Commentary Aristotle Physics
Lecture 9. The meaning of what is said about fortune
It is necessary, no doubt, that the causes of what comes to pass by fortune be indefinite, and that is why fortune is supposed to belong to the class of the indefinite and to be inscrutable to man.
And this is also why it might be thought that, in a way, nothing occurs by fortune. For all these statements are correct, because they are well grounded.
Things do, in a way, occur by fortune, for they occur accidentally and fortune is an accidental cause.
But, strictly, it is not the cause—without qualification—of anything;
for instance, a house builder is the cause of a house, but accidentally, a flute player may be so.
And the causes of the man’s coming and getting the money (when he did not come for the sake of that) are innumerable.
He may have wished to see somebody or been following somebody or avoiding somebody, or may have gone to see a spectacle.
Thus, to say that fortune is a thing contrary to rule is correct. For rule applies to what is always true or true for the most part, whereas fortune belongs to a third type of event. Hence, to conclude, since causes of this kind are indefinite, fortune too is indefinite.
(Yet, in some cases, one might raise the question whether any accidental fact might be the cause of the fortune occurrence, such as when the cause of health may be the fresh air or the sun’s heat, but having had one’s hair cut cannot be; for some accidental causes are more relevant to the effect than others.)
Fortune is called “good” when the result is good, and “evil” when it is evil.
The terms “good fortune” and “ill fortune” are used when either result is of considerable magnitude. Thus, one who comes within an ace of some great evil or great good is said to be fortunate or unfortunate. The mind affirms the essence of the attribute, ignoring the hair’s breadth of difference.
Further, it is with reason that good fortune is regarded as unstable; for fortune is unstable, as none of the things that result from it can be invariable or normal.
Both fortune and chance are, then, as I have said, accidental causes in the sphere of things that are capable of coming to pass neither simply nor frequently, and with reference to such of these as might come to pass for the sake of something.
217. Having given the definition of fortune, he establishes from this definition the meaning of those things that are said about fortune.
First, he considers those things that the ancient philosophers said about fortune.
Second, at “thus, to say” (197a18; [219]), he considers those things that the common man says about fortune.
He has given above three opinions concerning fortune and chance. And he disproved the second of these opinions as being altogether false, for this position held that fortune is the cause of the heavens and of all worldly things.
Thus, having rejected the second opinion, he here shows that the third opinion, which holds that fortune is hidden to man, is true.
Second, at “and this is also why” (197a10; [218]), he shows how the first opinion, which holds that nothing comes to be by fortune or chance, might be true.
Since it was said above that per accidens causes are infinite, and also that fortune is a per accidens cause, he concludes from this that the causes of that which is by fortune are infinite. And, since the infinite, insofar as it is infinite, is unknown, it follows that fortune is hidden to man.
218. Next, at “and this is also why” (197a10), he shows how the first opinion might be true. He says that, in a way, it is true to say that nothing comes to be by fortune. For all of those things that others say about fortune are in a certain respect true, because they have some reason. Since fortune is a per accidens cause, it follows that what is by fortune is something per accidens. But what is per accidens is not simply. Hence it follows that fortune is not the cause of anything simply.
And he clarifies what he has said about each of these opinions through an example. He says that, as the builder is the per se cause of a house and is the cause simply, whereas the flute player is a per accidens cause of the house, in like manner, the fact that someone should come to a place with no intention of taking money away is a per accidens cause of carrying it away.
But this per accidens cause is infinite, because it is possible for a man to go to that place because of an infinity of other reasons, such as if he came to visit someone, or to pursue an enemy, or to escape from a pursuer, or to see a show of some sort. Now, all these things and anything similar are causes of the taking of money that happens by chance.
219. Next, at “thus, to say” (197a18), he explains the meaning of those things that are commonly said about fortune.
First, he explains why it is said that what is by fortune is without reason;
second, at “fortune is called” (197a25; [222]), he explains why it is said that fortune is good or bad.
Concerning the first part, he makes two points.
First, he lays out his position;
second, he raises a certain difficulty, at “yet, in some cases” (197a21; [221]).
220. He says first (197a18) that fortune is rightly said to be without reason. For we can reason only about those things that happen always or in most instances. But fortune lies outside of both of these. And so, since such causes, which occur in exceptional cases, are per accidens and infinite and without reason, it follows that causes by fortune are infinite and without reason. For every per se cause produces its effect either always or in most cases.
221. Next, at “yet in some cases” (197a21), he raises a certain difficulty. He says that, although it may be said that fortune is a per accidens cause, some will question, or doubt, this. The problem is whether everything that happens to be a per accidens cause ought to be called a cause of that which comes to be by fortune. Thus, it is clear that the per se cause of health can be either nature or the art of the doctor.
However, can all those things with which the coming to be of health happens to be connected, such as the fresh air (or wind), and the heat, and shaving of the head, be called causes per accidens? The question, therefore, is whether each of these is a cause per accidens.
Now, since we said above that fortune is most properly called a per accidens cause on the part of the effect, since a thing is said to be a cause of that which happens to the effect, it is clear that a fortuitous cause produces something in the fortuitous effect even though it does not intend that, but rather something else connected with the effect. According to this, wind or heat can be called fortuitous causes of health, insofar as they produce some change in the body, upon which change health follows. But removing the hair or some other such thing does not produce anything clearly related to health. But, among the per accidens causes, some are nearer and others are more remote. Those that are more remote seem less to be causes.
222. Next, at “fortune is called” (197a25), he explains why fortune is said to be good or bad.
First, he explains why fortune is said to be good or bad simply. He says that fortune is said to be good when something good happens and bad when something bad happens.
223. Second, at the terms “good fortune” (197a26), he explains the meaning of good fortune and misfortune. He says that we refer to good fortune and misfortune when the fortuitous event has some great good or great evil. For an event is called good fortune when some great good follows; it is called misfortune when some great evil follows.
And, since being deprived of a good is included in the account of evil and being deprived of evil is included in the account of the good, then, when one is a little removed from a great good, he is said to be unfortunate if he misses it.
On the other hand, if one is close to a great evil and is freed from it, he is said to be fortunate. This is so because the intellect takes that which is only a little removed as if it were not removed at all, but already possessed.
224. Third, at “further, it is with reason” (197a30), he explains why good fortune is uncertain. He says that this is so because good fortune is a kind of fortune. But fortune is uncertain, because it pertains to things that are neither always nor frequent, as was said. Hence it follows that good fortune is uncertain.
225. Finally, at “both fortune and chance” (197a32), he concludes as a sort of recapitulation that each (chance and fortune) is a cause per accidens, and that each pertains to things that do not happen simply, neither always nor frequently, and that each pertains to things that come to be for the sake of something, as is clear from what was said above.