Commentary Aristotle Physics
Lecture 10. The difference between chance and fortune
They differ in that “chance” is the wider term. Every result of fortune is from chance, but not everything that is from chance is from fortune.
Fortune and what results from fortune are appropriate to agents that are capable of good fortune and of moral action generally. Therefore, fortune is necessarily in the sphere of moral actions.
This is indicated by the fact that good fortune is thought to be the same, or nearly the same, as happiness, and happiness to be a kind of moral action, since it is well-doing. Hence, what is not capable of moral action cannot do anything by fortune.
Thus, an inanimate thing or a lower animal or a child cannot do anything by fortune, because it does not have that which is proposed; nor can “good fortune” or “ill fortune” be ascribed to them, except metaphorically—as Protarchus, for example, said that the stones of which altars are made are fortunate because they are held in honor while their fellows are trodden under foot. Even these things, however, can in a way be affected by fortune, when one who is dealing with them does something to them by fortune, but not otherwise.
That which is by chance, on the other hand, is found both in the lower animals and in many inanimate objects.
We say, for example, that the horse came “by chance,” because, though his coming saved him, he did not come for the sake of safety.
Again, the tripod fell “of itself,” because, though when it fell it stood on its feet so as to serve for a seat, it did not fall for the sake of that.
Hence, it is clear that when things that come to be simply for the sake of something do not come to be for the sake of that which happens, but for the sake of something extrinsic, then we say that these things come to be by chance.
These chance events are said to be from fortune if they have the further characteristics of being the objects of deliberate intention and are due to agents capable of that mode of action.
This is indicated by the phrase “in vain,” which is used when A, which is for the sake of B, does not result in B. For instance: taking a walk is for the sake of evacuation of the bowels; if this does not follow after walking, we say that we have walked “in vain” and that the walking was “vain.”
This implies that what is naturally the means to an end is “in vain” when it does not effect the end toward which it was the natural means, for it would be absurd for a man to say that he had bathed in vain because the sun was not eclipsed, since the one was not done with a view to the other.
Thus, that which is by chance is, even according to its derivation, the case in which the thing itself happens in vain.
The stone that struck the man did not fall for the purpose of striking him; therefore, it fell by chance, because it might have fallen by the action of an agent and for the purpose of striking.
The difference between chance and what results by fortune is greatest in things that come to be by nature. For when anything comes to be contrary to nature, we do not say that it came to be by fortune, but from what is per se frustrated.
Yet, strictly, this too is different from what is per se frustrated; for the cause of the latter is external, that of the former internal. We have now explained what fortune is and what chance is, and in what they differ from each other.
Both belong to the mode of causation “source of change,” for either some natural or some intelligent agent is always the cause; but in this sort of causation, the number of possible causes is infinite.
Chance and fortune are causes of effects that, though they might result from intelligence or nature, have in fact been caused by something accidentally. Now, since nothing which is accidental is prior to what is per se, it is clear that no accidental cause can be prior to a cause per se. Chance and fortune, therefore, are posterior to intelligence and nature. Hence, however true it may be that the heavens are due to chance, it will still be true that intelligence and nature will be prior causes of this [whole] and of many things in it besides.
It is clear, then, that there are causes and that the number of them is what we have stated. The number is the same as that of the things comprehended under the question “why?”
The why is reduced finally to what the thing is in things that do not involve motion, like mathematics (to the definition of “straight line” or “commensurable,” etc.); or to what initiated a motion (such as, “Why does someone fight?” “Because he has stolen”); or to inquiring, “for the sake of what?” (e.g., “that they may rule”); or in the case of things that come into being, to looking for the matter. The causes, therefore, are these and so many in number.
226. Having treated fortune and chance with reference to those aspects in which they are alike, the Philosopher here explains the difference between them.
This section is divided into two parts.
First, he explains the difference between fortune and chance;
second, at “the difference between” (197b32; [235]), he explains that in which this difference primarily consists.
The first part is divided into two parts.
First, he explains the difference between chance and fortune;
second, at “hence, it is clear” (197b18; [233]), he summarizes what he has said about each of them.
227. Concerning the first part, he makes two points.
First (197a36), he explains the difference between chance and fortune. He says that they differ by reason of the fact that chance pertains to more things than fortune, because everything that is by fortune is by chance, but not conversely.
228. Second, at “fortune and what results” (197b1), he clarifies the difference mentioned above.
First, he designates the things in which fortune is found.
Second, at “that which is by chance” (197b13; [231]), he shows that chance is found in more things.
Concerning the first part, he makes two points.
First, he designates the things in which fortune is found.
Second, at “thus, an inanimate thing” (197b6; [230]), he draws a conclusion about those things in which fortune is not found.
229. He says first that fortune and that which is by fortune are found in those things in which something is said to happen well. For fortune is found in those things in which there can be good fortune and misfortune. Now, a thing is said to happen well for him to whom action belongs.
However, action belongs properly to the one who has dominion over his action. For what does not have dominion over its action is that which is acted upon, rather than that which acts. And, thus, action is not in the power of that which is acted upon, but rather in the power of that which acts.
Now, since the active or practical life pertains to those who have dominion over their acts (for here is where operation according to virtue or vice is found), it is necessary that fortune pertains to the practical.
A sign of this is the fact that fortune seems to be the same as happiness, or very nearly so. Hence, the happy are commonly called the fortunate. For according to those who think that happiness consists in external goods, happiness is the same as fortune; but according to those who say that external goods, in which fortune plays a great part, help as instruments in the attainment of happiness, good fortune is close to happiness because it helps one attain it. Hence, since happiness is a certain operation, since it is good operation—namely, that of perfected virtue, as is said in Ethics 1.8—it follows that fortune pertains to the actions in which one happens to act well or is impeded from acting well. And this means that things turn out either well or badly. Hence, since one has dominion over his actions insofar as he acts voluntarily, it follows that, in those actions alone where one acts voluntarily should something happen by fortune, but not in others.
230. Next, at “thus, an inanimate thing” (197b6), he draws from the above a conclusion about the things in which fortune is not found.
He says that, since fortune is found only in those who act voluntarily, it follows that neither an inanimate thing nor a child nor a beast act by fortune, since they do not act voluntarily as having free choice (which is here called that which is proposed).
Hence, neither good fortune nor misfortune can happen to them except metaphorically. Thus, someone said that the stones from which altars are built are fortunate because honor and reverence are shown them, but the stones next to the altar stones are walked upon.
This is said because of a certain likeness to men, among whom the honored seemed to be fortunate, whereas those stones that are walked upon are called unfortunate.
But, although it follows from the foregoing that such things do not act by fortune, there is nothing to prevent them from being acted upon by fortune. For some voluntary agent may act upon them. Thus, we say that it is good fortune when a man finds a treasure or that it is a misfortune when he is struck by a falling stone.
231. Next, at “that which is by chance” (197b13), he points out that chance is found also in other things.
Concerning this, he makes three points.
First, he shows that chance is found in other things;
second, at “hence, it is clear” (197b18; [233]), he draws a certain conclusion from what was said above;
third, at “this is indicated” (197b22; [234]), he uses an example to clarify the point.
232. He says first that chance is found not only in men, who act voluntarily, but also in other animals, and even in inanimate things. He gives an example dealing with other animals. It is said that a horse comes by chance when his coming is conducive to his safety, although he did not come for the sake of safety. He gives another example taken from inanimate things. We say that a tripod falls by chance because, as it stands, it is suitable for sitting, although it did not fall for the sake of this, namely, so that someone might sit on it.
233. Next, at “hence, it is clear” (197b18), he draws the following conclusion from the above: when things that come to be simply for the sake of something do not come to be for the sake of that which happens, but for the sake of something extrinsic, then we say that these things come to be by chance. But we say that, among the things that come to be by chance, only those things that happen in those who have free choice come to be by fortune.
234. Next, at “this is indicated” (197b22), he clarifies what he has stated in this conclusion, that chance occurs in those things that happen for the sake of something. A sign of this is the fact that the word vain is used, which is close to “chance” in the Greek.
For we use the term vain when that which is for the sake of something does not come to be because of that something, that is, when that thing on account of which it comes to be does not occur.
Thus, if one should walk in order to evacuate the bowels, and if this should not happen to the walker, then he is said to have walked in vain, and his walking would be vain. Thus, that which is suitable for the coming to be of something is vain and frustrated when it does not accomplish that for whose coming to be it is suitable.
He explains why he says that for whose coming to be it is suitable. If someone were to say that he bathed in vain because the sun was not eclipsed while he bathed, he would speak ridiculously, because bathing oneself is not apt for producing an eclipse of the sun.
Hence chance, which in the Greek is called automatum—that is, per se frustrated—occurs in those things that are for the sake of something. This is also true of that which is frustrated or vain. For the name per se frustrated signifies the very thing that is frustrated, just as per se man signifies man himself and per se good signifies good itself.
He gives an example of things that happen by chance. Thus, it is chance when it is said that a stone that strikes someone when falling did not fall for the purpose of striking him. Therefore, it fell because of that which is per se vain or per se frustrated, for the stone does not naturally fall for this purpose. However, at times a stone does fall as thrown by someone for the purpose of hitting another.
However, although chance and the vain are alike insofar as each is among the things that are for the sake of something, they nevertheless also differ. For a thing is called vain because of the fact that that which was intended does not follow, whereas a thing is called chance because of the fact that something else that was not intended does follow.
Hence, sometimes a thing is vain and chance at the same time, such as when that which was intended does not occur but something else does occur. However, sometimes there is chance but not the vain, as when both that which was intended and something else occur. And there is the vain and no chance when neither that which was intended nor anything else occurs.
235. Next, at “the difference” (197b32), he explains that in which chance most of all differs from fortune. He says that they differ most of all in the things that happen by nature, because chance has a place here but fortune does not. For when in the operations of nature something happens outside of nature—for example, when a six fingered person is born—we do not say that this happens by fortune, but rather because of that which is per se frustrated, that is, by chance.
And so we can take as another difference between chance and fortune the fact that the cause of those things that are by chance is intrinsic, just as the cause of those things that are by nature is intrinsic. But the cause of those things that are by fortune is extrinsic, just as the cause of those things that are from free choice is extrinsic.
And he finally concludes that he has now explained what the per se frustrated or chance is, what fortune is, and how they differ from each other.
236. Next, at “both belong” (198a2), he points out the genus of cause to which chance and fortune are reduced.
First, he states his position;
second, at “chance and fortune are causes” (198a5; [237]), he disproves from this a certain opinion mentioned above.
He therefore says first that both chance and fortune are reduced to the genus of the moving cause. For chance and fortune are causes either of those things that proceed from nature or of those things that proceed from intelligence, as is clear from what has been said.
Hence, since nature and intelligence are causes as things from which motion begins, so fortune and chance also are reduced to the same genus. But since chance and fortune are per accidens causes, their number is indeterminate, as was said above.
237. Next, at “chance and fortune are causes” (198a5), he refutes the opinion of those who maintain that fortune and chance are the causes of the heavens and of all worldly things.
He says that since chance and fortune are per accidens causes of those things of which intellect and nature are the per se causes, and since a per accidens cause is not prior to a per se cause, as nothing per accidens is prior to that which is per se, it follows that chance and fortune are causes that are posterior to intellect and nature.
Hence, if it should be held that chance is the cause of the heavens, as some maintained, as was said above, it would follow that intellect and nature are first of all causes of some other things and afterwards causes of the whole universe.
Moreover, the cause of the whole universe seems to be prior to the cause of some part of the universe, since any part of the universe is ordered to the perfection of the universe. But it seems to be inconsistent that some other cause is prior to that which is the cause of the heavens. Hence, it is inconsistent that chance is the cause of the heavens.
238. Furthermore, we must consider that, if those things that happen fortuitously or by chance—that is, outside the intention of inferior causes—are reduced to some superior cause that orders them, then, in relation to this latter cause, they cannot be said to be fortuitous or by chance. Hence, that superior cause cannot be called fortune.
239. Next, at “it is clear, then” (198a14), he shows that the causes are not more than those mentioned. This is clarified as follows. The question of why asks for the cause. But only the above mentioned causes answer the question of why. Therefore, the causes are not more than those that were mentioned. He says that the answers to the question of why are the same in number as the above mentioned causes.
For sometimes the why is reduced finally to what the thing is, to the definition, as is clear in all immobile things. The mathematicals are of this sort, in which the why is reduced to the definition of the straight or of the commensurate, or of some other thing that is demonstrated in mathematics. Since a right angle is defined as that angle that is formed by the falling of one line upon another that makes two equal angles on each side, then, if it should be asked why an angle is a right angle, the reply would be because it is formed by a line making two equal angles on each side. And it is the same in the other instances.
Sometimes the why is reduced to the first moving cause. Thus, for instance, “Why does someone fight?” “Because he has stolen.” For this is what brought on the fight.
Sometimes it is reduced to the final cause, as if we should ask for the sake of what does someone fight, with the answer being that he might rule.
Sometimes it is reduced to the material cause, as when it is asked why this body is corruptible and the answer is that it is composed of contraries.
Thus, it is clear that these are the causes and they are just so many.
240. Furthermore, there must be four causes. A cause is that upon which the existence of another follows. Now, the existence of that which has a cause can be considered in two ways.
First, it is considered absolutely, and thus the cause of the existing is the form by which something is in act;
second, it is considered insofar as a being comes to be in act from being in potency.
And, since everything that is in potency is reduced to act by that which is a being in act, it is necessary that there be two other causes: the matter and the agent that reduces the matter from potency to act. However, the action of the agent tends toward something determinate, and thus it proceeds from some determinate principle. For every agent does that which is suitable to it. But that toward which the action of the agent tends is called the final cause. Therefore, there must be four causes. But, since the form is the cause of existing absolutely, the other three are causes of existence insofar as something receives existence. Hence, in immobile things, the other three causes are not considered, but only the formal cause is considered.