Commentary Aristotle Physics
125. In like manner, if it is asked whether a thing comes to be from being, we must say that a thing comes to be from being per accidens, but not per se.
He shows this by the following example. Let us suppose that a dog is generated from a horse. Granting this, it is clear that a certain animal comes to be from a certain animal, and thus animal would come to be from animal. However, animal would not come to be from animal per se, but per accidens. For it does not come to be insofar as it is animal, but insofar as it is this animal. For animal already is before the dog comes to be. For the horse already is, but is not a dog. Hence the dog comes to be per se from that which is not a dog. And if animal were to come to be per se, and not per accidens, it would be necessary for it to come to be from non-animal.
And the same is true of being. For a being comes to be from that non-being that is not that which the being comes to be. Hence a thing does not come to be per se from being or per se from non-being. For this expression per se signifies that a thing comes to be from non-being in the sense that it comes to be from non-being insofar as it is non-being, as was said.
And thus, when this animal comes to be from this animal or when this body comes to be from this body, not all animal or non-animal, nor all body or non-body, is removed from that from which the thing comes to be. And likewise, neither all being nor all non-being is removed from that from which this being comes to be. For that from which fire comes to be has some being, because it is air, and also has some non-being, because it is not fire.
126. This, then, is one way of resolving the problem raised above. But this approach is not sufficient. For if being comes to be per accidens both from being and from non-being, it is necessary to posit something from which being comes to be per se. For everything that is per accidens is reduced to that which is per se.
127. In order to designate that from which a thing comes to be per se, he adds a second approach at “another consists” (191b27). He says that the same thing can be explained in terms of potency and act, as is clearly indicated in another place, in Metaphysics 9. Thus a thing comes to be per se from being in potency, but a thing comes to be per accidens from being in act or from non-being. He says this because matter, which is being in potency, is that from which a thing comes to be per se. For matter enters into the substance of the thing that is made.
But, from privation or from the preceding form, a thing comes to be per accidens insofar as the matter, from which the thing comes to be per se, happened to be under such a form or under such a privation.
Thus, a statue comes to be per se from bronze, but the statue comes to be per accidens both from that which does not have such a shape and from that which has another shape.
128. Finally, at “so, as we said” (191b30), he draws the conclusion that he principally intended. He says that we can truly say that all the difficulties, or problems, are answered by what has been said above. Driven on by certain difficulties, some of the ancients denied some of the things mentioned above, namely, generation and corruption and a plurality of substantially different things. But, once this nature (namely, matter) is understood, all of their ignorance is removed.
Lecture 15. Matter is distinguished from privation and is neither generable nor corruptible per se
Others, indeed, have apprehended the nature in question, but not adequately. In the first place, they allow that a thing may come to be without qualification from not being, accepting on this point the statement of Parmenides. Second, they think that, if the substratum is one numerically, it must be also one in potency.
But this is a very different thing. For we distinguish matter and privation and hold that one of these, the matter, is non-being only accidentally, while the privation in its own nature is non-being, and that the matter is nearly, in a sense is, substance, while the privation in no sense is.
They, on the other hand, identify their great and small alike with not being, and that whether they are taken together as one or separately. Their triad is, therefore, of quite a different kind from ours. For they got so far as to see that there must be some underlying nature, but they make it one, and even if one philosopher makes a dyad of it, which he calls great and small, the effect is the same, for he overlooked the other nature.
For the one that persists is a joint cause, with the form, of what comes to be—a mother, as it were. But the negative part of the contrariety may often seem, if you concentrate your attention on it as an evil agent, not to exist at all. For admitting with them that there is something divine, good, and desirable, we hold that there is a principle contrary to it.
But there is another principle, which of its own nature desires and yearns for it.
But the consequence of their view is that the contrary desires its extinction. Yet the form cannot desire itself, for it is not defective; nor can the contrary desire it, for contraries are mutually destructive. The truth is that what desires the form is matter, as the female desires the male and the ugly the beautiful—only the ugly or the female not per se, but per accidens.
The matter comes to be and ceases to be in one sense, while in another it does not. As that which contains the privation, it ceases to be in its own nature, for what ceases to be—the privation—is contained within it.
But, as potentiality, it does not cease to be in its own nature, but is necessarily outside the sphere of becoming and ceasing to be.
For if it came to be, something must have existed as a primary substratum from which it should come and that should persist in it; but this is its own special nature, so that it will be before coming to be.
(For my definition of matter is just this—the primary substratum of each thing, from which it comes to be without qualification, and that persists in the result.)
And, if it ceases to be, it will pass into that at the last, so it will have ceased to be before ceasing to be.
The accurate determination of the first principle in respect of form, whether it is one or many and what it is or what they are, is the province of first philosophy, so these questions may stand over till then. But of the natural (that is, perishable) forms, we shall speak in the expositions that follow.
The above, then, may be taken as sufficient to establish that there are principles and what they are and how many there are. Now let us make a fresh start and proceed.
129. Having excluded the problems and errors of the ancient philosophers that stem from their ignorance of matter, the Philosopher here excludes the errors that stem from their ignorance of privation.
Concerning this, he makes three points.
First, he sets forth the mistakes of those who erred.
Second, at “but this is a very different” (192a2; [132]), he shows how this position differs from the truth determined by him above.
Third, at “for the one that persists” (192a13; [134]), he proves that his own opinion is true.
130. He therefore says first (191b35) that some philosophers touched upon matter but did not understand it sufficiently. For they did not distinguish between matter and privation. Hence, they attributed to matter what belongs to privation. And because privation, considered in itself, is non-being, they said that matter, considered in itself, is non-being. And so, just as a thing comes to be simply and per se from matter, so they believed that a thing comes to be simply and per se from non-being.
And they were led to hold this position for two reasons.
First, they were influenced by the argument of Parmenides, who said that whatever is other than being is non-being. Since, then, matter is other than being, because it is not being in act, they said that it is non-being simply.
Second, it seemed to them that that which is one in number or subject is also one in account. And Aristotle calls this a state of being one in potency, because things that are one in account are such that each has the same power. But things that are one in subject but not one in account do not have the same potency or power, as is clear in the white and the musical. But subject and privation are one in number, such as the bronze and the unshaped. Hence it seemed to them that they would be the same in account or in power. Hence this position accepts the unity of potency.
131. But, lest anyone, because of these words, be in doubt about what the potency of matter is and whether it is one or many, it must be pointed out that act and potency divide every genus of beings, as is clear in Metaphysics 9, and in book 3 of the present work. Hence, just as the potency for quality is not something outside the genus of quality, so the potency for substantial being is not outside the genus of substance. Therefore, the potency of matter is not some property added to its essence. Rather, matter in its very substance is potency for substantial being. Moreover, the potency of matter is one in subject with respect to many forms. But, in its account, there are many potencies according to its relation to different forms. Hence, in book 3, it will be said that to be able to be healed and to be able to be ill differ according to account.
132. Next, at “but this is a very different” (192a2), he explains the difference between his own opinion and the opinion just given.
Concerning this, he makes two points.
First, he clarifies our understanding of his own opinion.
Second, at “they, on the other hand” (192a6; [133]), he shows what the other opinion holds.
He therefore says first that there is a great difference between a thing’s being one in number or subject and its being one in potency or account. For as is clear from the above, we say that matter and privation, although one in subject, are other in account.
And this is clear for two reasons.
First, matter is non-being accidentally, whereas privation is non-being per se. For “unshaped” signifies non-being, but “bronze” does not signify non-being except insofar as “unshaped” happens to be in it.
Second, matter is near to the thing and exists in some respect, because it is in potency to the thing and is in some respect the substance of the thing, since it enters into the constitution of the substance. But this cannot be said of privation.