of incorruptible things are not the same, at for if they are the same.
Third, he introduces arguments to show that they are not different, at but if the principles.
He says first, then, that there is a problem which has been neglected no less by the modern philosophers, who followed Plato, than by the ancient philosophers of nature, who also were puzzled about whether the principles of corruptible and incorruptible things are the same or different.
467. For if they are the same. Here he advances an argument to show that the principles of corruptible things and of incorruptible things are not the same. In regard to this he does three things.
First, he gives the argument.
Second, he criticizes the solution of the proposed argument which the theological poets gave, at the followers of Hesiod.
Third, he criticizes the solution which some philosophers of nature gave, at however, from those who.
He says first, then, that if the principles of corruptible and of incorruptible things are held to be the same, since from the same principles there follow the same effects, it seems that either all things are corruptible or all are incorruptible. Therefore, the question arises of how some things are corruptible and others incorruptible, and what the reason is.
468. The followers of Hesiod. He criticizes the solution given by the theological poets.
First, he gives their solution.
Second, he argues against it, at and it is clear that.
Third, he gives the reason why he does not criticize this position with more care, at but with regard to those.
Concerning the first, it must be noted that there were among the Greeks, or philosophers of nature, certain students of wisdom (such as Orpheus, Hesiod, and certain others) who were concerned with the gods and hid the truth about the gods under a cloak of fables, just as Plato hid philosophical truth under mathematics (as Simplicius says in his Commentary on the Categories). Therefore, he says that the followers of Hesiod, and all those who were called theologians, paid attention to what was convincing to themselves and have neglected us, because the truth which they understood was treated by them in such a way that it could be known only to themselves. For if the truth is obscured by fables, then the truth which underlies these fables can be known only to the one who devised them. Therefore, the followers of Hesiod called the first principles of things gods, and said that those among the gods who have not tasted a certain delectable food called nectar or manna became mortal, whereas those who had tasted it became immortal.
469. But some part of the truth could lie hidden under this fable, provided that by nectar or manna is understood the supreme goodness itself of the first principle. For all the sweetness of love and affection is referred to goodness. But every good is derived from a first good. Therefore, the meaning of these words could be that some things are incorruptible by reason of an intimate participation in the highest good, as those which participate perfectly in the divine being. But certain things, because of their remoteness from the first principle, which is the meaning of “not tasting manna and nectar,” cannot remain perpetually the same in number, but only in species, as the Philosopher says in On Generation and Corruption 2. But whether they intended to treat this obscurely, or something else, cannot be perceived any more fully from this statement.