Commentary Aristotle Metaphysics
Hence the text of Boethius also says: therefore, as we enter upon the task of this science, their opinions will constitute a preamble to the road that is now to be traveled. Another text has: therefore, as we enter upon our present course it will be a certain work of life in the investigation that now confronts us, and it must be read in this way: therefore, as we enter upon our present course, that is, upon the present study and art, it will be necessary to consider the opinion of these men as a work of life, that is to say, as necessary, like works which are done for the preservation of life, so that this reading is interpreted as a metaphorical way of speaking, meaning by work of life anything necessary.
Now this is useful, because from the opinions of these men we will either discover another genus of causes over and above those already enumerated, or be more convinced of the things that have just been stated about the causes, namely, that there are four of them.
73. Most of those. Here he begins to deal with the opinions of the ancient philosophers; and in regard to this he does two things.
First, he states their opinions;
second, he finds fault with them, at therefore, all those.
First, he states the opinions which each one of the philosophers held about the causes.
Second, he summarizes the discussion, at we have examined.
The first part is divided into two parts.
In the first, he gives the opinions of those who omitted the formal cause.
In the second, he gives the opinion of Plato, who was the first to posit a formal cause, at after the philosophies.
First, he gives the opinion of those who claimed that certain evident things are principles.
Second, he gives the opinions of those who devised extrinsic principles, at Leucippus and his colleague.
First, he touches on the opinions which the ancient philosophers held about the material cause;
second, on their opinions about the efficient cause, at but as men.
First, he states in a general way the views of those who posited a material cause.
Second, he examines their views in detail, at Thales, the originator.
First, he states their opinions about the material cause.
Second, he states their opinions about the generation of things, which follow from the first, at and for this reason.
Opinions of those who gave only material cause; four characteristics of matter
74. Accordingly, he says first that most of those who first philosophized about the natural world held that the principles of all things are merely those which are referred to the species of material cause. In regard to this, it must be said that they took the four conditions of matter which seem to belong to the notion of a principle.
For that of which a thing is composed seems to be a principle of that thing. But matter is such a thing, for we say that a thing that has matter is “of” its matter, as a knife is of iron.
That from which a thing comes to be (which is also a principle of the process of generation of that thing) seems to be one of its causes, because a thing comes into being by way of generation. But a thing first comes to be from matter, because the matter of things precedes their production. And a thing does not come from matter in an accidental way, for a thing is generated in an accidental way from its contrary or privation, as when we say that white comes from black.
Third, that into which all things are ultimately dissolved by corruption seems to be a principle of things. For just as principles are first in the process of generation, in a similar way they are last in the process of dissolution. Obviously this too pertains to matter.
Fourth, since a principle must remain in existence, then that which remains throughout the process of generation and corruption seems to be a principle. Now the matter which they said is the substance of a thing remains throughout every transmutation, although its attributes, such as its form and everything that accrues to it over and above its material substance, are changed. From all these considerations they concluded that matter is the element and principle of all beings.
No generation or corruption without a material cause
75. And for this reason. Then he gives, as a secondary point, what they held as following from the above—namely, that in the world nothing is generated or corrupted in an absolute sense.
For when some change occurs with regard to a thing’s attributes, and its substance remains unchanged, we do not say that it is generated or corrupted in an absolute sense, but only in a qualified one. For example, when Socrates becomes good or musical, we do not say that he simply comes to be, but comes to be this. And similarly when he loses a state of this kind, we do not say that he is corrupted in an absolute sense, but only in a qualified one. But matter (which is the substance of things according to them) always remains, and every change affects some of a thing’s accidents, such as its attributes.
From this they concluded that nothing is generated or corrupted in an absolute sense, but only in a qualified one.
76. Yet even though they all agreed in positing a material cause, nevertheless they differed in their position in two respects: first, with respect to the number of material causes, because some held that there is one, and others many; second, with respect to its nature, because some held that it is fire, others water, and so on. Similarly, among those who posited many material causes, some assigned certain ones as the material principles of things, and some the others.
77. Thales, the originator. Here he begins to give the opinions of each of the philosophers about the material cause.
First, he gives the opinions of those who posited one material cause;
second, the opinions of those who posited many, at Empedocles.
In regard to the first he does three things.
First, he gives the opinions of those who claimed that water is the principle of all things;
second, he gives the opinion of those who made air the principle of things, at Anaximenes;
and third, the opinion of those who claimed that fire is the principle of things, at Hippasus.
In regard to the first he does two things.
First, he gives the opinion of Thales, who said that water is the principle of things;
second, the reason for this opinion (for presumably).
He says then that Thales, the originator of this kind of philosophy, speculative philosophy, said that water is the first principle of all things. Thales is said to have been the originator of speculative philosophy because he was the only one of the seven wise men who came after the theological poets to make an investigation into the causes of things, the other sages being concerned with moral matters.
The names of the seven wise men are as follows. The first was Thales of Miletus, who lived during the time of Romulus and when Achaz, King of Israel, was reigning over the Hebrews. The second was Pittacus of Mitylene, who lived when Sedecias was reigning over the Hebrews and when Tarquinius Priscus was reigning over the Romans. The other five sages were Solon of Athens, Chilo of Lacedaemon, Periander of Corinth, Cleobulus of Lydia, and Bias of Prienne, all of whom lived during the period of the Babylonian captivity.
Hence, since Thales alone among these men investigated the natures of things and distinguished himself by committing his arguments to writing, he is described here as the originator of this science.
78. Nor should it be thought unfitting if he touches here on the opinions of those who have treated only the philosophy of nature, because, according to the ancients, who knew no other substance except the bodily and mobile, it was necessary that first philosophy be the philosophy of nature, as is stated in book 4. And from this position Thales next adopted this one, that the earth rests upon water, as anything having a principle is based on its principle.
79. For presumably he took. Here he gives the reasons by which Thales could be led to the above position.
First, he shows how he was led to this position by his own reasoning;
and second, by the authority of his predecessors, at but there are some.
Now he was led by two lines of reasoning.
One is taken from the cause itself of a thing.
The other is taken from a consideration of the generation of things, at and on the fact.
Therefore, these premises are related. For the second follows from the first, because that which is a principle of being of other things is also the first principle from which things are generated. The third follows from the second, because by corruption each thing is dissolved into that from which it was generated. The fourth follows from the second and the third; for that which precedes the generation of things and remains after they have been corrupted must always remain in being.