Commentary Aristotle Metaphysics
477. Nor, similarly, is love. Here he gives the third argument, which pertains to love. He says that in like manner love is not the cause of generation or being, as Empedocles claimed, if another position of his is considered. For he said that, when all the elements are combined into a unity, the corruption of the world will then take place. Thus love corrupts all things. Therefore, with respect to the world in general, love is the cause of corruption, whereas hate is the cause of generation. But with respect to singular things, hate is the cause of corruption and love of generation.
478. Moreover, he does. Here he shows that Empedocles’ argument is not adequate. For Empedocles said that there exists in the world a certain alternation of hate and friendship, in such a way that at one time love unites all things and afterward hate separates them. But as to the reason why this alternation takes place, so that at one time hate predominates and at another time love, he said nothing more than that it was naturally disposed to be so.
479. And next he gives Empedocles’ words, which, because they are written in Greek verse, are difficult and differ from the common way of speaking. These words are: but thus mighty hate was nourished among the members and rose to a position of honor when the time was fulfilled, which, being changeable, dissolved the bond. But the text of Boethius runs thus: but when mighty discord in the members was promoted to a place of honor, because it marched forward in a completed year, which, when these things have been changed, returns to a full bond. Now in order to understand this it must be noted that he speaks poetically of the whole world as though it were a single living thing in whose members and parts there is found at first the greatest harmony, which he calls love or concord, and afterward there begins to exist little by little a certain dissonance, which he calls discord. And, similarly, in the parts of the universe at first there was maximum concord, and afterward hate was nourished little by little until it acquired a position of honor, that is, it acquired dominion over the elements. This comes about when a completed time is reached or a year is completed, as Empedocles held, which (hate or discord, or the year), being changeable, dissolves the bond, that is, the former union of the elements. Or the year or hate returns to a full bond because by a certain ability and hidden power it returns to predominate over things.
480. After these words of Empedocles, Aristotle, in giving the meaning of the word changeable which he used, explains it as though change were necessary. For he says that Empedocles made the foregoing statements as though it were necessary that there should be an alternation of hate and love, but he gives no reason for this necessity. For, in the case of this one living thing, it is evident that what causes the alternation of hate and love is the motion of the heavens which causes generation and corruption in the world. But no such cause can be assigned for why the whole should be changed in this way by love and hate. Hence it is clear that his argument was inadequate.
481. Yet he alone. Here he shows that this argument of Empedocles is not to the point. He says that Empedocles seems to say expressly, or clearly, only that he does not hold that some of the things derived from these principles are corruptible and others incorruptible, but he holds that all things are corruptible with the exception of the elements alone. Thus he seems to avoid the foregoing problem inasmuch as the question remains why some things are corruptible and some not, if they come from the same principles. Hence it is also clear that his argument is not to the point, because he neglects the very point that requires explanation.
482. But it can be asked how he can say here that Empedocles held all things to be corruptible except the elements, since Empedocles has said above that the one is God, that is, what is composed of the other principles except hate.
It must be noted, however, that Empedocles posited two processes of corruption in the world, as is clear from what was said above. He posited one with respect to the blending of the whole universe, which was brought about by love. From this process he did not make even God immune, because in God he placed love, which caused other things to be mixed with God. And he posited another process of corruption for singular things, and the principle of this process is hate. But he excluded this kind of corruption from God, seeing that he did not posit hate in God. In summing up, then, Aristotle concludes that this much has been said for the purpose of showing that corruptible and incorruptible things do not have the same principles.
483. But if the principles. Here he argues the other side of the question, with two arguments.
The first is this. If the principles of corruptible and incorruptible things are not the same, the question arises of whether the principles of corruptible things are corruptible or incorruptible. If one says that they are corruptible, he proves that this is false by two arguments.
The first runs thus. Every corruptible thing is dissolved into the principles of which it is composed. If, then, the principles of corruptible things are corruptible, it will be necessary to hold also that there are other principles from which they are derived. But this is untenable, unless an infinite regress is posited.
Now it was shown in book 2 that it is impossible to have an infinite regress in principles in any genus of cause. And it would be just as untenable for someone to say that this condition applies in the case of corruptible principles, since corruption seems to come about as a result of something being dissolved into prior principles.
484. The second argument runs thus. If the principles of corruptible things are corruptible, they must be corrupted, because every corruptible thing will be corrupted. But after they have been corrupted they cannot be principles, for what is corrupted or has been corrupted cannot cause anything. Therefore, since corruptible things are always caused in succession, the principles of corruptible things cannot be said to be corruptible.
485. Again, if it is said that the principles of corruptible things are incorruptible, evidently the principles of incorruptible things are incorruptible. Therefore, the question remains of why it is that, from certain incorruptible principles, corruptible effects are produced, and from certain others, incorruptible effects are produced. For this seems to be unreasonable and either is impossible or requires considerable explanation.
486. Further, no one. Then, relative to his main thesis, he gives his second argument, which is drawn from the common opinions of all men. For no one has attempted to say that corruptible and incorruptible things have different principles, but all say that all things have the same principles. Yet, all pass lightly over the first argument, given in favor of the first part of the question, as though it were of little importance; but this is to acknowledge its truth. Hence the text of Boethius says: but they swallow the first argument as though they considered it a minor matter.
Are the principles of corruptible and incorruptible things the same?
487. Now the solution to this problem is given in book 12, where the Philosopher shows that the first active or motive principles of all things are the same, but in a certain sequence. For the first principles of things are unqualifiedly incorruptible and immobile, whereas the second are incorruptible and mobile, that is, the celestial bodies, which cause generation and corruption in the world as a result of their motion. Now the intrinsic principles of corruptible things and of incorruptible things are the same, not numerically but analogically. Still the intrinsic principles of corruptible things, which are matter and form, are not corruptible in themselves, but only accidentally. For it is in this way that the matter and form of corruptible things are corrupted, as is stated in Physics 1.