Commentary Aristotle Physics
Lecture 6
The modes of causing and what things are consequent on them
Now, the modes of causation are many, but when brought under headings, they too can be reduced in number.
For “cause” is used in many senses, and even within the same kind, one may be prior to another—for instance, the doctor and the expert are causes of health, and the relation 2:1 and number of the octave, and always what is inclusive to what is particular.
Another mode of causation is the accidental and its genera: for instance, “Polycletus” is the cause of a statue in one way but “sculptor” in another, because “being Polycletus” and being “sculptor” are accidentally conjoined.
It is likewise with the classes in which the accident is included; thus “a man” could be said to be the cause of a statue or, generally, “a living creature.”
An accident too may be more or less remote: for instance, suppose that “a pale man” or “a musical man” were said to be the cause of the statue.
All causes, both proper and accidental, may be spoken of either as potential or as actual; for example, the cause of a house being built is either “house builder” or “house builder building.” Similar distinctions can be made in the things of which the causes are causes, such as of “this statue” or of “statue” or of “image” generally, of “this bronze” or of “bronze,” or of “material” generally. And it is also so with the accidents.
Again, we may use a complex expression for either and say, for instance, neither “Polycletus” nor “sculptor” but “Polycletus, sculptor.”
All these various uses, however, come to six in number, under each of which again the usage is twofold. “Cause” means either what is particular or a genus, or an accident or a genus of that, and these either as a complex or each by itself—and all six either as actual or as potential.
The difference is that causes that are actually at work and singular exist and cease to exist simultaneously with their effect: for instance, this healing person with this being-healed person and that house-building man with that being-built house; but this is not always true of potential causes—the house and the house builder do not pass away simultaneously.
In investigating the cause of each thing, it is always necessary to seek what is most precise (as also in other things): thus, man builds because he is a builder and a builder builds in virtue of his art of building. This last cause, then, is prior (and so generally).
Further, generic effects should be assigned to generic causes, particular effects to particular causes (such as statue to sculptor, this statue to this sculptor), powers relative to possible effects, and actually operating causes to things that are actually being effected. This must suffice for our account of the number of causes and the modes of causation.
187. After the Philosopher has distinguished the species of causes, he here distinguishes the various modes of causes in respect to the same species of cause.
Concerning this, he makes two points.
First, he distinguishes the different modes of causes.
Second, at “the difference is” (195b16; [195]), he treats certain consequences of this distinction.
Concerning the first part, he makes two points.
First, he distinguishes the different modes of causes;
second, at “all these various” (195b12; [194]), he reduces them to a certain number.
Concerning the first part, he distinguishes the modes of causes according to four divisions.
He says first (195a27) that, while the modes of causes are numerous, if they are reduced to headings, either under some highest or under some common aspect, they are found to be fewer.
Or headings may be taken as a combination, for it is obvious that combinations of the modes are fewer than the modes.
188. Therefore, the first division or combination of modes is that, in the same species of cause, one cause is said to be prior to another, as when we understand that the more universal cause is prior. Thus, the doctor is the proper and posterior cause of health, whereas the artisan is the more common and prior cause. This is in the species of efficient cause. And the same thing is true in the species of formal cause. For the proper and posterior formal cause of the octave is the proportion of the double, whereas the more common and prior is the numerical proportion that is called multiplicity. And, in like manner, a cause that contains any cause in the entirety of its extension is a prior cause.
189. It must be noted, however, that the “universal,” “proper,” “prior,” and “posterior” causes can be taken either according to a commonness in predication (as in the example given about the doctor and the artisan), or according to a commonness in causality (as if we say the sun is a universal cause of heating while fire is a proper cause).
And these two divisions correspond to each other. For it is clear that any power extends to certain things insofar as they share in one account, and the farther that that power extends, the more common that account must be. And, since a power is proportioned to its object according to its account, it follows that a higher cause acts according to a form that is more universal and less contracted.
And this can be seen in the order of things. For to the extent that some things are superior among beings, they have forms that are less contracted and more dominant over matter, which contracts the power of form. And so, that which is prior in causing is found to be prior in some way under the account of a more universal predication. For example, if fire is the first in heating, then the heavens are not only the first in heating but also the first in producing alteration.
190. He gives the second division at “another mode of causation” (195a32). He says that, just as per se causes are divided into prior and posterior or common and proper, so also are per accidens causes. For besides per se causes, there are per accidens causes and their genera. Thus, Polycletus is a per accidens cause of the statue, while the sculptor is a per se cause. For Polycletus is a cause of statue insofar as he happens to be a sculptor. And, in like manner, those things that contain Polycletus in their commonness, such as man and animal, are per accidens causes of the statue.
Moreover, it must be noted that, among per accidens causes, some are closer to the per se causes and some are more removed. For everything that is joined to the per se cause but is not of its account is called a per accidens cause. Now, a thing can be closer to the account of the per se cause or more removed from it, and the per accidens causes are closer or more removed to this extent. Thus, if a sculptor happens to be white and musical, the musical is closer, because it is in the same subject in respect to the same thing—that is, in respect to the soul in which are both the art of the musician and that of statue making. But the subject itself is still more closely related than the other accidents. Thus, Polycletus is closer than white or musical, for these latter are not joined to this sculptor except through the subject.
191. He gives the third division at “all causes” (195b3). He says that, besides the proper causes—that is, the causes per se and the causes per accidens—some things are said to be causes in potency, such as being able to operate, while other things are actually operating causes. Thus, either the builder in habit or the builder in act can be called the cause of the building of a house.
192. And, just as causes are distinguished according to the above-mentioned modes, so also the things of which they are the causes are distinguished. For one thing is caused posteriorly and more properly, and another priorly and more commonly.
Thus, something might be called the cause of this statue, or of statue in general, or it might still more commonly be called the cause of an image. And, likewise, something might be called the moving cause of this bronze, or of bronze in the universal, or of matter. So also, in per accidens effects, it can be said that one thing is more common and another less common. An effect is said to be per accidens when it is joined to a per se effect and is outside its account. Thus, the per se effect of cooking is delectable food, but the per accidens effect is healthful food. However, the converse is true of medicine.
193. He gives the fourth division at “again, we may use” (195b10). He says that per se causes are sometimes taken as a complex with per accidens causes, as when we do not say that Polycletus, who is a per accidens cause, is the cause of the statue, nor that the sculptor, who is the cause per se, is the cause, but rather that the sculptor Polycletus is the cause.
194. Next, at “all these various uses” (195b12), he reduces the above-mentioned modes to a certain number. He says that they are six in number, but each of them is used in two ways. These are the six modes: the singular and the genus, which above he called the prior and the posterior; the accident and the genus of the accident; the simple and the complex. And each of these is divided by potency and act; thus, all the modes become twelve. He distinguishes all the modes by potency and act because what is in potency is not simply.
195. Next, at “the difference is” (195b16), he treats three things that follow from the distinction of modes just made.
The first point is that causes in act and causes in potency differ as follows. Causes operating in act exist and do not exist simultaneously with those things of which they are the causes in act.
For example, if we take singular causes—that is, proper causes—then this healer exists and does not exist simultaneously with the person who becomes healed, and this builder exists simultaneously with that which is built.
But this is not true if we take causes in act, which are not proper causes. For it is not true that the builder exists and does not exist simultaneously with that which is built. For it can happen that the builder is in act but this building is not being built, but some other.
But, if we take the one who is building this building, and if we take this building insofar as it is being built, then it is necessary that, when one is posited, the other must be posited also, and when one is removed the other is removed.
But this does not always happen in regard to causes that are in potency. For a home and the man who built it are not corrupted simultaneously.
And thus it follows that, just as inferior agents, which are causes of the coming to be of things, must exist simultaneously with the things that come to be as long as they are coming to be, so also the divine agent, which is the cause of existing in act, is simultaneous with the existence of the thing in act.
Hence if the divine action were removed from things, things would fall into nothingness, just as light ceases to be in the air when the presence of the sun is removed.
196. He sets forth the second point at “in investigating the cause” (195b21). He says that it is necessary to seek in natural things the first cause of each thing, just as we do in artificial things. So, if we should ask why it is that a man builds, we answer, “because he is a builder.” Likewise, if we ask why he is a builder, we answer, “because he possesses the builder’s art.” And the inquiry stops at this point, because this is the first cause in this order. Hence, in natural things, we should proceed to the first cause. This is so because the effect is not known unless the cause is known. Hence, if the cause of an effect is itself the effect of some yet other cause, then it cannot be known unless its cause is known, and so on until we arrive at a first cause.
197. He sets forth the third point at “further, generic effects” (195b25). Effects should correspond proportionally to causes such that general effects be referred to general causes and singular effects to singular causes. For example, if it is said that the cause of statue is sculptor, then the cause of this statue is this sculptor. In like manner, effects in potency should correspond to causes in potency and effects in act to causes in act.
And finally in summary he concludes that this is a sufficient treatment of the species and modes of causes.