Philebus
ProtarchusIndeed I am afraid that I cannot.
SocratesDo you mean to say that I must make the division for you?
ProtarchusYes, and what is more, I beg that you will.
SocratesAre there not three ways in which ignorance of self may be shown?
ProtarchusWhat are they?
SocratesIn the first place, about money; the ignorant may fancy himself richer than he is.
ProtarchusYes, that is a very common error.
SocratesAnd still more often he will fancy that he is taller or fairer than he is, or that he has some other advantage of person which he really has not.
ProtarchusOf course.
SocratesAnd yet surely by far the greatest number err about the goods of the mind; they imagine themselves to be much better men than they are.
ProtarchusYes, that is by far the commonest delusion.
SocratesAnd of all the virtues, is not wisdom the one which the mass of mankind are always claiming, and which most arouses in them a spirit of contention and lying conceit of wisdom?
SocratesAnd may not all this be truly called an evil condition?
ProtarchusVery evil.
SocratesBut we must pursue the division a step further, Protarchus, if we would see in envy of the childish sort a singular mixture of pleasure and pain.
ProtarchusHow can we make the further division which you suggest?
SocratesAll who are silly enough to entertain this lying conceit of themselves may of course be divided, like the rest of mankind, into two classes—one having power and might; and the other the reverse.
SocratesLet this, then, be the principle of division; those of them who are weak and unable to revenge themselves, when they are laughed at, may be truly called ridiculous, but those who can defend themselves may be more truly described as strong and formidable; for ignorance in the powerful is hateful and horrible, because hurtful to others both in reality and in fiction, but powerless ignorance may be reckoned, and in truth is, ridiculous.
ProtarchusThat is very true, but I do not as yet see where is the admixture of pleasures and pains.
SocratesWell, then, let us examine the nature of envy.
SocratesIs not envy an unrighteous pleasure, and also an unrighteous pain?
SocratesThere is nothing envious or wrong in rejoicing at the misfortunes of enemies?
SocratesBut to feel joy instead of sorrow at the sight of our friends’ misfortunes—is not that wrong?
ProtarchusUndoubtedly.
SocratesDid we not say that ignorance was always an evil?
SocratesAnd the three kinds of vain conceit in our friends which we enumerated—the vain conceit of beauty, of wisdom, and of wealth, are ridiculous if they are weak, and detestable when they are powerful: May we not say, as I was saying before, that our friends who are in this state of mind, when harmless to others, are simply ridiculous?
ProtarchusThey are ridiculous.
SocratesAnd do we not acknowledge this ignorance of theirs to be a misfortune?
SocratesAnd do we feel pain or pleasure in laughing at it?
ProtarchusClearly we feel pleasure.
SocratesAnd was not envy the source of this pleasure which we feel at the misfortunes of friends?
SocratesThen the argument shows that when we laugh at the folly of our friends, pleasure, in mingling with envy, mingles with pain, for envy has been acknowledged by us to be mental pain, and laughter is pleasant; and so we envy and laugh at the same instant.
SocratesAnd the argument implies that there are combinations of pleasure and pain in lamentations, and in tragedy and comedy, not only on the stage, but on the greater stage of human life; and so in endless other cases.
ProtarchusI do not see how any one can deny what you say, Socrates, however eager he may be to assert the opposite opinion.
SocratesI mentioned anger, desire, sorrow, fear, love, emulation, envy, and similar emotions, as examples in which we should find a mixture of the two elements so often named; did I not?
SocratesWe may observe that our conclusions hitherto have had reference only to sorrow and envy and anger.
ProtarchusI see.
SocratesThen many other cases still remain?
SocratesAnd why do you suppose me to have pointed out to you the admixture which takes place in comedy? Why but to convince you that there was no difficulty in showing the mixed nature of fear and love and similar affections; and I thought that when I had given you the illustration, you would have let me off, and have acknowledged as a general truth that the body without the soul, and the soul without the body, as well as the two united, are susceptible of all sorts of admixtures of pleasures and pains; and so further discussion would have been unnecessary. And now I want to know whether I may depart; or will you keep me here until midnight? I fancy that I may obtain my release without many words;—if I promise that to-morrow I will give you an account of all these cases. But at present I would rather sail in another direction, and go to other matters which remain to be settled, before the judgment can be given which Philebus demands.
ProtarchusVery good, Socrates; in what remains take your own course.
SocratesThen after the mixed pleasures the unmixed should have their turn; this is the natural and necessary order.
ProtarchusExcellent.
SocratesThese, in turn, then, I will now endeavour to indicate; for with the maintainers of the opinion that all pleasures are a cessation of pain, I do not agree, but, as I was saying, I use them as witnesses, that there are pleasures which seem only and are not, and there are others again which have great power and appear in many forms, yet are intermingled with pains, and are partly alleviations of agony and distress, both of body and mind.
ProtarchusThen what pleasures, Socrates, should we be right in conceiving to be true?
SocratesTrue pleasures are those which are given by beauty of colour and form, and most of those which arise from smells; those of sound, again, and in general those of which the want is painless and unconscious, and of which the fruition is palpable to sense and pleasant and unalloyed with pain.
ProtarchusOnce more, Socrates, I must ask what you mean.
SocratesMy meaning is certainly not obvious, and I will endeavour to be plainer. I do not mean by beauty of form such beauty as that of animals or pictures, which the many would suppose to be my meaning; but, says the argument, understand me to mean straight lines and circles, and the plane or solid figures which are formed out of them by turning-lathes and rulers and measurers of angles; for these I affirm to be not only relatively beautiful, like other things, but they are eternally and absolutely beautiful, and they have peculiar pleasures, quite unlike the pleasures of scratching. And there are colours which are of the same character, and have similar pleasures; now do you understand my meaning?
ProtarchusI am trying to understand, Socrates, and I hope that you will try to make your meaning clearer.
SocratesWhen sounds are smooth and clear, and have a single pure tone, then I mean to say that they are not relatively but absolutely beautiful, and have natural pleasures associated with them.
ProtarchusYes, there are such pleasures.
SocratesThe pleasures of smell are of a less ethereal sort, but they have no necessary admixture of pain; and all pleasures, however and wherever experienced, which are unattended by pains, I assign to an analogous class. Here then are two kinds of pleasures.
ProtarchusI understand.
SocratesTo these may be added the pleasures of knowledge, if no hunger of knowledge and no pain caused by such hunger precede them.
ProtarchusAnd this is the case.
SocratesWell, but if a man who is full of knowledge loses his knowledge, are there not pains of forgetting?
ProtarchusNot necessarily, but there may be times of reflection, when he feels grief at the loss of his knowledge.
SocratesYes, my friend, but at present we are enumerating only the natural perceptions, and have nothing to do with reflection.
ProtarchusIn that case you are right in saying that the loss of knowledge is not attended with pain.
SocratesThese pleasures of knowledge, then, are unmixed with pain; and they are not the pleasures of the many but of a very few.
SocratesAnd now, having fairly separated the pure pleasures and those which may be rightly termed impure, let us further add to our description of them, that the pleasures which are in excess have no measure, but that those which are not in excess have measure; the great, the excessive, whether more or less frequent, we shall be right in referring to the class of the infinite, and of the more and less, which pours through body and soul alike; and the others we shall refer to the class which has measure.
ProtarchusQuite right, Socrates.
SocratesStill there is something more to be considered about pleasures.
ProtarchusWhat is it?
SocratesWhen you speak of purity and clearness, or of excess, abundance, greatness and sufficiency, in what relation do these terms stand to truth?
ProtarchusWhy do you ask, Socrates?
SocratesBecause, Protarchus, I should wish to test pleasure and knowledge in every possible way, in order that if there be a pure and impure element in either of them, I may present the pure element for judgment, and then they will be more easily judged of by you and by me and by all of us.
SocratesLet us investigate all the pure kinds; first selecting for consideration a single instance.
ProtarchusWhat instance shall we select?
SocratesSuppose that we first of all take whiteness.
SocratesHow can there be purity in whiteness, and what purity? Is that purest which is greatest or most in quantity, or that which is most unadulterated and freest from any admixture of other colours?
ProtarchusClearly that which is most unadulterated.
SocratesTrue, Protarchus; and so the purest white, and not the greatest or largest in quantity, is to be deemed truest and most beautiful?
SocratesAnd we shall be quite right in saying that a little pure white is whiter and fairer and truer than a great deal that is mixed.
ProtarchusPerfectly right.
SocratesThere is no need of adducing many similar examples in illustration of the argument about pleasure; one such is sufficient to prove to us that a small pleasure or a small amount of pleasure, if pure or unalloyed with pain, is always pleasanter and truer and fairer than a great pleasure or a great amount of pleasure of another kind.
ProtarchusAssuredly; and the instance you have given is quite sufficient.
SocratesBut what do you say of another question:—have we not heard that pleasure is always a generation, and has no true being? Do not certain ingenious philosophers teach this doctrine, and ought not we to be grateful to them?
ProtarchusWhat do they mean?
SocratesI will explain to you, my dear Protarchus, what they mean, by putting a question.
ProtarchusAsk, and I will answer.
SocratesI assume that there are two natures, one self-existent, and the other ever in want of something.
ProtarchusWhat manner of natures are they?
SocratesThe one majestic ever, the other inferior.
ProtarchusYou speak riddles.
SocratesYou have seen loves good and fair, and also brave lovers of them.
ProtarchusI should think so.
SocratesSearch the universe for two terms which are like these two and are present everywhere.
ProtarchusYet a third time I must say, Be a little plainer, Socrates.
SocratesThere is no difficulty, Protarchus; the argument is only in play, and insinuates that some things are for the sake of something else (relatives), and that other things are the ends to which the former class subserve (absolutes).
ProtarchusYour many repetitions make me slow to understand.
SocratesAs the argument proceeds, my boy, I dare say that the meaning will become clearer.
ProtarchusVery likely.
SocratesHere are two new principles.
ProtarchusWhat are they?
SocratesOne is the generation of all things, and the other is essence.
ProtarchusI readily accept from you both generation and essence.
SocratesVery right; and would you say that generation is for the sake of essence, or essence for the sake of generation?
ProtarchusYou want to know whether that which is called essence is, properly speaking, for the sake of generation?
SocratesYes.
ProtarchusBy the gods, I wish that you would repeat your question.
SocratesI mean, O my Protarchus, to ask whether you would tell me that ship-building is for the sake of ships, or ships for the sake of ship-building? and in all similar cases I should ask the same question.
ProtarchusWhy do you not answer yourself, Socrates?
SocratesI have no objection, but you must take your part.
SocratesMy answer is, that all things instrumental, remedial, material, are given to us with a view to generation, and that each generation is relative to, or for the sake of, some being or essence, and that the whole of generation is relative to the whole of essence.
ProtarchusAssuredly.
SocratesThen pleasure, being a generation, must surely be for the sake of some essence?
SocratesAnd that for the sake of which something else is done must be placed in the class of good, and that which is done for the sake of something else, in some other class, my good friend.
ProtarchusMost certainly.
SocratesThen pleasure, being a generation, will be rightly placed in some other class than that of good?
ProtarchusQuite right.
SocratesThen, as I said at first, we ought to be very grateful to him who first pointed out that pleasure was a generation only, and had no true being at all; for he is clearly one who laughs at the notion of pleasure being a good.
ProtarchusAssuredly.
SocratesAnd he would surely laugh also at those who make generation their highest end.
ProtarchusOf whom are you speaking, and what do they mean?
SocratesI am speaking of those who when they are cured of hunger or thirst or any other defect by some process of generation are delighted at the process as if it were pleasure; and they say that they would not wish to live without these and other feelings of a like kind which might be mentioned.
ProtarchusThat is certainly what they appear to think.
SocratesAnd is not destruction universally admitted to be the opposite of generation?
SocratesThen he who chooses thus, would choose generation and destruction rather than that third sort of life, in which, as we were saying, was neither pleasure nor pain, but only the purest possible thought.
ProtarchusHe who would make us believe pleasure to be a good is involved in great absurdities, Socrates.
SocratesGreat, indeed; and there is yet another of them.
ProtarchusWhat is it?
SocratesIs there not an absurdity in arguing that there is nothing good or noble in the body, or in anything else, but that good is in the soul only, and that the only good of the soul is pleasure; and that courage or temperance or understanding, or any other good of the soul, is not really a good?—and is there not yet a further absurdity in our being compelled to say that he who has a feeling of pain and not of pleasure is bad at the time when he is suffering pain, even though he be the best of men; and again, that he who has a feeling of pleasure, in so far as he is pleased at the time when he is pleased, in that degree excels in virtue?
ProtarchusNothing, Socrates, can be more irrational than all this.
SocratesAnd now, having subjected pleasure to every sort of test, let us not appear to be too sparing of mind and knowledge: let us ring their metal bravely, and see if there be unsoundness in any part, until we have found out what in them is of the purest nature; and then the truest elements both of pleasure and knowledge may be brought up for judgment.
SocratesKnowledge has two parts,—the one productive, and the other educational?
SocratesAnd in the productive or handicraft arts, is not one part more akin to knowledge, and the other less; and may not the one part be regarded as the pure, and the other as the impure?
SocratesLet us separate the superior or dominant elements in each of them.
ProtarchusWhat are they, and how do you separate them?
SocratesI mean to say, that if arithmetic, mensuration, and weighing be taken away from any art, that which remains will not be much.
ProtarchusNot much, certainly.
SocratesThe rest will be only conjecture, and the better use of the senses which is given by experience and practice, in addition to a certain power of guessing, which is commonly called art, and is perfected by attention and pains.
ProtarchusNothing more, assuredly.
SocratesMusic, for instance, is full of this empiricism; for sounds are harmonized, not by measure, but by skilful conjecture; the music of the flute is always trying to guess the pitch of each vibrating note, and is therefore mixed up with much that is doubtful and has little which is certain.
SocratesAnd the same will be found to hold good of medicine and husbandry and piloting and generalship.
SocratesThe art of the builder, on the other hand, which uses a number of measures and instruments, attains by their help to a greater degree of accuracy than the other arts.
ProtarchusHow is that?
SocratesIn ship-building and house-building, and in other branches of the art of carpentering, the builder has his rule, lathe, compass, line, and a most ingenious machine for straightening wood.
ProtarchusVery true, Socrates.
SocratesThen now let us divide the arts of which we were speaking into two kinds,—the arts which, like music, are less exact in their results, and those which, like carpentering, are more exact.
ProtarchusLet us make that division.
SocratesOf the latter class, the most exact of all are those which we just now spoke of as primary.
ProtarchusI see that you mean arithmetic, and the kindred arts of weighing and measuring.
SocratesCertainly, Protarchus; but are not these also distinguishable into two kinds?
ProtarchusWhat are the two kinds?
SocratesIn the first place, arithmetic is of two kinds, one of which is popular, and the other philosophical.
ProtarchusHow would you distinguish them?
SocratesThere is a wide difference between them, Protarchus; some arithmeticians reckon unequal units; as for example, two armies, two oxen, two very large things or two very small things. The party who are opposed to them insist that every unit in ten thousand must be the same as every other unit.
ProtarchusUndoubtedly there is, as you say, a great difference among the votaries of the science; and there may be reasonably supposed to be two sorts of arithmetic.
SocratesAnd when we compare the art of mensuration which is used in building with philosophical geometry, or the art of computation which is used in trading with exact calculation, shall we say of either of the pairs that it is one or two?
ProtarchusOn the analogy of what has preceded, I should be of opinion that they were severally two.
SocratesRight; but do you understand why I have discussed the subject?
ProtarchusI think so, but I should like to be told by you.
SocratesThe argument has all along been seeking a parallel to pleasure, and true to that original design, has gone on to ask whether one sort of knowledge is purer than another, as one pleasure is purer than another.
ProtarchusClearly; that was the intention.
SocratesAnd has not the argument in what has preceded, already shown that the arts have different provinces, and vary in their degrees of certainty?
SocratesAnd just now did not the argument first designate a particular art by a common term, thus making us believe in the unity of that art; and then again, as if speaking of two different things, proceed to enquire whether the art as pursued by philosophers, or as pursued by non-philosophers, has more of certainty and purity?
ProtarchusThat is the very question which the argument is asking.
SocratesAnd how, Protarchus, shall we answer the enquiry?
ProtarchusO Socrates, we have reached a point at which the difference of clearness in different kinds of knowledge is enormous.
SocratesThen the answer will be the easier.
ProtarchusCertainly; and let us say in reply, that those arts into which arithmetic and mensuration enter, far surpass all others; and that of these the arts or sciences which are animated by the pure philosophic impulse are infinitely superior in accuracy and truth.
SocratesThen this is your judgment; and this is the answer which, upon your authority, we will give to all masters of the art of misinterpretation?
ProtarchusWhat answer?
SocratesThat there are two arts of arithmetic, and two of mensuration; and also several other arts which in like manner have this double nature, and yet only one name.
ProtarchusLet us boldly return this answer to the masters of whom you speak, Socrates, and hope for good luck.
SocratesWe have explained what we term the most exact arts or sciences.
SocratesAnd yet, Protarchus, dialectic will refuse to acknowledge us, if we do not award to her the first place.
ProtarchusAnd pray, what is dialectic?
SocratesClearly the science which has to do with all that knowledge of which we are now speaking; for I am sure that all men who have a grain of intelligence will admit that the knowledge which has to do with being and reality, and sameness and unchangeableness, is by far the truest of all. But how would you decide this question, Protarchus?
ProtarchusI have often heard Gorgias maintain, Socrates, that the art of persuasion far surpassed every other; this, as he says, is by far the best of them all, for to it all things submit, not by compulsion, but of their own free will. Now, I should not like to quarrel either with you or with him.
SocratesYou mean to say that you would like to desert, if you were not ashamed?
ProtarchusAs you please.
SocratesMay I not have led you into a misapprehension?
ProtarchusHow?
SocratesDear Protarchus, I never asked which was the greatest or best or usefullest of arts or sciences, but which had clearness and accuracy, and the greatest amount of truth, however humble and little useful an art. And as for Gorgias, if you do not deny that his art has the advantage in usefulness to mankind, he will not quarrel with you for saying that the study of which I am speaking is superior in this particular of essential truth; as in the comparison of white colours, a little whiteness, if that little be only pure, was said to be superior in truth to a great mass which is impure. And now let us give our best attention and consider well, not the comparative use or reputation of the sciences, but the power or faculty, if there be such, which the soul has of loving the truth, and of doing all things for the sake of it; let us search into the pure element of mind and intelligence, and then we shall be able to say whether the science of which I have been speaking is most likely to possess the faculty, or whether there be some other which has higher claims.
ProtarchusWell, I have been considering, and I can hardly think that any other science or art has a firmer grasp of the truth than this.
SocratesDo you say so because you observe that the arts in general and those engaged in them make use of opinion, and are resolutely engaged in the investigation of matters of opinion? Even he who supposes himself to be occupied with nature is really occupied with the things of this world, how created, how acting or acted upon. Is not this the sort of enquiry in which his life is spent?
SocratesHe is labouring, not after eternal being, but about things which are becoming, or which will or have become.
SocratesAnd can we say that any of these things which neither are nor have been nor will be unchangeable, when judged by the strict rule of truth ever become certain?
SocratesHow can anything fixed be concerned with that which has no fixedness?
ProtarchusHow indeed?
SocratesThen mind and science when employed about such changing things do not attain the highest truth?
ProtarchusI should imagine not.
SocratesAnd now let us bid farewell, a long farewell, to you or me or Philebus or Gorgias, and urge on behalf of the argument a single point.
ProtarchusWhat point?
SocratesLet us say that the stable and pure and true and unalloyed has to do with the things which are eternal and unchangeable and unmixed, or if not, at any rate what is most akin to them has; and that all other things are to be placed in a second or inferior class.
SocratesAnd of the names expressing cognition, ought not the fairest to be given to the fairest things?
ProtarchusThat is natural.
SocratesAnd are not mind and wisdom the names which are to be honoured most?
SocratesAnd these names may be said to have their truest and most exact application when the mind is engaged in the contemplation of true being?
SocratesAnd these were the names which I adduced of the rivals of pleasure?
ProtarchusVery true, Socrates.
SocratesIn the next place, as to the mixture, here are the ingredients, pleasure and wisdom, and we may be compared to artists who have their materials ready to their hands.
SocratesAnd now we must begin to mix them?
SocratesBut had we not better have a preliminary word and refresh our memories?
ProtarchusOf what?
SocratesOf that which I have already mentioned. Well says the proverb, that we ought to repeat twice and even thrice that which is good.
SocratesWell then, by Zeus, let us proceed, and I will make what I believe to be a fair summary of the argument.
ProtarchusLet me hear.
SocratesPhilebus says that pleasure is the true end of all living beings, at which all ought to aim, and moreover that it is the chief good of all, and that the two names ‘good’ and ‘pleasant’ are correctly given to one thing and one nature; Socrates, on the other hand, begins by denying this, and further says, that in nature as in name they are two, and that wisdom partakes more than pleasure of the good. Is not and was not this what we were saying, Protarchus?
SocratesAnd is there not and was there not a further point which was conceded between us?
ProtarchusWhat was it?
SocratesThat the good differs from all other things.
ProtarchusIn what respect?
SocratesIn that the being who possesses good always everywhere and in all things has the most perfect sufficiency, and is never in need of anything else.
ProtarchusExactly.
SocratesAnd did we not endeavour to make an imaginary separation of wisdom and pleasure, assigning to each a distinct life, so that pleasure was wholly excluded from wisdom, and wisdom in like manner had no part whatever in pleasure?
ProtarchusWe did.
SocratesAnd did we think that either of them alone would be sufficient?
SocratesAnd if we erred in any point, then let any one who will, take up the enquiry again and set us right; and assuming memory and wisdom and knowledge and true opinion to belong to the same class, let him consider whether he would desire to possess or acquire,—I will not say pleasure, however abundant or intense, if he has no real perception that he is pleased, nor any consciousness of what he feels, nor any recollection, however momentary, of the feeling,—but would he desire to have anything at all, if these faculties were wanting to him? And about wisdom I ask the same question; can you conceive that any one would choose to have all wisdom absolutely devoid of pleasure, rather than with a certain degree of pleasure, or all pleasure devoid of wisdom, rather than with a certain degree of wisdom?
ProtarchusCertainly not, Socrates; but why repeat such questions any more?
SocratesThen the perfect and universally eligible and entirely good cannot possibly be either of them?
SocratesThen now we must ascertain the nature of the good more or less accurately, in order, as we were saying, that the second place may be duly assigned.
SocratesHave we not found a road which leads towards the good?
ProtarchusWhat road?
SocratesSupposing that a man had to be found, and you could discover in what house he lived, would not that be a great step towards the discovery of the man himself?
SocratesAnd now reason intimates to us, as at our first beginning, that we should seek the good, not in the unmixed life but in the mixed.
SocratesThere is greater hope of finding that which we are seeking in the life which is well mixed than in that which is not?
ProtarchusFar greater.
SocratesThen now let us mingle, Protarchus, at the same time offering up a prayer to Dionysus or Hephaestus, or whoever is the god who presides over the ceremony of mingling.