Commentary Aristotle Metaphysics
Lecture 4. Opinions about the material cause
It is evident, then, that one must acquire scientific knowledge of those causes which stand at the beginning, for we say that we have scientific knowledge of each thing when we think we comprehend its first cause. Now causes are spoken of in four ways. Of these we say that one is the substance or quiddity of a thing, for the first “why” of a thing is reduced to its ultimate intelligible structure, and the first why of a thing is a cause or principle. Another is the matter or subject. A third is the source of motion. A fourth is the cause which is opposite to this, namely, that for the sake of which, or the good; for this is the goal of every generation and motion. There has been sufficient consideration of these in our works on nature.
However, let us examine those who have undertaken an investigation of existing things and have philosophized about the truth before us. For evidently they too speak of certain principles and causes. Therefore, to us who come later [their views] will serve as an introduction to the study which we are now making, for we shall either discover some other genus of cause, or be more convinced of those which have just been expounded.
Most of those who first philosophized thought that only the things that belong to the species of matter are the principles of all things. For that of which all things are composed, from which they first come to be, and into which they are finally dissolved while their substance remains (although it is changed in its attributes)—this they call the element and principle of existing things.
And for this reason they thought that nothing is either generated or corrupted, as if such a reality always remained in existence. And just as we do not say that Socrates comes to be in an unqualified sense when he becomes good or musical, or is corrupted when he loses these states, because the subject Socrates himself remains, in the same way they say that nothing else is generated or corrupted. For there must be some matter, either one or more than one, from which other things come to be, and which itself remains in existence. However, they do not all speak in the same way about the number and nature of such a principle.
Thales, the originator of this kind of philosophy, says that this principle is water; this is why he also claimed that the earth rests upon water.
For presumably he took this position because he saw that the nutriment of all things is moist, that heat itself is generated from this, and that animal life comes from this. But that from which each thing comes to be is a principle of all things. He bases his opinion on this, then, and on the fact that the seeds of all things have a moist nature, and water is by nature the principle of moist things.
But there are some who think that the ancients who lived long before the present generation and were the first to speculate about the gods held this view about the nature of things. For they made Oceanus and Tethys the parents of generation, and held the oath of the gods to be by a body of water, to which the poets gave the name Styx. For what is oldest is most honorable, and what is most honorable is that by which one swears. Whether this view of nature is in fact the ancient and primary one is perhaps uncertain. Thales is said to have expressed himself in this way about the first cause, but no one could say that Hippo is to be included in this group, because of the weakness of his understanding.
Anaximenes and Diogenes hold that air is prior to water and is the most fundamental of the simple bodies.
Hippasus of Metopontium and Heraclitus of Ephesus hold that fire [is the primary principle].
Empedocles holds that there are four [simple bodies], since he adds a fourth—earth—to those already mentioned. For he says that these always remain and only become many or few in number by being combined into a unity and separated out of a unity.
Anaxagoras of Clazomenae, who was prior to Empedocles in years but later in his speculations, says that the principles of things are infinite in number. For he says that nearly all bodies which are made up of parts like themselves, such as fire or water, are generated or corrupted merely by combining and separating; but that otherwise they are neither generated nor corrupted but always remain in existence. From these views, then, one might think that the only cause is the one which is said to belong to the species of matter.
69. Having set forth a preface in which he indicates the aim of this science, its dignity and goal, Aristotle begins to deal with this science; and this is divided into two parts.
In the first, he explains what the first philosophers had to say about the causes of things.
In the second, he begins to pursue the truth of this science. He does this in book 2, at theoretical or speculative knowledge.
The first part is divided into two members.
First, he gives the opinions of the philosophers about the causes of things.
Second, he criticizes them insofar as their statements are unsatisfactory, at therefore, all those.
First, he takes up again the enumeration of causes which was treated in greater detail in Physics 2.
Second, he presents the opinions of the philosophers, at however, let us examine.
The four causes and three characteristics of final cause
70. Accordingly, he first says that, since it is evident that wisdom speculates about causes, we ought to begin by acquiring knowledge from the causes of things. This also seems to be in keeping with the intelligible structure of science, because we say that we know each thing scientifically when we think we are not ignorant of its cause.
Now causes are spoken of in four ways. One of these is the formal cause, which is the very substance of a thing by which we know what each thing is. For it is well known, as is stated in Physics 2, that we do not say that anything has a nature before it has received a form. Now it is clear that a form is a cause, because to answer the question “Why is something so?” we go back to its formal cause as its ultimate explanation, beginning with proximate forms and proceeding to the ultimate form. But evidently the “why” asks about a cause and principle. Hence it is evident that a form is a cause. A second cause is the material cause. A third is the efficient cause, which is the source of motion. A fourth is the final cause, which is opposite to the efficient cause as a goal is to a starting-point, for motion begins with the efficient cause and terminates with the final cause. This cause is also that for the sake of which a thing comes to be, and the good of each nature.
71. He makes the final cause known by three considerations. It is the goal of motion, and thus is opposite to the source of motion, which is the efficient cause. It is first in intention, and for this reason is said to be that for the sake of which. And it is desirable of itself, and for this reason is called a good, for the good is what all desire.
Hence, in explaining how the final cause is opposite to the efficient cause, he says that it is the end of every process of generation and motion, whose starting point is the efficient cause. By these two types of change he seems to imply that there is a twofold goal. For the goal of a process of generation is the form itself, which is a part of a thing. But the goal of motion is something sought for outside the thing moved. He says that he has treated these causes at sufficient length in the Physics, lest he should be asked to make a more extensive treatment of them.
72. However, let us examine. Here he states what the philosophers had to say about the causes; and in regard to this he does two things.
First, he gives the reasons why this must be done;
and, second, he begins to carry out his plan, at most of those.
Accordingly, he says that even though there is a treatise on the causes in the Physics it is still necessary to consider the opinions of the philosophers who first undertook an investigation of the natures of existing things, and have philosophized about the truth before him; because they too set down causes and principles. Therefore, for us who have come later, a consideration of their opinions will be first, or a preamble, in the study, that is, to the art which we are now seeking.