Commentary Aristotle Physics
Lecture 14. Solution of the ancients’ errors which arose from ignorance of matter
We will now proceed to show that the difficulty of the early thinkers, as well as our own, is solved in this way alone.
The first of those who studied science were misled in their search for truth and the nature of things by their inexperience, which, as it were, thrust them into another path. So, they say that none of the things that are either comes to be or passes out of existence, because what comes to be must do so either from what is or from what is not, both of which are impossible.
For what is cannot come to be (because it is already), and nothing could have come to be from what is not (because something must be present as a substratum).
So, too, they exaggerated the consequence of this and went so far as to deny even the existence of a plurality of things, maintaining that only being itself is. Such, then, was their opinion, and such the reason for its adoption.
But we say that the phrases “something comes to be from what is or from what is not” and “what is not or what is does something or has something done to it or becomes some particular thing” are to be taken (in the first way) in the same sense as “a doctor does something or has something done to him” or “is or becomes something from being a doctor.”
These expressions may be taken in two senses, and so too, clearly, may “from being” and “being acts or is acted on.” A doctor builds a house not qua doctor, but qua housebuilder, and he turns gray not qua doctor, but qua dark-haired. On the other hand, he doctors or fails to doctor qua doctor.
But we are using words most appropriately when we say that a doctor does something, undergoes something, or becomes something from being a doctor if he does, undergoes, or becomes qua doctor. Clearly, then, “to come to be so-and-so from non-being” likewise means “qua non-being.”
It was through failure to make this distinction that those thinkers gave the matter up, and through this error that they went so much further astray as to suppose that nothing else comes to be or exists apart from being itself, thus doing away with all generation.
We agree with them in holding that nothing can be simply said to come from what is not. But we nevertheless maintain that a thing may come to be from what is not in a qualified sense.
For a thing comes to be from the privation, which in its own nature is non-being—this not surviving as a constituent of the result.
Yet this causes surprise, and it is thought impossible that something should come to be in the way described from what is not.
In the same way, we maintain that nothing comes to be from being, and that being does not come to be except in a qualified sense.
In that way, however, it does, just as animal might come to be from animal, and an animal of a certain kind from an animal of a certain kind. Thus, suppose a dog to come to be from a horse. The dog would then, it is true, come to be from animal (as well as from an animal of a certain kind) but not as animal, for that is already there.
But, if anything is to become an animal not in a qualified sense, it will not be from animal; and if being, not from being—nor from non-being either, for it has been explained that, by “from not being,” we mean from non-being qua non-being.
Note further that we do not subvert the principle that everything either is or is not. This, then, is one way of solving the difficulty.
Another consists in pointing out that the same things can be explained in terms of potentiality and act. But this has been done with greater precision elsewhere.
So, as we said, the difficulties that constrain people to deny the existence of some of the things we mentioned are now solved.
For it was this reason that also caused some of the earlier thinkers to turn so far aside from the road that leads to generation and passing away and change generally. If they had come in sight of this nature, all their ignorance would have been dispelled.
120. Having determined the truth about the principles of nature, the Philosopher here excludes certain difficulties of the ancients by means of what has been determined about the principles.
He considers first the problems or errors that stem from an ignorance of matter, and second, at “others, indeed” (191b35; [129]), the problems or errors that stem from an ignorance of privation.
Third, at “the accurate determination” (192a34; [140]), he reserves for another science the problems that arise with reference to form.
Concerning the first part, he makes two points.
First, he states the problem and the error into which the ancients fell through their ignorance of matter.
Second, at “but we say that” (191a34; [122]), he answers their difficulty by means of those things that have already been determined.
121. Therefore, he says first (191a23) that, after determining the truth about the principles, it must be pointed out that only in this way is every difficulty, or problem, of the ancients solved. And this is an indication that what has been said about the principles is true. For truth excludes every falsehood and difficulty. But, when something false is granted, some difficulty must remain.
Now, the problem and error of the ancient philosophers was this. The first ones who philosophically sought the truth and the nature of things were diverted into a path other than the way of truth and the way of nature. This happened to them because of the weakness of their understanding. For they said that nothing is either generated or corrupted. This is contrary to truth and contrary to nature.
The weakness of their understanding forced them to hold this position, because they did not know how to resolve the following argument, according to which it seemed to be proven that being is not generated.
If being comes to be, it comes to be either from being or from non-being. And each of these seems to be impossible, namely, that being comes to be from being or that it comes to be from non-being.
It is clearly impossible for something to come to be from being, because that which is does not come to be, for nothing is before it comes to be. And being already is; hence it does not come to be.
It is also clearly impossible for something to come to be from non-being. For it is always necessary that there be a subject for that which comes to be, as was shown above. From nothing, nothing comes to be.
And from this it was concluded that there is neither generation nor corruption of being.
And those who argued in this fashion exaggerated their position to the point where they said that there are not many beings, but only one being. And they said this for the reason already given. Since they held that there is only one material principle, and since they said that nothing is caused from that one principle by way of generation and corruption, but only by way of alteration, then it follows that it would always be one according to substance.
122. Next, at “but we say that” (191a34), he answers the objection just mentioned.
Concerning this, he makes two points.
First, he answers the previously mentioned objection in two ways.
Second, at “so, as we said” (191b30; [128]), he draws the conclusion that he principally intends.
The first point is divided into two parts according to the two solutions given; the second is found at “another consists in” (191b27; [127]).
123. He says first (191a34) that, as far as the manner of speaking is concerned, it makes no difference whether we say that something comes to be from being or from non-being, or that being or non-being does something or is acted upon, or anything else, or whether we say this same sort of thing about a doctor (namely, that the doctor does something or is acted upon, or that something is or comes to be from the doctor).
But to say that the doctor does something or is acted upon, or that something comes to be from the doctor, has two meanings. Therefore, to say that something comes to be from being or from non-being, or that being or non-being makes something, or is acted upon, has two meanings. And the same is true regardless of the terms used; for instance, it might be said that something comes to be from white, or that the white does something or is acted upon.
That there is a twofold meaning when we use expressions such as the doctor does something or is acted upon, or that something comes to be from the doctor, he shows as follows. We say that a doctor builds. But he does not do this insofar as he is a doctor, but insofar as he is a builder. And, in like manner, we say that the doctor becomes white, but not insofar as he is a doctor, but insofar as he is black. However, in another sense, we say that the doctor heals insofar as he is a doctor, and in like manner, that the doctor becomes a non-doctor insofar as he is a doctor.
Thus we say properly and per se that the doctor does something or is acted upon, or that something comes to be from the doctor, when we attribute this to the doctor insofar as he is a doctor. But when something is attributed to him per accidens, it is not insofar as he is a doctor, but insofar as he is something else.
Therefore, it is clear that, when it is said that the doctor does something or is acted upon, or that something comes to be from doctor, this has two meanings, per se and per accidens. From this, it is clear that, when it is said that a thing comes to be from non-being, this is to be understood properly and per se if that thing should come to be from non-being insofar as it is non-being. And the same argument applies to being.
But the ancients, failing to perceive this distinction, erred insofar as they thought that nothing comes to be. And they did not think that anything other than their first material principle has substantial existence. For example, those who said that air is the first material principle held that all other things signify a certain accidental existence. Thus they excluded every substantial generation, retaining only alteration. Because of the fact that nothing comes to be per se either from non-being or from being, they thought that it would not be possible for anything to come to be from being or non-being.
124. And we also say that nothing comes to be from non-being simply and per se, but only per accidens. For what is—namely, being—is not from privation per se. And this is so because privation does not enter into the essence of the thing made. Rather a thing comes to be per se from that which is in the thing after it has already been made. Thus, the shaped comes to be from the unshaped not per se, but per accidens, for once it already has been shaped, the unshaped is not in it. But this is a remarkable way for a thing to come to be from non-being, and it seemed impossible to the ancient philosophers. Therefore, it is clear that a thing comes to be from non-being not per se, but per accidens.