Commentary Aristotle Physics
Lecture 5
There is no alteration in form and figure, nor in habit and disposition of the body
All things that are altered are altered by sensible things. And there is alteration only of those things that in themselves are said to suffer from these. We will consider these.
Of the other things one will especially think that there is alteration in figures and forms and habits in regard to both their removal and their reception. For this seems to be alteration. But this is not so in these things. Rather, these things came to be when certain things are altered. For the matter becomes dense or rarefied, or becomes hot or cold. But there is no alteration.
That from which the form of state is we do not call form, nor that from which the figure of pyramid or bed is. Rather, we denominate this “bronzen,” and that “waxen,” and another “wooden.” But that which is altered we call form. For we say that bronze is wet or strong or hot. And not only thus, but we say the wet and hot is bronze, predicating the matter equally with the passion. Hence, since that from which the form and figure is and which was made is not equally predicated with the figures that are from it; and since things that are altered are predicated equally with the passions, it is clear that there is alteration only in sensible things.
Further, there is another inconsistency. To say that a man or a house is altered, by taking the end, is ridiculous. If we say that the perfection of a house, either the roofing or the bricking, is an alteration, then when the house has been closed or bricked, it is being altered. However, it is clear that that which pertains to alteration is not in things that are becoming.
Nor is there alteration in habits. For habits are virtues and vices. And all virtues and vices are relations. Thus health is a certain proportion of cold and hot things, either of these that are within or to the container. Likewise beauty and agility are relations. For certain dispositions of the perfect are to the best. I call that perfect which is healthy and is disposed concerning nature. Therefore, since virtues and vices are in relation, and since these are not generations, nor is there generation of them or any alteration, it is clear that there is altogether no alteration of habit.
913. Because the Philosopher had assumed in the preceding argument that every alteration takes place in respect of what is sensible, he now undertakes to prove this.
First, he proposes what he intends;
second, he proves the proposition, at of the other things (245b21; [914]).
He says first (245b19) that, from what will follow, it must be considered that all things that are altered are altered according to sensible qualities and that, consequently, to be altered belongs only to those things that are per se affected by such qualities.
914. Then, at of the other things (245b21), he proves his proposition by arguing from the greater to the lesser.
First, he posits the proposition;
second, he proves certain things he assumed, at that from which the form (245b26; [915]).
He thus says first (245b21) that, in addition to the sensible qualities (the third species of quality), alteration seems to occur especially in respect to the fourth species of quality, a quality concerned with quantity—namely, form and figure—and to the first species, which contains habits and dispositions. For when such qualities are freshly removed or newly acquired, alteration seems to be involved, for these things seem unable to occur without some changes and a change in respect of quality is alteration, as was said above.
But, in the above-mentioned qualities of the first and fourth species, there is no alteration primarily and principally, but only in a secondary sense, for such qualities follow upon alterations of the primary qualities, as is clear from the fact that, when the underlying matter becomes dense or rare, a consequent change of figure results. In like manner, when it becomes hot or cold, there follows a change in regard to health and sickness, which pertain to the first species of quality. Rare and dense and hot and cold are sensible qualities, and so it is clear that there is not alteration in the first and fourth species of quality primarily and per se; rather, the receiving or removing of them are a consequence of some alteration affecting sensible qualities.
From this, it is also plain why he makes no mention of the second species of quality, that is, natural potency and impotency. For it is clear that these latter are not received or lost without a change in the nature, which takes place through alteration. That is why he did not mention them.
915. Then, at that from which the form (245b26), he proves what he had supposed:
first, that alteration does not occur in the fourth species of quality;
second, that it does not occur in the first species, at further, there is another inconsistency (246a25; [916]).
In regard to the first, he gives two reasons, the first of which (245b26) is based on the way people speak. Here it must be considered that form and figure mutually differ: figure implies termination of quantity, for the figure is that which is confined by the terminus or termini; but form is something that gives artifacts a kind of species, for the forms of artifacts are accidents.
He says, therefore, that we do not call form that from which the form of a statue comes to be; that is, the matter of the statue is not predicated of the statue primarily and rightly, and the same is so for the figure of a pyramid or of a couch; rather, in all such cases, the matter is predicated denominatively. For we say that a triangle is wooden or golden or waxen. But, in things that are altered, we predicate of the subject the quality received by the alteration, for we say that brass is wet and strong and hot, and we conversely say that the wet thing or the hot thing is brass—that is, we predicate the matter of the quality and the quality of the matter. And we say that a man is a white thing and that some white thing is a man. Therefore, because in forms and figures, the matter is not predicated conversely with the figure such that either could be said of the other primarily and rightly, but rather the matter is predicated of the figure only in a denominative way—whereas in things that are altered, the subject and the quality are mutually predicated—from this it follows that, in forms and figures, there is not alteration but only in sensible qualities.
916. He gives a second reason at “further, there is another inconsistency” (246a25), and it is based on a property of a thing. For it is foolish to say that a man or a house or anything else is altered just because it receives the end of its perfection. For example, if a house is made perfect when it gets a roof or when it is decorated or enclosed with walls, it is ridiculous to say that the house is being altered when it becomes roofed. It is also clear that, with things that come to be, alteration does not affect them precisely as coming to be; rather, a thing becomes perfect and comes to be inasmuch as it receives its own form and figure. Consequently, alteration is not involved in the receiving of figure and form.
917. In order to make these reasons clearer, we should consider that, of all qualities in a thing, it is figure that both follows upon the species and indicates it. This is particularly evident in animals and plants, in which there is no more sure way to judge a diversity of species than by a diversity of figure. The reason for this is that, just as quantity is the nearest of all the accidents to the substance, so the figure, which is a quality affecting quantity, is nearest to the substantial form. Hence, just as some philosophers supposed that dimensions were the substances of things, so they supposed that their figures were their substantial forms. It is for this reason that an image, which is an express representation of a thing, is based especially on the figure, rather than on the color or something else. And, since art imitates nature and an artifact is an image of a natural thing, the forms of artificial things are the figure or something close to the figure. And therefore, on account of the similarity of forms and figures to substantial forms, the Philosopher says that the receiving of form and figure is not alteration, but perfection. And that is also why the matter is not predicated of them except denominatively, similarly to the case of natural substances—for we do not say that a man is earth, but of earth.
918. Then, at nor is there alteration in habits (246a29), he shows that there is not alteration in the first species of quality:
first, in regard to habits and dispositions of the body;
second, in regard to habits and dispositions of the soul, at nor is there alteration of the virtues (246b27; [919]).
In regard to the first, he gives this argument. Habits that are in the first species of quality, even if they be bodily, are called virtues and vices. For in general, the virtue of a thing is what makes it good and renders its work good; hence a virtue of the body is that according to which it is well kept in itself and acts well, for instance, health; or, on the other hand, it is a vice, as is sickness.
Now, every virtue and vice is spoken of as relations. And this he makes clear by examples. For health, which is a virtue of the body, is a definite harmony of the hot and the cold, and I say that this harmony is in respect to the due proportion of these that are within, that is, of the humors, of which the body is composed, both in relation to themselves or to the container, that is, to the whole body. For a proportion of humors that would be health in a lion would be not health for a man, but destruction, for his nature would not stand it.
The Commentator refers the phrase to the container to the surrounding air. But the first explanation is better, because the health of an animal is not considered in relation to the air; rather, the disposition of the air is called healthy in relation to the animal.
Likewise, beauty and agility are said in relation to something (agility is taken here for the disposition whereby one is disposed for motion and action). For such dispositions are in a thing that is perfect in its nature in comparison to the best, that is, to the end, which is operation. For as it was said, such dispositions are called virtues because they make their possessor good and his work good. Therefore, these dispositions are described in reference to their due work, which is the best for a thing.
There is no use trying to explain best in terms of something extrinsic, as in the case of what is most beautiful or most healthy, as the Commentator does, for it is accidental to beauty and health that they be related to something extrinsic disposed in the best possible manner; rather, what is per se is their relation to a good work.
And lest anyone understand by perfect a thing that has already attained its end, he says that perfect is here taken in the sense of what is healthy and disposed according to nature. But it must not be supposed here that such habits and dispositions are of their very nature relations, for thus they would not be in the genus of quality. The point is that their definition depends on a relation of some sort.
Therefore, because habits of this kind imply a relation, and in relation, there is neither motion nor generation nor alteration, as was proved in book 5, it is clear that, in habits of this kind, there is not alteration primarily and per se; rather, a change follows upon a previous alteration of the hot and the cold or of something of this sort, just as relations begin to exist as a consequence of certain motions or changes.