The Philosophy of Law: General Divisions of the Metaphysic of Morals, I: Division of the Metaphysic of Morals as a System of Duties Generally
General Divisions of the Metaphysic of Morals, I: Division of the Metaphysic of Morals as a System of Duties Generally
1. All Duties are either Duties of Right, that is, JURIDICAL DUTIES (Officia Juris}, or Duties of Virtue, that is, ETHICAL DUTIES (Officia Virtutis s. ethica). Juridical Duties are such as may be promulgated by external Legislation; Ethical Duties are those for which such legislation is not possible. The reason why the latter cannot be properly made the subject of external Legislation is because they relate to an End or final purpose, which is itself, at the same time, embraced in these Duties, and which it is a Duty for the individual to have as such. But no external Legislation can cause any one to adopt a particular intention, or to propose to himself a certain purpose; for this depends upon an internal condition or act of the mind itself. However, external actions conducive to such a mental condition may be commanded, without its being implied that the individual will of necessity make them an End to himself.
But why, then, it may be asked, is the Science of Morals or Moral Philosophy, commonly entitled—especially by Cicero—the Science of Duty and not also the Science of Right, since Duties and Rights refer to each other? The reason is this. We know our own Freedom—from which all Moral Laws and consequently all Rights as well as all Duties arise—011by through the Moral Imperative, which is an immediate injunction of Duty; whereas tne,. conception of Right as a ground of putting others under Obligation has afterwards to be developed out of it.
2. In the Doctrine of Duty, Man may and ought to be represented in accordance with the nature of his faculty of Freedom, which is entirely supra-sensible. He is, therefore, to be represented purely according to his Humanity as a Personality independent of physical determinations (homo noumcnori), in distinction from the same person as a Man modified with these determinations (homo phenomenon). Hence the conceptions of IJi-ht and End when referred to Duty, in view of this twofold quality, give the following Division:—ACCORDING TO THE OBJECTIVE RELATION OF THE LAW TO DUTY I. THE RIGHT OF HUMANITY in our own Person
I. Juridical), Xeself
Others
(Juridical Duties towards Oneself).
II. THE RIGHT OF MANKIND in Others (Juridical Duties towards Others).
rill. THE END OF HUMANITY in our Person (Ethical Duties towards Oneself).
IV. THE END OF MANKIND in Others (Ethical Duties towards Others).