Commentary Aristotle Physics
Lecture 7. Different opinions about fortune and chance
But fortune also and chance are reckoned among causes: many things are said both to be and to come to be as a result of fortune and chance.
We must inquire, therefore, in what manner fortune and chance are present among the causes enumerated and whether they are the same or different, and generally what fortune and chance are.
Some people even question whether they are real or not. They say that nothing happens by fortune, but that everything that we ascribe to fortune or chance has some definite cause—for instance, coming by fortune into the market and finding there a man whom one wanted but did not expect to meet is due to one’s wish to go and buy in the market.
Similarly, in other cases of fortune, it is always possible, they maintain, to find something that is the cause, but not fortune.
For if fortune were real, it would seem strange indeed, and the question might be raised of why on earth none of the wise men of old, in speaking of the causes of generation and decay, took account of fortune, whence it would seem that they too did not believe that anything is by fortune.
But there is a further circumstance that is surprising. Many things both come to be and are by fortune and chance, and although all know that each of them can be ascribed to some cause (as the old argument said which denied fortune), they nevertheless speak of some of these things as happening by fortune and others not. For this reason also, they ought to have at least referred to the matter in some way or other. Certainly the early physicists found no place for fortune among the causes that they recognized—love, strife, mind, fire, or the like.
This is strange, whether they supposed that there is no such thing as fortune or whether they thought there is but omitted to mention it—and that too when they sometimes used it, as Empedocles does when he says that the air is not always separated into the highest region, but “as it may chance.”
At any rate he says in his cosmogony that “it happened to run that way at that time, but it often ran otherwise.” He tells us also that most of the parts of animals came to be by fortune.
There are some too who ascribe this heavenly sphere and all the worlds to chance. They say that the vortex arose by chance (that is, the motion that separated and arranged in its present order all that exists).
This statement might well cause surprise. For they are asserting that fortune is not responsible for the existence or generation of animals and plants, nature or mind or something of the kind being the cause of them (for it is not any chance thing that comes from a given seed but an olive from one kind and a man from another).
Yet, at the same time, they assert that the heavenly sphere and the divinest of visible things arose by chance, having no such cause as is assigned to animals and plants. Yet, if this is so, it is a fact that deserves to be dwelt upon, and something might well have been said about it.
For besides the other absurdities of the statement, it is the more absurd that people should make it when they see nothing coming to be by chance in the heavens, but much happening by chance among the things that, as they say, are not due to fortune, when we should have expected exactly the opposite.
Others there are who, indeed, believe that fortune is a cause but that it is inscrutable to human intelligence, as being a divine thing and full of mystery. Thus we must inquire what fortune and chance are, whether they are the same or different, and how they fit into our division of causes.
198. Having treated the obvious species and modes of cause, the Philosopher here takes up certain hidden modes, namely, fortune and chance.
Concerning this, he makes two points.
First, he states his intention;
second, he pursues what he has proposed, at “some people even question” (195b36; [199]).
He says first that fortune and chance are also reckoned among the causes, since many things are said to come to be or to exist because of fortune and chance.
And, so, with respect to fortune and chance, three things must be considered:
how they are reduced to the causes mentioned above;
whether fortune and chance are the same or different;
and finally, what chance and fortune are.
Next, at “some people even question” (195b36; [199]), he begins his treatment of fortune and chance.
First, he sets forth the opinions of others.
Second, at “first, then, we observe” (196b10; [207]), he establishes the truth.
Concerning the first part, he sets forth three opinions.
The second begins at “there are some” (196a24; [203]), and the third at “others there are” (196b5; [206]).
Concerning the first part, he makes two points.
First, he sets forth the opinions and arguments of those who deny fortune and chance.
Second, at “but there is a further circumstance” (196a11; [201]), he argues about the second of these reasons.
199. He says first (195b36) that some have questioned whether fortune and chance exist.
They deny that they exist for two reasons.
The first argument is that all of those things that are said to come to be by chance or fortune are found to have some determinate cause other than fortune. He gives an example of this sort of thing. If someone coming to the market place should find some man whom he wished to find, but who he did not previously believe would be found, we say that his finding of this man was due to fortune. But the cause of this finding is his will to buy, for the sake of which he went to the market where the man whom he sought was. And the same is true of all other things that are said to be by fortune, for they have some cause other than fortune. And, so, fortune does not seem to be a cause of anything, and consequently is nothing. For we do not posit fortune except insofar as we hold that some things exist by fortune.
200. He gives the second argument at “for if chance were real” (196a7). He says that, if fortune were something, it seems to be inconsistent (and that it is truly inconsistent is shown below) and puzzling that none of the ancient wise men who treated the causes of generation and corruption treated fortune. But, as it seems, those ancients thought that nothing exists by fortune. And thus this second argument is taken from the opinion of the ancient natural philosophers.
201. Next, at “but there is a further circumstance” (196a11), he argues about this second proof, showing what he had assumed above, that it is inconsistent that the ancient natural philosophers did not treat chance and fortune.
He proves this with two arguments.
His first argument is as follows. It seems remarkable, and indeed it is, that the ancient natural philosophers did not treat chance and fortune. For they assumed that they treated the causes of those things that come to be, yet there are many things that come to be by fortune and chance. Hence they should have treated fortune and chance. Nor are they to be excused by the argument given above that denies fortune and chance. For although men know that every effect is reduced to some cause, as the above opinion that denies fortune and chance stated, nevertheless, regardless of this argument, these philosophers held that some things come to be by fortune and other things do not.
Hence, these natural philosophers must make mention of fortune and chance at least in order to show that it is false that some things come to be by fortune and chance, and in order to point out the reason that some things are said to be by fortune and some not. Nor can they be excused by reason of the fact that chance and fortune would be reduced to one of the causes that they posited. For they did not think that fortune is one of the things that they thought to be causes, such as friendship or strife or some other such thing.
202. He gives his second argument at “this is strange” (196a19). He says that, whether they thought that fortune existed or not, it is inconsistent that the ancient natural philosophers neglected to treat fortune. For if they thought that there was fortune, it is inconsistent that they did not treat it; but if they thought that there was no fortune, it is inconsistent that they sometimes used it.
For example, Empedocles said that air is not always united on high above the earth, as if this were natural to it, but rather this happens by chance. For he says that, when the earth was made by strife distinguishing the elements, it happened that air gathered together in this place, and as it came together then, it will hold this course so long as the world remains.
But, in other worlds, which he held come to be and are corrupted to infinity, as was said above, air would be differently related in many ways to the parts of the universe. And he said likewise that the many parts of animals come to be by fortune, such that, in the first production of the world, heads came to be without necks.
203. Next, at “these are some” (196a24), he gives the second opinion.
Concerning this, he makes two points.
First, he sets forth the opinion;
second, he disproves it, at “this statement might” (196a28; [204]).
Thus, he first says (196a24) that some have said that chance is the cause of the heavens and all the parts of the world. And they said that the revolution of the world—the motion of the stars distinguishing and constituting the whole universe below according to this order—is by chance. This seems to be the opinion of Democritus, who says that the heavens and the whole world are constituted by chance through the motion of atoms, which are per se mobile.
204. Next, at “this statement might” (196a28), he disproves this position with two arguments.
The first argument is that it would seem to be worthy of great wonder that animals and plants are not from fortune, but from intellect or nature or some other determinate cause. For it is clear that a thing is not generated from any seed whatsoever, but man from a determinate seed and the olive from a determinate seed. And, since these inferior things do not come to be by fortune, it is worthy of wonder that the heavens and those things that are more divine among the sensible things known to us, namely, the sempiternal parts of the world, are by chance and should not have any determinate cause, as do animals and plants. And, if this is true, it would have been worthwhile to insist and to give a reason why this is so. But the ancients failed to do this.
205. He gives the second argument at “for besides the other” (196b1). How can it be true that the celestial bodies are by chance while inferior bodies are not? This seems to be inconsistent first from the fact that they are the nobler; second, it is even more inconsistent in the light of what is seen. For we see that, in the heavens, nothing comes to be by chance, whereas in inferior bodies, which are not said to be by chance, many things seem to happen by fortune. According to their position, it would be more reasonable if the converse were true, such that, in those things whose cause is chance or fortune, some things would be found to come to be by chance or by fortune, but not in those things whose cause is not chance or fortune.
206. Next, at “others there are” (196b5), he sets forth the third opinion about fortune. He says that it seems to some that fortune is a cause, but it is hidden to the human intellect, as if it were something divine and above men. For they wanted to hold the position that all fortuitous events are reduced to some divine ordaining cause, as we hold that all things are ordered by divine providence.
But, although this opinion has a radical truth, they did not use the name “fortune” well. For that divine thing that orders cannot be called or named fortune, for to the extent that a thing participates in reason or order, it no longer falls under the idea of fortune. Hence, the inferior cause, which of itself does not have an ordination to the fortuitous event, should much more be called fortune than the superior cause, if such a cause is the one that orders. He omits an inquiry about this opinion, both because it exceeds the bounds of natural science and because he shows below that fortune is not a per se cause, but a per accidens cause. Hence, how he evaluates these opinions will be made more clear in what follows. And so he concludes that, for the clarification of these opinions, we must consider what fortune and chance are and whether they are the same or different, and how they are reduced to the causes mentioned above.