Philebus
SocratesThen the first I will call the infinite or unlimited, and the second the finite or limited; then follows the third, an essence compound and generated; and I do not think that I shall be far wrong in speaking of the cause of mixture and generation as the fourth.
SocratesAnd now what is the next question, and how came we hither? Were we not enquiring whether the second place belonged to pleasure or wisdom?
ProtarchusWe were.
SocratesAnd now, having determined these points, shall we not be better able to decide about the first and second place, which was the original subject of dispute?
ProtarchusI dare say.
SocratesWe said, if you remember, that the mixed life of pleasure and wisdom was the conqueror—did we not?
SocratesAnd we see what is the place and nature of this life and to what class it is to be assigned?
ProtarchusBeyond a doubt.
SocratesThis is evidently comprehended in the third or mixed class; which is not composed of any two particular ingredients, but of all the elements of infinity, bound down by the finite, and may therefore be truly said to comprehend the conqueror life.
SocratesAnd what shall we say, Philebus, of your life which is all sweetness; and in which of the aforesaid classes is that to be placed? Perhaps you will allow me to ask you a question before you answer?
PhilebusLet me hear.
SocratesHave pleasure and pain a limit, or do they belong to the class which admits of more and less?
PhilebusThey belong to the class which admits of more, Socrates; for pleasure would not be perfectly good if she were not infinite in quantity and degree.
SocratesNor would pain, Philebus, be perfectly evil. And therefore the infinite cannot be that element which imparts to pleasure some degree of good. But now—admitting, if you like, that pleasure is of the nature of the infinite—in which of the aforesaid classes, O Protarchus and Philebus, can we without irreverence place wisdom and knowledge and mind? And let us be careful, for I think that the danger will be very serious if we err on this point.
PhilebusYou magnify, Socrates, the importance of your favourite god.
SocratesAnd you, my friend, are also magnifying your favourite goddess; but still I must beg you to answer the question.
ProtarchusSocrates is quite right, Philebus, and we must submit to him.
PhilebusAnd did not you, Protarchus, propose to answer in my place?
ProtarchusCertainly I did; but I am now in a great strait, and I must entreat you, Socrates, to be our spokesman, and then we shall not say anything wrong or disrespectful of your favourite.
SocratesI must obey you, Protarchus; nor is the task which you impose a difficult one; but did I really, as Philebus implies, disconcert you with my playful solemnity, when I asked the question to what class mind and knowledge belong?
ProtarchusYou did, indeed, Socrates.
SocratesYet the answer is easy, since all philosophers assert with one voice that mind is the king of heaven and earth—in reality they are magnifying themselves. And perhaps they are right. But still I should like to consider the class of mind, if you do not object, a little more fully.
PhilebusTake your own course, Socrates, and never mind length; we shall not tire of you.
SocratesVery good; let us begin then, Protarchus, by asking a question.
ProtarchusWhat question?
SocratesWhether all this which they call the universe is left to the guidance of unreason and chance medley, or, on the contrary, as our fathers have declared, ordered and governed by a marvellous intelligence and wisdom.
ProtarchusWide asunder are the two assertions, illustrious Socrates, for that which you were just now saying to me appears to be blasphemy; but the other assertion, that mind orders all things, is worthy of the aspect of the world, and of the sun, and of the moon, and of the stars and of the whole circle of the heavens; and never will I say or think otherwise.
SocratesShall we then agree with them of old time in maintaining this doctrine,—not merely reasserting the notions of others, without risk to ourselves,—but shall we share in the danger, and take our part of the reproach which will await us, when an ingenious individual declares that all is disorder?
ProtarchusThat would certainly be my wish.
SocratesThen now please to consider the next stage of the argument.
ProtarchusLet me hear.
SocratesWe see that the elements which enter into the nature of the bodies of all animals, fire, water, air, and, as the storm-tossed sailor cries, ‘land’ (i.e., earth), reappear in the constitution of the world.
ProtarchusThe proverb may be applied to us; for truly the storm gathers over us, and we are at our wit’s end.
SocratesThere is something to be remarked about each of these elements.
ProtarchusWhat is it?
SocratesOnly a small fraction of any one of them exists in us, and that of a mean sort, and not in any way pure, or having any power worthy of its nature. One instance will prove this of all of them; there is fire within us, and in the universe.
SocratesAnd is not our fire small and weak and mean? But the fire in the universe is wonderful in quantity and beauty, and in every power that fire has.
SocratesAnd is the fire in the universe nourished and generated and ruled by the fire in us, or is the fire in you and me, and in other animals, dependent on the universal fire?
ProtarchusThat is a question which does not deserve an answer.
SocratesRight; and you would say the same, if I am not mistaken, of the earth which is in animals and the earth which is in the universe, and you would give a similar reply about all the other elements?
ProtarchusWhy, how could any man who gave any other be deemed in his senses?
SocratesI do not think that he could—but now go on to the next step. When we saw those elements of which we have been speaking gathered up in one, did we not call them a body?
ProtarchusWe did.
SocratesAnd the same may be said of the cosmos, which for the same reason may be considered to be a body, because made up of the same elements.
SocratesBut is our body nourished wholly by this body, or is this body nourished by our body, thence deriving and having the qualities of which we were just now speaking?
ProtarchusThat again, Socrates, is a question which does not deserve to be asked.
SocratesWell, tell me, is this question worth asking?
ProtarchusWhat question?
SocratesMay our body be said to have a soul?
ProtarchusClearly.
SocratesAnd whence comes that soul, my dear Protarchus, unless the body of the universe, which contains elements like those in our bodies but in every way fairer, had also a soul? Can there be another source?
ProtarchusClearly, Socrates, that is the only source.
SocratesWhy, yes, Protarchus; for surely we cannot imagine that of the four classes, the finite, the infinite, the composition of the two, and the cause, the fourth, which enters into all things, giving to our bodies souls, and the art of self-management, and of healing disease, and operating in other ways to heal and organize, having too all the attributes of wisdom;—we cannot, I say, imagine that whereas the self-same elements exist, both in the entire heaven and in great provinces of the heaven, only fairer and purer, this last should not also in that higher sphere have designed the noblest and fairest things?
ProtarchusSuch a supposition is quite unreasonable.
SocratesThen if this be denied, should we not be wise in adopting the other view and maintaining that there is in the universe a mighty infinite and an adequate limit, of which we have often spoken, as well as a presiding cause of no mean power, which orders and arranges years and seasons and months, and may be justly called wisdom and mind?
ProtarchusMost justly.
SocratesAnd wisdom and mind cannot exist without soul?
SocratesAnd in the divine nature of Zeus would you not say that there is the soul and mind of a king, because there is in him the power of the cause? And other gods have other attributes, by which they are pleased to be called.
SocratesDo not then suppose that these words are rashly spoken by us, O Protarchus, for they are in harmony with the testimony of those who said of old time that mind rules the universe.
SocratesAnd they furnish an answer to my enquiry; for they imply that mind is the parent of that class of the four which we called the cause of all; and I think that you now have my answer.
ProtarchusI have indeed, and yet I did not observe that you had answered.
SocratesA jest is sometimes refreshing, Protarchus, when it interrupts earnest.
SocratesI think, friend, that we have now pretty clearly set forth the class to which mind belongs and what is the power of mind.
SocratesAnd the class to which pleasure belongs has also been long ago discovered?
SocratesAnd let us remember, too, of both of them, (1) that mind was akin to the cause and of this family; and (2) that pleasure is infinite and belongs to the class which neither has, nor ever will have in itself, a beginning, middle, or end of its own.
ProtarchusI shall be sure to remember.
SocratesWe must next examine what is their place and under what conditions they are generated. And we will begin with pleasure, since her class was first examined; and yet pleasure cannot be rightly tested apart from pain.
ProtarchusIf this is the road, let us take it.
SocratesI wonder whether you would agree with me about the origin of pleasure and pain.
ProtarchusWhat do you mean?
SocratesI mean to say that their natural seat is in the mixed class.
ProtarchusAnd would you tell me again, sweet Socrates, which of the aforesaid classes is the mixed one?
SocratesI will, my fine fellow, to the best of my ability.
SocratesLet us then understand the mixed class to be that which we placed third in the list of four.
ProtarchusThat which followed the infinite and the finite; and in which you ranked health, and, if I am not mistaken, harmony.
SocratesCapital; and now will you please to give me your best attention?
ProtarchusProceed; I am attending.
SocratesI say that when the harmony in animals is dissolved, there is also a dissolution of nature and a generation of pain.
ProtarchusThat is very probable.
SocratesAnd the restoration of harmony and return to nature is the source of pleasure, if I may be allowed to speak in the fewest and shortest words about matters of the greatest moment.
ProtarchusI believe that you are right, Socrates; but will you try to be a little plainer?
SocratesDo not obvious and every-day phenomena furnish the simplest illustration?
ProtarchusWhat phenomena do you mean?
SocratesHunger, for example, is a dissolution and a pain.
SocratesWhereas eating is a replenishment and a pleasure?
SocratesThirst again is a destruction and a pain, but the effect of moisture replenishing the dry place is a pleasure: once more, the unnatural separation and dissolution caused by heat is painful, and the natural restoration and refrigeration is pleasant.
SocratesAnd the unnatural freezing of the moisture in an animal is pain, and the natural process of resolution and return of the elements to their original state is pleasure. And would not the general proposition seem to you to hold, that the destroying of the natural union of the finite and infinite, which, as I was observing before, make up the class of living beings, is pain, and that the process of return of all things to their own nature is pleasure?
ProtarchusGranted; what you say has a general truth.
SocratesHere then is one kind of pleasures and pains originating severally in the two processes which we have described?
ProtarchusGood.
SocratesLet us next assume that in the soul herself there is an antecedent hope of pleasure which is sweet and refreshing, and an expectation of pain, fearful and anxious.
ProtarchusYes; this is another class of pleasures and pains, which is of the soul only, apart from the body, and is produced by expectation.
SocratesRight; for in the analysis of these, pure, as I suppose them to be, the pleasures being unalloyed with pain and the pains with pleasure, methinks that we shall see clearly whether the whole class of pleasure is to be desired, or whether this quality of entire desirableness is not rather to be attributed to another of the classes which have been mentioned; and whether pleasure and pain, like heat and cold, and other things of the same kind, are not sometimes to be desired and sometimes not to be desired, as being not in themselves good, but only sometimes and in some instances admitting of the nature of good.
ProtarchusYou say most truly that this is the track which the investigation should pursue.
SocratesWell, then, assuming that pain ensues on the dissolution, and pleasure on the restoration of the harmony, let us now ask what will be the condition of animated beings who are neither in process of restoration nor of dissolution. And mind what you say: I ask whether any animal who is in that condition can possibly have any feeling of pleasure or pain, great or small?
SocratesThen here we have a third state, over and above that of pleasure and of pain?
SocratesAnd do not forget that there is such a state; it will make a great difference in our judgment of pleasure, whether we remember this or not. And I should like to say a few words about it.
ProtarchusWhat have you to say?
SocratesWhy, you know that if a man chooses the life of wisdom, there is no reason why he should not live in this neutral state.
ProtarchusYou mean that he may live neither rejoicing nor sorrowing?
SocratesYes; and if I remember rightly, when the lives were compared, no degree of pleasure, whether great or small, was thought to be necessary to him who chose the life of thought and wisdom.
ProtarchusYes, certainly, we said so.
SocratesThen he will live without pleasure; and who knows whether this may not be the most divine of all lives?
ProtarchusIf so, the gods, at any rate, cannot be supposed to have either joy or sorrow.
SocratesCertainly not—there would be a great impropriety in the assumption of either alternative. But whether the gods are or are not indifferent to pleasure is a point which may be considered hereafter if in any way relevant to the argument, and whatever is the conclusion we will place it to the account of mind in her contest for the second place, should she have to resign the first.
ProtarchusJust so.
SocratesThe other class of pleasures, which as we were saying is purely mental, is entirely derived from memory.
ProtarchusWhat do you mean?
SocratesI must first of all analyze memory, or rather perception which is prior to memory, if the subject of our discussion is ever to be properly cleared up.
ProtarchusHow will you proceed?
SocratesLet us imagine affections of the body which are extinguished before they reach the soul, and leave her unaffected; and again, other affections which vibrate through both soul and body, and impart a shock to both and to each of them.
ProtarchusGranted.
SocratesAnd the soul may be truly said to be oblivious of the first but not of the second?
SocratesWhen I say oblivious, do not suppose that I mean forgetfulness in a literal sense; for forgetfulness is the exit of memory, which in this case has not yet entered; and to speak of the loss of that which is not yet in existence, and never has been, is a contradiction; do you see?
SocratesThen just be so good as to change the terms.
ProtarchusHow shall I change them?
SocratesInstead of the oblivion of the soul, when you are describing the state in which she is unaffected by the shocks of the body, say unconsciousness.
ProtarchusI see.
SocratesAnd the union or communion of soul and body in one feeling and motion would be properly called consciousness?
SocratesThen now we know the meaning of the word?
SocratesAnd memory may, I think, be rightly described as the preservation of consciousness?
SocratesBut do we not distinguish memory from recollection?
ProtarchusI think so.
SocratesAnd do we not mean by recollection the power which the soul has of recovering, when by herself, some feeling which she experienced when in company with the body?
SocratesAnd when she recovers of herself the lost recollection of some consciousness or knowledge, the recovery is termed recollection and reminiscence?
SocratesThere is a reason why I say all this.
ProtarchusWhat is it?
SocratesI want to attain the plainest possible notion of pleasure and desire, as they exist in the mind only, apart from the body; and the previous analysis helps to show the nature of both.
ProtarchusThen now, Socrates, let us proceed to the next point.
SocratesThere are certainly many things to be considered in discussing the generation and whole complexion of pleasure. At the outset we must determine the nature and seat of desire.
ProtarchusAy; let us enquire into that, for we shall lose nothing.
SocratesNay, Protarchus, we shall surely lose the puzzle if we find the answer.
ProtarchusA fair retort; but let us proceed.
SocratesDid we not place hunger, thirst, and the like, in the class of desires?
SocratesAnd yet they are very different; what common nature have we in view when we call them by a single name?
ProtarchusBy heavens, Socrates, that is a question which is not easily answered; but it must be answered.
SocratesThen let us go back to our examples.
ProtarchusWhere shall we begin?
SocratesDo we mean anything when we say ‘a man thirsts’?
SocratesWe mean to say that he ’is empty’?
ProtarchusOf course.
SocratesAnd is not thirst desire?
ProtarchusYes, of drink.
SocratesWould you say of drink, or of replenishment with drink?
ProtarchusI should say, of replenishment with drink.
SocratesThen he who is empty desires, as would appear, the opposite of what he experiences; for he is empty and desires to be full?
ProtarchusClearly so.
SocratesBut how can a man who is empty for the first time, attain either by perception or memory to any apprehension of replenishment, of which he has no present or past experience?
SocratesAnd yet he who desires, surely desires something?
ProtarchusOf course.
SocratesHe does not desire that which he experiences, for he experiences thirst, and thirst is emptiness; but he desires replenishment?
SocratesThen there must be something in the thirsty man which in some way apprehends replenishment?
ProtarchusThere must.
SocratesAnd that cannot be the body, for the body is supposed to be emptied?
SocratesThe only remaining alternative is that the soul apprehends the replenishment by the help of memory; as is obvious, for what other way can there be?
ProtarchusI cannot imagine any other.
SocratesBut do you see the consequence?
ProtarchusWhat is it?
SocratesThat there is no such thing as desire of the body.
ProtarchusWhy so?
SocratesWhy, because the argument shows that the endeavour of every animal is to the reverse of his bodily state.
SocratesAnd the impulse which leads him to the opposite of what he is experiencing proves that he has a memory of the opposite state.
SocratesAnd the argument, having proved that memory attracts us towards the objects of desire, proves also that the impulses and the desires and the moving principle in every living being have their origin in the soul.
SocratesThe argument will not allow that our body either hungers or thirsts or has any similar experience.
ProtarchusQuite right.
SocratesLet me make a further observation; the argument appears to me to imply that there is a kind of life which consists in these affections.
ProtarchusOf what affections, and of what kind of life, are you speaking?
SocratesI am speaking of being emptied and replenished, and of all that relates to the preservation and destruction of living beings, as well as of the pain which is felt in one of these states and of the pleasure which succeeds to it.
SocratesAnd what would you say of the intermediate state?
ProtarchusWhat do you mean by ‘intermediate’?
SocratesI mean when a person is in actual suffering and yet remembers past pleasures which, if they would only return, would relieve him; but as yet he has them not. May we not say of him, that he is in an intermediate state?
SocratesWould you say that he was wholly pained or wholly pleased?
ProtarchusNay, I should say that he has two pains; in his body there is the actual experience of pain, and in his soul longing and expectation.
SocratesWhat do you mean, Protarchus, by the two pains? May not a man who is empty have at one time a sure hope of being filled, and at other times be quite in despair?
SocratesAnd has he not the pleasure of memory when he is hoping to be filled, and yet in that he is empty is he not at the same time in pain?
SocratesThen man and the other animals have at the same time both pleasure and pain?
ProtarchusI suppose so.
SocratesBut when a man is empty and has no hope of being filled, there will be the double experience of pain. You observed this and inferred that the double experience was the single case possible.
ProtarchusQuite true, Socrates.
SocratesShall the enquiry into these states of feeling be made the occasion of raising a question?
ProtarchusWhat question?
SocratesWhether we ought to say that the pleasures and pains of which we are speaking are true or false? or some true and some false?
ProtarchusBut how, Socrates, can there be false pleasures and pains?
SocratesAnd how, Protarchus, can there be true and false fears, or true and false expectations, or true and false opinions?
ProtarchusI grant that opinions may be true or false, but not pleasures.
SocratesWhat do you mean? I am afraid that we are raising a very serious enquiry.
ProtarchusThere I agree.
SocratesAnd yet, my boy, for you are one of Philebus’ boys, the point to be considered, is, whether the enquiry is relevant to the argument.
ProtarchusSurely.
SocratesNo tedious and irrelevant discussion can be allowed; what is said should be pertinent.
SocratesI am always wondering at the question which has now been raised.
ProtarchusHow so?
SocratesDo you deny that some pleasures are false, and others true?
ProtarchusTo be sure I do.
SocratesWould you say that no one ever seemed to rejoice and yet did not rejoice, or seemed to feel pain and yet did not feel pain, sleeping or waking, mad or lunatic?
ProtarchusSo we have always held, Socrates.
SocratesBut were you right? Shall we enquire into the truth of your opinion?
ProtarchusI think that we should.
SocratesLet us then put into more precise terms the question which has arisen about pleasure and opinion. Is there such a thing as opinion?
SocratesAnd such a thing as pleasure?
SocratesAnd an opinion must be of something?
SocratesAnd a man must be pleased by something?
ProtarchusQuite correct.
SocratesAnd whether the opinion be right or wrong, makes no difference; it will still be an opinion?
SocratesAnd he who is pleased, whether he is rightly pleased or not, will always have a real feeling of pleasure?
ProtarchusYes; that is also quite true.
SocratesThen, how can opinion be both true and false, and pleasure true only, although pleasure and opinion are both equally real?
ProtarchusYes; that is the question.
SocratesYou mean that opinion admits of truth and falsehood, and hence becomes not merely opinion, but opinion of a certain quality; and this is what you think should be examined?
SocratesAnd further, even if we admit the existence of qualities in other objects, may not pleasure and pain be simple and devoid of quality?
ProtarchusClearly.
SocratesBut there is no difficulty in seeing that pleasure and pain as well as opinion have qualities, for they are great or small, and have various degrees of intensity; as was indeed said long ago by us.
SocratesAnd if badness attaches to any of them, Protarchus, then we should speak of a bad opinion or of a bad pleasure?
ProtarchusQuite true, Socrates.
SocratesAnd if rightness attaches to any of them, should we not speak of a right opinion or right pleasure; and in like manner of the reverse of rightness?
SocratesAnd if the thing opined be erroneous, might we not say that the opinion, being erroneous, is not right or rightly opined?
SocratesAnd if we see a pleasure or pain which errs in respect of its object, shall we call that right or good, or by any honourable name?
ProtarchusNot if the pleasure is mistaken; how could we?
SocratesAnd surely pleasure often appears to accompany an opinion which is not true, but false?
ProtarchusCertainly it does; and in that case, Socrates, as we were saying, the opinion is false, but no one could call the actual pleasure false.