Philebus
SocratesHow eagerly, Protarchus, do you rush to the defence of pleasure!
ProtarchusNay, Socrates, I only repeat what I hear.
SocratesAnd is there no difference, my friend, between that pleasure which is associated with right opinion and knowledge, and that which is often found in all of us associated with falsehood and ignorance?
ProtarchusThere must be a very great difference, between them.
SocratesThen, now let us proceed to contemplate this difference.
ProtarchusLead, and I will follow.
SocratesWell, then, my view is—
ProtarchusWhat is it?
SocratesWe agree—do we not?—that there is such a thing as false, and also such a thing as true opinion?
SocratesAnd pleasure and pain, as I was just now saying, are often consequent upon these—upon true and false opinion, I mean.
SocratesAnd do not opinion and the endeavour to form an opinion always spring from memory and perception?
SocratesMight we imagine the process to be something of this nature?
ProtarchusOf what nature?
SocratesAn object may be often seen at a distance not very clearly, and the seer may want to determine what it is which he sees.
ProtarchusVery likely.
SocratesSoon he begins to interrogate himself.
ProtarchusIn what manner?
SocratesHe asks himself—’What is that which appears to be standing by the rock under the tree?’ This is the question which he may be supposed to put to himself when he sees such an appearance.
SocratesTo which he may guess the right answer, saying as if in a whisper to himself—’It is a man.’
SocratesOr again, he may be misled, and then he will say—’No, it is a figure made by the shepherds.’
SocratesAnd if he has a companion, he repeats his thought to him in articulate sounds, and what was before an opinion, has now become a proposition.
SocratesBut if he be walking alone when these thoughts occur to him, he may not unfrequently keep them in his mind for a considerable time.
SocratesWell, now, I wonder whether you would agree in my explanation of this phenomenon.
ProtarchusWhat is your explanation?
SocratesI think that the soul at such times is like a book.
ProtarchusHow so?
SocratesMemory and perception meet, and they and their attendant feelings seem to me almost to write down words in the soul, and when the inscribing feeling writes truly, then true opinion and true propositions which are the expressions of opinion come into our souls—but when the scribe within us writes falsely, the result is false.
ProtarchusI quite assent and agree to your statement.
SocratesI must bespeak your favour also for another artist, who is busy at the same time in the chambers of the soul.
ProtarchusWho is he?
SocratesThe painter, who, after the scribe has done his work, draws images in the soul of the things which he has described.
ProtarchusBut when and how does he do this?
SocratesWhen a man, besides receiving from sight or some other sense certain opinions or statements, sees in his mind the images of the subjects of them;—is not this a very common mental phenomenon?
SocratesAnd the images answering to true opinions and words are true, and to false opinions and words false; are they not?
ProtarchusThey are.
SocratesIf we are right so far, there arises a further question.
ProtarchusWhat is it?
SocratesWhether we experience the feeling of which I am speaking only in relation to the present and the past, or in relation to the future also?
ProtarchusI should say in relation to all times alike.
SocratesHave not purely mental pleasures and pains been described already as in some cases anticipations of the bodily ones; from which we may infer that anticipatory pleasures and pains have to do with the future?
SocratesAnd do all those writings and paintings which, as we were saying a little while ago, are produced in us, relate to the past and present only, and not to the future?
ProtarchusTo the future, very much.
SocratesWhen you say, ‘Very much,’ you mean to imply that all these representations are hopes about the future, and that mankind are filled with hopes in every stage of existence?
ProtarchusExactly.
SocratesAnswer me another question.
ProtarchusWhat question?
SocratesA just and pious and good man is the friend of the gods; is he not?
ProtarchusCertainly he is.
SocratesAnd the unjust and utterly bad man is the reverse?
SocratesAnd all men, as we were saying just now, are always filled with hopes?
SocratesAnd these hopes, as they are termed, are propositions which exist in the minds of each of us?
SocratesAnd the fancies of hope are also pictured in us; a man may often have a vision of a heap of gold, and pleasures ensuing, and in the picture there may be a likeness of himself mightily rejoicing over his good fortune.
SocratesAnd may we not say that the good, being friends of the gods, have generally true pictures presented to them, and the bad false pictures?
SocratesThe bad, too, have pleasures painted in their fancy as well as the good; but I presume that they are false pleasures.
ProtarchusThey are.
SocratesThe bad then commonly delight in false pleasures, and the good in true pleasures?
ProtarchusDoubtless.
SocratesThen upon this view there are false pleasures in the souls of men which are a ludicrous imitation of the true, and there are pains of a similar character?
ProtarchusThere are.
SocratesAnd did we not allow that a man who had an opinion at all had a real opinion, but often about things which had no existence either in the past, present, or future?
SocratesAnd this was the source of false opinion and opining; am I not right?
SocratesAnd must we not attribute to pleasure and pain a similar real but illusory character?
ProtarchusHow do you mean?
SocratesI mean to say that a man must be admitted to have real pleasure who is pleased with anything or anyhow; and he may be pleased about things which neither have nor have ever had any real existence, and, more often than not, are never likely to exist.
ProtarchusYes, Socrates, that again is undeniable.
SocratesAnd may not the same be said about fear and anger and the like; are they not often false?
ProtarchusQuite so.
SocratesAnd can opinions be good or bad except in as far as they are true or false?
ProtarchusIn no other way.
SocratesNor can pleasures be conceived to be bad except in so far as they are false.
ProtarchusNay, Socrates, that is the very opposite of truth; for no one would call pleasures and pains bad because they are false, but by reason of some other great corruption to which they are liable.
SocratesWell, of pleasures which are corrupt and caused by corruption we will hereafter speak, if we care to continue the enquiry; for the present I would rather show by another argument that there are many false pleasures existing or coming into existence in us, because this may assist our final decision.
ProtarchusVery true; that is to say, if there are such pleasures.
SocratesI think that there are, Protarchus; but this is an opinion which should be well assured, and not rest upon a mere assertion.
SocratesThen now, like wrestlers, let us approach and grasp this new argument.
SocratesWe were maintaining a little while since, that when desires, as they are termed, exist in us, then the body has separate feelings apart from the soul—do you remember?
ProtarchusYes, I remember that you said so.
SocratesAnd the soul was supposed to desire the opposite of the bodily state, while the body was the source of any pleasure or pain which was experienced.
SocratesThen now you may infer what happens in such cases.
ProtarchusWhat am I to infer?
SocratesThat in such cases pleasures and pains come simultaneously; and there is a juxtaposition of the opposite sensations which correspond to them, as has been already shown.
ProtarchusClearly.
SocratesAnd there is another point to which we have agreed.
ProtarchusWhat is it?
SocratesThat pleasure and pain both admit of more and less, and that they are of the class of infinites.
ProtarchusCertainly, we said so.
SocratesBut how can we rightly judge of them?
ProtarchusHow can we?
SocratesIs it our intention to judge of their comparative importance and intensity, measuring pleasure against pain, and pain against pain, and pleasure against pleasure?
ProtarchusYes, such is our intention, and we shall judge of them accordingly.
SocratesWell, take the case of sight. Does not the nearness or distance of magnitudes obscure their true proportions, and make us opine falsely; and do we not find the same illusion happening in the case of pleasures and pains?
ProtarchusYes, Socrates, and in a degree far greater.
SocratesThen what we are now saying is the opposite of what we were saying before.
ProtarchusWhat was that?
SocratesThen the opinions were true and false, and infected the pleasures and pains with their own falsity.
SocratesBut now it is the pleasures which are said to be true and false because they are seen at various distances, and subjected to comparison; the pleasures appear to be greater and more vehement when placed side by side with the pains, and the pains when placed side by side with the pleasures.
ProtarchusCertainly, and for the reason which you mention.
SocratesAnd suppose you part off from pleasures and pains the element which makes them appear to be greater or less than they really are: you will acknowledge that this element is illusory, and you will never say that the corresponding excess or defect of pleasure or pain is real or true.
SocratesNext let us see whether in another direction we may not find pleasures and pains existing and appearing in living beings, which are still more false than these.
ProtarchusWhat are they, and how shall we find them?
SocratesIf I am not mistaken, I have often repeated that pains and aches and suffering and uneasiness of all sorts arise out of a corruption of nature caused by concretions, and dissolutions, and repletions, and evacuations, and also by growth and decay?
ProtarchusYes, that has been often said.
SocratesAnd we have also agreed that the restoration of the natural state is pleasure?
SocratesBut now let us suppose an interval of time at which the body experiences none of these changes.
ProtarchusWhen can that be, Socrates?
SocratesYour question, Protarchus, does not help the argument.
ProtarchusWhy not, Socrates?
SocratesBecause it does not prevent me from repeating mine.
ProtarchusAnd what was that?
SocratesWhy, Protarchus, admitting that there is no such interval, I may ask what would be the necessary consequence if there were?
ProtarchusYou mean, what would happen if the body were not changed either for good or bad?
SocratesYes.
ProtarchusWhy then, Socrates, I should suppose that there would be neither pleasure nor pain.
SocratesVery good; but still, if I am not mistaken, you do assert that we must always be experiencing one of them; that is what the wise tell us; for, say they, all things are ever flowing up and down.
ProtarchusYes, and their words are of no mean authority.
SocratesOf course, for they are no mean authorities themselves; and I should like to avoid the brunt of their argument. Shall I tell you how I mean to escape from them? And you shall be the partner of my flight.
ProtarchusHow?
SocratesTo them we will say: ‘Good; but are we, or living things in general, always conscious of what happens to us—for example, of our growth, or the like? Are we not, on the contrary, almost wholly unconscious of this and similar phenomena?’ You must answer for them.
ProtarchusThe latter alternative is the true one.
SocratesThen we were not right in saying, just now, that motions going up and down cause pleasures and pains?
SocratesA better and more unexceptionable way of speaking will be—
ProtarchusWhat?
SocratesIf we say that the great changes produce pleasures and pains, but that the moderate and lesser ones do neither.
ProtarchusThat, Socrates, is the more correct mode of speaking.
SocratesBut if this be true, the life to which I was just now referring again appears.
ProtarchusWhat life?
SocratesThe life which we affirmed to be devoid either of pain or of joy.
SocratesWe may assume then that there are three lives, one pleasant, one painful, and the third which is neither; what say you?
ProtarchusI should say as you do that there are three of them.
SocratesBut if so, the negation of pain will not be the same with pleasure.
SocratesThen when you hear a person saying, that always to live without pain is the pleasantest of all things, what would you understand him to mean by that statement?
ProtarchusI think that by pleasure he must mean the negative of pain.
SocratesLet us take any three things; or suppose that we embellish a little and call the first gold, the second silver, and there shall be a third which is neither.
SocratesNow, can that which is neither be either gold or silver?
SocratesNo more can that neutral or middle life be rightly or reasonably spoken or thought of as pleasant or painful.
SocratesAnd yet, my friend, there are, as we know, persons who say and think so.
SocratesAnd do they think that they have pleasure when they are free from pain?
ProtarchusThey say so.
SocratesAnd they must think or they would not say that they have pleasure.
ProtarchusI suppose not.
SocratesAnd yet if pleasure and the negation of pain are of distinct natures, they are wrong.
ProtarchusBut they are undoubtedly of distinct natures.
SocratesThen shall we take the view that they are three, as we were just now saying, or that they are two only—the one being a state of pain, which is an evil, and the other a cessation of pain, which is of itself a good, and is called pleasant?
ProtarchusBut why, Socrates, do we ask the question at all? I do not see the reason.
SocratesYou, Protarchus, have clearly never heard of certain enemies of our friend Philebus.
ProtarchusAnd who may they be?
SocratesCertain persons who are reputed to be masters in natural philosophy, who deny the very existence of pleasure.
ProtarchusIndeed!
SocratesThey say that what the school of Philebus calls pleasures are all of them only avoidances of pain.
ProtarchusAnd would you, Socrates, have us agree with them?
SocratesWhy, no, I would rather use them as a sort of diviners, who divine the truth, not by rules of art, but by an instinctive repugnance and extreme detestation which a noble nature has of the power of pleasure, in which they think that there is nothing sound, and her seductive influence is declared by them to be witchcraft, and not pleasure. This is the use which you may make of them. And when you have considered the various grounds of their dislike, you shall hear from me what I deem to be true pleasures. Having thus examined the nature of pleasure from both points of view, we will bring her up for judgment.
ProtarchusWell said.
SocratesThen let us enter into an alliance with these philosophers and follow in the track of their dislike. I imagine that they would say something of this sort; they would begin at the beginning, and ask whether, if we wanted to know the nature of any quality, such as hardness, we should be more likely to discover it by looking at the hardest things, rather than at the least hard? You, Protarchus, shall answer these severe gentlemen as you answer me.
ProtarchusBy all means, and I reply to them, that you should look at the greatest instances.
SocratesThen if we want to see the true nature of pleasures as a class, we should not look at the most diluted pleasures, but at the most extreme and most vehement?
ProtarchusIn that every one will agree.
SocratesAnd the obvious instances of the greatest pleasures, as we have often said, are the pleasures of the body?
SocratesAnd are they felt by us to be or become greater, when we are sick or when we are in health? And here we must be careful in our answer, or we shall come to grief.
ProtarchusHow will that be?
SocratesWhy, because we might be tempted to answer, ‘When we are in health.’
ProtarchusYes, that is the natural answer.
SocratesWell, but are not those pleasures the greatest of which mankind have the greatest desires?
SocratesAnd do not people who are in a fever, or any similar illness, feel cold or thirst or other bodily affections more intensely? Am I not right in saying that they have a deeper want and greater pleasure in the satisfaction of their want?
ProtarchusThat is obvious as soon as it is said.
SocratesWell, then, shall we not be right in saying, that if a person would wish to see the greatest pleasures he ought to go and look, not at health, but at disease? And here you must distinguish:—do not imagine that I mean to ask whether those who are very ill have more pleasures than those who are well, but understand that I am speaking of the magnitude of pleasure; I want to know where pleasures are found to be most intense. For, as I say, we have to discover what is pleasure, and what they mean by pleasure who deny her very existence.
ProtarchusI think I follow you.
SocratesYou will soon have a better opportunity of showing whether you do or not, Protarchus. Answer now, and tell me whether you see, I will not say more, but more intense and excessive pleasures in wantonness than in temperance? Reflect before you speak.
ProtarchusI understand you, and see that there is a great difference between them; the temperate are restrained by the wise man’s aphorism of ‘Never too much,’ which is their rule, but excess of pleasure possessing the minds of fools and wantons becomes madness and makes them shout with delight.
SocratesVery good, and if this be true, then the greatest pleasures and pains will clearly be found in some vicious state of soul and body, and not in a virtuous state.
SocratesAnd ought we not to select some of these for examination, and see what makes them the greatest?
ProtarchusTo be sure we ought.
SocratesTake the case of the pleasures which arise out of certain disorders.
ProtarchusWhat disorders?
SocratesThe pleasures of unseemly disorders, which our severe friends utterly detest.
ProtarchusWhat pleasures?
SocratesSuch, for example, as the relief of itching and other ailments by scratching, which is the only remedy required. For what in Heaven’s name is the feeling to be called which is thus produced in us?—Pleasure or pain?
ProtarchusA villainous mixture of some kind, Socrates, I should say.
SocratesI did not introduce the argument, O Protarchus, with any personal reference to Philebus, but because, without the consideration of these and similar pleasures, we shall not be able to determine the point at issue.
ProtarchusThen we had better proceed to analyze this family of pleasures.
SocratesYou mean the pleasures which are mingled with pain?
ProtarchusExactly.
SocratesThere are some mixtures which are of the body, and only in the body, and others which are of the soul, and only in the soul; while there are other mixtures of pleasures with pains, common both to soul and body, which in their composite state are called sometimes pleasures and sometimes pains.
ProtarchusHow is that?
SocratesWhenever, in the restoration or in the derangement of nature, a man experiences two opposite feelings; for example, when he is cold and is growing warm, or again, when he is hot and is becoming cool, and he wants to have the one and be rid of the other;—the sweet has a bitter, as the common saying is, and both together fasten upon him and create irritation and in time drive him to distraction.
ProtarchusThat description is very true to nature.
SocratesAnd in these sorts of mixtures the pleasures and pains are sometimes equal, and sometimes one or other of them predominates?
SocratesOf cases in which the pain exceeds the pleasure, an example is afforded by itching, of which we were just now speaking, and by the tingling which we feel when the boiling and fiery element is within, and the rubbing and motion only relieves the surface, and does not reach the parts affected; then if you put them to the fire, and as a last resort apply cold to them, you may often produce the most intense pleasure or pain in the inner parts, which contrasts and mingles with the pain or pleasure, as the case may be, of the outer parts; and this is due to the forcible separation of what is united, or to the union of what is separated, and to the juxtaposition of pleasure and pain.
ProtarchusQuite so.
SocratesSometimes the element of pleasure prevails in a man, and the slight undercurrent of pain makes him tingle, and causes a gentle irritation; or again, the excessive infusion of pleasure creates an excitement in him,—he even leaps for joy, he assumes all sorts of attitudes, he changes all manner of colours, he gasps for breath, and is quite amazed, and utters the most irrational exclamations.
ProtarchusYes, indeed.
SocratesHe will say of himself, and others will say of him, that he is dying with these delights; and the more dissipated and good-for-nothing he is, the more vehemently he pursues them in every way; of all pleasures he declares them to be the greatest; and he reckons him who lives in the most constant enjoyment of them to be the happiest of mankind.
ProtarchusThat, Socrates, is a very true description of the opinions of the majority about pleasures.
SocratesYes, Protarchus, quite true of the mixed pleasures, which arise out of the communion of external and internal sensations in the body; there are also cases in which the mind contributes an opposite element to the body, whether of pleasure or pain, and the two unite and form one mixture. Concerning these I have already remarked, that when a man is empty he desires to be full, and has pleasure in hope and pain in vacuity. But now I must further add what I omitted before, that in all these and similar emotions in which body and mind are opposed (and they are innumerable), pleasure and pain coalesce in one.
ProtarchusI believe that to be quite true.
SocratesThere still remains one other sort of admixture of pleasures and pains.
ProtarchusWhat is that?
SocratesThe union which, as we were saying, the mind often experiences of purely mental feelings.
ProtarchusWhat do you mean?
SocratesWhy, do we not speak of anger, fear, desire, sorrow, love, emulation, envy, and the like, as pains which belong to the soul only?
SocratesAnd shall we not find them also full of the most wonderful pleasures? need I remind you of the anger
‘Which stirs even a wise man to violence, And is sweeter than honey and the honeycomb?’
And you remember how pleasures mingle with pains in lamentation and bereavement?
ProtarchusYes, there is a natural connexion between them.
SocratesAnd you remember also how at the sight of tragedies the spectators smile through their tears?
ProtarchusCertainly I do.
SocratesAnd are you aware that even at a comedy the soul experiences a mixed feeling of pain and pleasure?
ProtarchusI do not quite understand you.
SocratesI admit, Protarchus, that there is some difficulty in recognizing this mixture of feelings at a comedy.
ProtarchusThere is, I think.
SocratesAnd the greater the obscurity of the case the more desirable is the examination of it, because the difficulty in detecting other cases of mixed pleasures and pains will be less.
SocratesI have just mentioned envy; would you not call that a pain of the soul?
SocratesAnd yet the envious man finds something in the misfortunes of his neighbours at which he is pleased?
SocratesAnd ignorance, and what is termed clownishness, are surely an evil?
ProtarchusTo be sure.
SocratesFrom these considerations learn to know the nature of the ridiculous.
ProtarchusExplain.
SocratesThe ridiculous is in short the specific name which is used to describe the vicious form of a certain habit; and of vice in general it is that kind which is most at variance with the inscription at Delphi.
ProtarchusYou mean, Socrates, ‘Know thyself.’
SocratesI do; and the opposite would be, ‘Know not thyself.’
SocratesAnd now, O Protarchus, try to divide this into three.