Commentary Aristotle Metaphysics
470. And it is clear. He argues against the aforesaid position. He says that the meaning which these followers of Hesiod wished to convey by the terms “nectar” or “manna” was known to them but not to us. Therefore, their explanation of the way in which these causes are meant to solve this question and preserve things from corruption is beyond our understanding. For if these terms are understood in their literal sense, they appear to be inadequate, because the gods who tasted nectar or manna did so either for the sake of pleasure or because these things were necessary for their existence, since these are the reasons why men partake of food.
Now if they partook of them for the sake of pleasure, nectar and manna could not be the cause of their existence so as to make them incorruptible, because pleasure is something that follows on being. But if they partook of the aforesaid nourishment because they needed it to exist, they would not be eternal, having repeated need of food. Therefore, it seems that gods who are first corruptible, as it were, standing as they do in need of food, are made incorruptible by means of food. This also seems to be unreasonable, because food does not nourish a thing according to its species unless it is corrupted and passes over into the species of the one nourished. But nothing that is corruptible can be responsible for the incorruptibility of something else.
471. But with regard to those. Here he gives his reason for not investigating this opinion with more care. He says that it is not worth our while to pay any attention to those who have philosophized by using fables, that is, by hiding philosophical truth under fables. For if anyone argues against their statements insofar as they are taken in a literal sense, these statements are ridiculous. But if one wishes to inquire into the truth hidden by these fables, it is not evident. Hence it is understood that Aristotle, in arguing against Plato and other thinkers of this kind who have treated their own doctrines by hiding them under something else, does not argue about the truth which is hidden, but about those things that are outwardly expressed.
472. However, from those who make assertions. Then he argues against the answer given by some of the philosophers of nature, and in regard to this he does three things.
First, he gives the argument.
Second, he gives the answer, at for the explanation.
Third, he criticizes it, at yet even hate.
Accordingly, he says, first, that, having dismissed those who treated the truth by using fables, it is necessary to seek information about the aforesaid question from those who have treated the truth in a demonstrative way, by asking them why it is that, if all beings are derived from the same principles, some beings are eternal by nature and others are corrupted. And since these men give no reason why this is so, and since it is unreasonable that things should be as they say (namely, that, in the case of beings having the same principles, some should be corruptible and others eternal), it seems clearly to follow that corruptible and eternal things do not have the same principles or the same causes.
473. For the explanation. Then he gives one solution. He says that the explanation given to the aforesaid question which seems to fit it best is the one which Empedocles gave, although he was subject to the same error as the others, because the explanation which he gave is no more adequate than theirs, as is about to be shown. For he maintained that corruptible and incorruptible things have certain common principles, but that a special principle, hate, causes the corruption of the elements in such a way that the coming together of this cause and another principle produces corruption in the world.
474. Yet even hate. Here he criticizes Empedocles’ argument, and he does this in three ways.
First, he does this by showing that the argument which Empedocles gave is not in keeping with his position;
second, by showing that it is not adequate, at moreover, he does not;
third, by showing that it is not to the point, at yet he alone speaks.
In regard to the first, he does three things.
First, he shows that Empedocles’ argument does not agree with his other views about hate;
second, that it does not agree with his view about God himself, at for this reason;
and third, that it does not agree with his view about love, at nor, similarly.
Accordingly, he says, first, that Empedocles’ position that hate is the cause of corruption is untenable, because according to his position hate also seems to be the cause of the generation of all things except one. For he held that everything else is composed essentially of hate along with the other principles, with the exception of God alone, whom he claimed to be composed of the other principles without hate. Moreover, he called the heavens God, as was stated above in book 1, because Xenophanes, after reflecting upon the whole heavens, said that the one itself is God.
And Empedocles, considering the indestructibleness of the heavens, held that the heavens are composed of the four elements and love, but not of strife or hatred. But in the case of other things, he said that all those which are or were or will be come from hate, such as sprouting trees, and men and women, and beasts (which are terrestrial animals), and vultures (which are flying and long-lived animals), and fish (which are nourished in the water), and the long-lived gods.
And by the gods he seems to mean either the stars, which he held are sometimes corrupted (although after a long period of time), or the demons, which the Platonists held to be ethereal animals. Or by the gods he also means those beings whom the Epicureans held to be of human form, as was stated above. Therefore, from the fact that all living things except one are generated from hate, it can be said that hate is the cause of generation.
475. And in addition to this there is another reason, for, according to Empedocles’ position, it is evident that, if hate did not exist in the world, all things would be one, since hate is the reason why things are distinct. Hence he quotes Empedocles’ words to the effect that, when all things come together into a unity (for example, when chaos comes into being), hate will stand last of all, separating and dissolving things. Hence the text of Boethius says: when it comes together, then chaos knows the ultimate discord. Thus it is clear that, since the being of the world consists in the distinction of things, hate is the cause of the world’s generation.
476. For this reason. Here he gives a second argument, which pertains to the deity. He says that, since Empedocles would hold that hate is not a constituent of the divine composition, it follows, according to his arguments, that God, who is said by all men to be most happy, and consequently most knowing, is less prudent than all other beings who have knowledge. For, according to Empedocles’ position, it follows that God does not know the elements because he does not contain hate. Hence he does not know himself. And like knows like according to the opinion of Empedocles, who said that by earth we know earth, by water, water, and by affection, which is love or concord, we know affection, or love or concord. And in a similar way we know hate by mournful hate, which is sadness, whether unpleasant or evil, according to the text of Boethius, who says that by evil discord we know discord. It is evident, then, that Aristotle thought this untenable and contrary to the position that God is most happy, because he himself would not know some of the things that we know. And since this argument seemed to be beside the point, therefore, returning to his principal theme, he says that, in returning to the point from which the first argument began, it is evident, so far as Empedocles is concerned, that hate is no more a cause of corruption than of being.