Commentary Aristotle Physics
Lecture 6
There is no alteration in the first species of quality in regard to habits of the soul
Nor is there alteration of the virtues and vices of the soul. For virtue is a certain perfection. Each thing is most perfect when it attains its proper virtue, and then it is best in respect to nature. Thus a circle is best in respect to nature when it is most circular. And vice is the corruption and removal of these things.
Both the reception of virtue and the removal of vice occur when something is altered. Nevertheless, there is alteration of neither of these.
It is clear that something is altered. For virtue either is a certain impassiveness or thus passive. But vice is passivity or the passion contrary to virtue.
All moral virtue occurs in pleasant and sad things. The pleasure is either in respect to act or through memory or hope. If it is in respect to act, the sense is the cause. If it is through memory or through hope, it is from one’s self. The qualities that we have suffered are in those who remember pleasure, or the qualities that we will suffer are in those who hope.
Nor is there alteration in the intellective part of the soul. For knowing is best called a relation. This is clear: knowledge does not occur in us in respect to any potency for motions, but when something appears. For we take universal knowledge from experience in respect to the part.
Neither, therefore, is there generation of act unless one says that sight and touch are generations. For such things are acts.
Since the reception of knowledge is from a principle, there is neither generation nor alteration. For in rest and quiet the soul becomes knowing and prudent. Thus, when a sleeping man awakens, or when a drunken man ceases, or when a sick man is ordered, he is not made a knower, although before he could not use and act in accordance with knowledge. When disturbance is changed and the mind returns to its state, the potency for the suitability of knowledge was there. Therefore, in this way something comes from the beginning to things that exist of knowledge: there is a certain quiet and subsiding from disturbance. Hence children cannot learn from and judge sensibles, as do presbyters. For there is much disturbance and motion about them. Moreover, disturbance ceases and is driven away sometimes by nature, sometimes by other things. In both cases something is altered, as when one arises and becomes awake to act. It is clear, therefore, that there is alteration in sensible things and in the sensible part of the soul, but not in any other thing, except accidentally.
919. After showing that alteration does not occur in the first species of quality in respect of dispositions of the body, the Philosopher shows the same about the habits of the soul:
first, as to the appetitive part of the soul;
second, as to the intellectual part of the soul, at nor is there alteration (247a28; [923]).
About the first, he does two things:
first, he shows that there is no primary and per se alteration in changes that affect virtues and vices;
second, that changes involving virtue and vice are consequences of other alterations, at both the reception of virtue (247a20; [921]).
920. He concludes first (246b27) from the foregoing that, with respect to virtues and vices that pertain to the appetitive part of the soul, there is no primary and per se alteration. And he mentions this as a conclusion because he will proceed to prove it with the same arguments as he proved the previous points.
Accordingly, in order to prove this, he makes the assumption that virtue is a kind of perfection. And this he proves in the following manner. A thing is perfect when it can attain to its own virtue or power; for example, a natural body is perfect when it can make something like unto itself, and this is a virtue of the nature. He also proves this by the fact that a thing is most according to nature when it has the virtue of its nature (for virtue in a nature is a sign that the nature is complete), and when a thing has its nature completely, it is said to be perfect. And this is true not only in natural things but also in things mathematical, where their form is taken as the nature, for it is then that a figure is most circular, that is, a perfect circle, namely, when it is best in respect to nature, that is, when it has the perfection of that form. In this way, then, it is evident that, since the virtue of a thing follows upon the perfection of its form, a thing is perfect when it possesses its virtue. Consequently, virtue is a kind of perfection.
With the premise proved thus, the Commentator says that the full argument will be this. Every perfection is simple and indivisible; but no alteration or motion can affect what is simple and indivisible, as was proved above; therefore, in respect of virtue, there can be no alteration.
But this reasoning will not apply to what Aristotle adds about vices, which are the removal and ceasing to be of a perfection. For although a perfection is simple and indivisible, yet the departure from perfection is not simple and indivisible, but occurs in many different ways. Again, it is not the custom of Aristotle to ignore a fact on which the conclusion chiefly depends, unless that fact is implied by something else he mentions.
Therefore, it is better to say that the argument here must be like the one used above for form and figure. For nothing is said to be altered when it is being made perfect or, for the same reason, when it is being corrupted. Hence, if virtue is a perfection and vice a corruption, there will be no alteration in respect of them any more than there is in respect of forms and figures.
921. Then, at “both the reception of virtue” (247a20), he shows that a change in virtue and vice is a result of some alteration.
And first he proposes what he intends and says that the receiving of a virtue and the removal of a vice (or vice versa) take place when something is altered in such a way that, on the occasion of that alteration, there follows the receiving and loss of virtue and vice. Nevertheless, neither of these is a primary and per se alteration.
Then, at “it is clear that something is altered” (247a22), he proves the proposition and says that it is clear from the following that something must be altered in order that it receive or lose a vice or a virtue.
This is seen to be proved in two ways.
First, it is proved according to two opinions that men have about virtue and vice. For the Stoics declared that virtues are impassibilities and that no virtue can exist in the soul unless all the passions of the soul are first removed (that is, fear, hope, and so on). For they said that such passions are disturbances and ailments of the soul, whereas virtue is a peaceful and healthy state of soul. Accordingly, they said that the very capacity to undergo emotion is an evil or vice of the soul.
However, the opinion of the Peripatetics, derived from Aristotle, is that virtue consists in a defined control of the passions. For a moral virtue establishes a mean in the passions, as is said in Ethics 2.7. And, according to this, even the vice opposed to a virtue is not any kind of passibility at all, but a certain inclination to the passions contrary to the virtue, which are reckoned in terms of excess and defect.
Now, whichever may be true, the reception of virtue depends on some modification in the realm of the passions, either that the passions be entirely removed or that they be controlled. But the passions themselves, since they exist in the sense appetite, are subject to alteration. What remains, therefore, is that the receiving and loss of virtue and vice occur as a result of an alteration.
922. Then, at “all moral virtue occurs” (247a23), he proves the same thing in this way. Every moral virtue consists in some delight or sadness, for a person is not just unless he enjoys just works and becomes sad at their contrary, and the same is true of the other moral virtues. The reason for this is that the activity of every appetitive power, in which moral virtue exists, is terminated at delight or sadness, since delight follows upon the attainment of what the appetite seeks and sadness upon the attainment of what the appetite dislikes. Hence, a person who desires or hopes is delighted when he attains what he desires or hopes for. In like manner, the angry person is delighted when he punishes. On the other hand, one who fears or hates something becomes sad when the evil he sought to escape occurs. But all sadness and delight are caused either by the actual presence of a thing or by the memory of a past thing or by hope of a future thing. Therefore, if delight concerns an actual present thing, the cause of this delight is a sense, for an agreeable thing does not delight unless it be sensed. Likewise, if the delight is based on memory or on hope, it proceeds from a sense, as when we remember sense pleasures we experienced in the past or ones we hope to experience in the future. From this, it is clear that delight and sadness are based on the soul’s sensitive part, in which alteration occurs, as was said above. If, therefore, delight and sadness are involved in moral virtue and moral vice, and it is possible to undergo alteration in respect of delight and sadness, then it follows that the reception and loss of virtue and vice are consequent upon some alteration.
It is significant that he said that the whole of moral virtue consists in delights and sadnesses, in order to distinguish it from intellectual virtues, which also have their own delight. But that delight is not according to sense. Consequently, it has no contrary, nor can there be alteration in respect to it, except in a metaphorical sense.
923. Then, at nor is there alteration (247a28), he shows that alteration is not found in the intellectual part of the soul.
First, he proves this in general;
second, in greater detail, at “neither, therefore, is there generation” (247b21; [924]).
In regard to the first (247a28), he gives this argument. Knowing is especially spoken of as a relation, that is, to the knowable, the likeness of which existing in the knower is science.
This he now proves. It is only in relation, and in no other genus, that something happens to a thing without its being changed; for something can become equal to something else without itself being changed, the other alone having been changed.
Now, we can see that even though no change occurs in the intellectual power, knowledge comes to be—for science comes to be merely on the occasion of something existing in the sensitive part. In effect, from experiencing particular things, which pertain to the sensitive part, we receive knowledge of the universal in the intellect, as is proved in Metaphysics 1 and in Posterior Analytics 2.19. Therefore, since there is no motion in relation, as was proved above, it follows that there is no alteration involved in receiving science.
924. Then, at neither, therefore, is there generation (247b21), he shows in detail that there is no alteration in the intellectual part:
first, in the case of one who already has science and speculates upon it, which is to use science;
second, in the case of one who receives science for the first time, at since the reception of knowledge (247b22; [925]).
He thus says first that, although there is no alteration in the intellectual part of the soul, it cannot be said that the use of science (which is “to consider”) is a type of generation any more than we can say that, when the eye externally regards an object or when one touches, there is generation. For just as seeing is the act of the visual potency and touching is the act of the tactile one, so to consider is an act of the intellectual potency. Now, act does not imply that a principle is being generated, but rather that there is a proceeding from some active principle. Consequently, to understand is neither generation nor alteration. However, there is nothing to prevent an act from following upon generation and alteration, as fire heats subsequent to its generation. In like manner, on the occasion of a sense being altered by the sensible, the act of seeing or touching occurs.
925. Then, at since the reception of knowledge (247b22), he shows that there is not generation and alteration when science is newly received. For whatever accrues to a thing solely through the subsiding of certain disturbances and motions does not accrue through generation and alteration. But science, which is speculative knowledge, and prudence, which is practical reason, accrue to the soul through the subsiding of bodily motions and sensible passions. Therefore, neither science nor prudence accrue to the soul through generation and alteration.
To elucidate this argument, he gives examples. For let us suppose that some person who possesses science is asleep or drunk or sick. It is clear that he cannot, at such a time, use his science and act according to it. But it is also clear that, when the disturbance subsides and the mind returns to its normal state, he can then use his science and act according to it. Yet we do not say, when a sleeping person is awakened, or when someone drunk becomes sober, or when the life of a sick person is restored to due order by health, that he then becomes a knower, as though science were newly generated in him, for there already existed in him a habitual potency for the suitability of knowledge, that is, to be restored to a congruous state in which he could use his science.
Now, he says that something like that happens when a person newly acquires science. For this seems to take place on account of a certain quieting and subsiding from disturbance, that is, of disordered motions, which are present in boys both in respect of their bodies, because their whole nature is undergoing change by reason of growing, and in respect of their sensitive part, because passions rule in them.
Hence, when he says, quiet, he seems to be referring to disturbances of the body, which are calmed when nature arrives to full estate; and when he says subsiding, he seems to refer to the passions of the sensitive part, which are not completely at rest, but subside by reason of their being controlled by reason to the extent that they do not disturb the reason. It is in this way that we say that certain liquids have subsided when the dregs descend to the bottom and what is pure remains at the top.
Why is it that youths cannot learn by taking in what is said by others, and why is it they cannot judge with their internal senses as well as can seniors or presbyters (the Greek term for “senior”) about what they hear or somehow comes to their knowledge? It is because the youth are subject to many disturbances and many commotions, as we said. But disturbances of this sort can be entirely removed or at least mitigated, sometimes by nature, as when a person reaches old age (in which motions of this kind are put to rest), and sometimes by other causes such as by training and habit. It is then that they can learn and judge well. That is why the exercising of the moral virtues, through which passions of this kind are bridled, is of great value in acquiring science.
Therefore, whether the passions are made to subside by the exercise of virtue or by nature, an alteration is involved, since these passions are located in the sensitive part, just as an alteration takes place in the body when a sleeping person arises and becomes awake and starts to act.
From this, it is clear that newly to acquire science is not an alteration, but a consequence of an alteration.
From this, however, he further concludes universally that alteration can occur in the external senses, in sensible bodies, and in the entire sensitive part of the soul (which he says on account of the interior passions), but in no other part of the soul, except per accidens.
926. What Aristotle says here about receiving science seems to agree with Plato’s opinion. For Plato taught that, just as separated forms are the cause of the generation and existence of natural things, in the sense that corporeal matter participates in these separated forms in some way, so also are they the cause of science in us, for our soul somehow participates in them in such a way that it is the very participation of separated forms in our soul that is science. In this way, it will be true that science is newly acquired not by its being generated in the soul, but merely by the subsiding of bodily and sensitive passions, which prevented the soul from using its science. And, in this way, it will also be true that, even though no change occurs in the intellect, a man becomes a knower by the mere presence of the sensible things of which he has experience, as occurs in relative things. This means that sensible things are not required for knowledge except for the purpose of arousing the soul.
However, Aristotle’s opinion is that science comes to be in the soul through the intelligible species, abstracted by the agent intellect, being received in the possible intellect, as is said in De anima 3.5. For this reason, he says in the same place that to understand is a certain passion, although the way the intellect undergoes differs from the way the senses do.
It is not unfitting that Aristotle should here make use of the opinion of Plato. For it is his custom to make use of the opinions of others before giving his own, just as in book 3 he used Plato’s opinion that every sensible body has heaviness or lightness, the contrary of which he will prove in De caelo 1.2.
927. Nevertheless, in Aristotle’s opinion, these arguments are saved. To make this clear, it must be considered that a receiver can be related in three ways to a form that is to be received.
For sometimes the receiver is in the final disposition for the reception of the form and no impediments exist either in it or in anything else. Under these conditions, as soon as the active principle is present, the receiver accepts the form without any further alteration, as is evident when air is illumined, the sun being present.
But sometimes the receiver is not in the final disposition required for receiving the form. In that case, a per se alteration is required to put into the matter a disposition for this particular form, as, for example, when fire comes to be from air.
Sometimes the receiver is in the final disposition for the form but an obstacle is present, as when air is prevented from receiving light either by closing a shutter or by the presence of clouds. In these cases, an alteration or change is required per accidens, that is, the removal of the obstacle.
Now, the possible intellect, considered in itself, is always in the final disposition for receiving the intelligible species. Therefore, if there be no obstacle, then, whenever there are present objects received through experience, there will arise in the intellect an intelligible species, just as an image will appear in a mirror when a body is present. It was on this basis that Aristotle took his first argument, in which he said that science is a relation. However, if there be an obstacle, as happens in youths, then these obstacles must be removed in order to allow the intelligible species to be received in the intellect. In this case, an alteration is necessary per accidens.