Part II, Chapter 6: Of the Nature of Incidental Propositions which form part of Complex Propositions
BUT before speaking of propositions whose complexity falls on the form, that is to say, on the affirmation or negation there are several important remarks to be made on the nature of incidental propositions, which constitute part of the subject, or the attribute, of those which are complex according to the matter.
1°. We have already seen that incidental propositions are those whose subject is the relative who as. Men who are created to know and to love God; or, men who are pious: taking away the term men, the rest is an incidental proposition. But we must remember here what was said in Chapter VIII., Part First,—that the addition of complex terms was of two kinds, one which may be called that of simple appositives, which is, when the addition effects no change in the idea of the term, because that which is added agrees with it generally, and in all its extension: as in the first example, men who are created to know and to love God The other which may be called determinatives, because what is added to a term does not belong to a term in all its extension, but restricts and determines the signification of it, as in the second example, men who are pious. Accordingly we may say there is a who explicative, and a who determinative. Now, when the who is explicative, the attribute of the incidental proposition is affirmed of the subject to which the who refers, although this may be only incidentally of the whole proposition, so that we may substitute the subject even for who, as may be seen in the first example, men who are created to know and love God; for we may say, men were created to know and love God.
But when the who is determinative, the attribute of the incidental proposition is not properly affirmed of the subject to which the who refers; for if, after having said, men who are pious are charitable, we were to substitute the word men for who, in saying men are pious, the proposition would be false, for this would be to affirm the word pious of men as men; but in saying, men who are pious are charitable, we do not affirm of men in general, or of any men in particular, that they are pious; but the mind, connecting the idea of pious with that of men, and making them a total idea, judges that the attribute charitable agrees to that total idea; and thus all the judgment which is expressed in the incidental proposition is solely that by which our mind judges that the idea of pious is not incompatible with that of men, and that thus it may be considered as united with it, and that afterwards it may be examined with what agrees with them in relation to this union.
2°. There are often terms which are doubly or trebly complex, being composed of many parts, each of which is in itself complex; and thus there may be found in it divers incidental propositions, and of various kinds; the who or which of one may be determinative, and the who or which of another, explicative. This will be seen better by an example. The doctrine which places the sovereign good in bodily pleasure, which was taught by Epicurus, is unworthy of a philosopher. This proposition has for attributes unworthy of a philosopher, and all the rest for subject. Thus the subject is a complex term, which contains two incidental propositions,—the first is, which places the sovereign good in bodily pleasure. The which in this incidental proposition is determinative, for it determines the word doctrine, which is general, to that which affirms that the sovereign good of men is found in bodily pleasure; whence it happens, that we cannot, without absurdity, substitute the word which for the word doctrine, saying, doctrine places the sovereign good in bodily pleasure. The second incidental proposition is, which was taught by Epicurus, and the subject to which this which refers, is the whole complex term, the doctrine which places the sovereign good in bodily pleasure, which indicates the doctrine singular and individual, capable of various accidents, as of being maintained by different men, although it is determined in itself to be always taken in the same sense, at least in this particular point, according to which it is understood, This is why the which of the second incidental proposition, which was taught by Epicurus, is not determinative, but solely expli-cative, whence it happens that we may substitute the subject whereto this which refers, in the place of it, saying, The doctrine which places the sovereign good in bodily pleasures was taught by Epicurus.
3°. The last remark is,—that in order to judge of the nature of these propositions, and to know whether the relative pronoun {who, which) is determinative or explicative, we must often pay more attention to the meaning and intention of the speaker than to the simple expression; for there are often complex terms which appear more or less complex than they really are, for a part of the term, which is joined to the word, is an individual and distinct idea, which determines it to signify only a single thing.
We have said that this commonly appeared from circumstances, as in the mouth of a Frenchman the word king signifies Louis XIV. But the following is a rule that may enable us to judge when a common term remains in its general idea, and when it is determined by an idea distinct and particular, though not expressed; when there is a manifest absurdity in connecting the attribute with the subject remaining in its general idea, we must believe that he who uttered this proposition did not leave that subject in its general idea. Thus, if I hear it said by a man, Rex hoc mihi imperavit, (The king commanded me to do such a thing) I am assured he did not leave the word king in its general idea, for king, in general, can give no particular command.
If a man said to me, the “Brussels Gazette” for the 11th of January 1662, relating to what passed in Paris, is false, I should be sure that he had something in his mind beyond what these terms express, since all this will not enable him to judge whether the Gazette were true or false, and that hence it must be that he had in his mind some distinct and particular news, which he judged contrary to truth, as for instance, if that “Gazette” had said that the king had made a hundred knights of the order of the Holy Ghost.
So also, in the judgments which are made of the opinions of philosophers, when any one says that the doctrine of such a philosopher is false, without distinctly expressing what that doctrine is, as that the doctrine of Lucretius touching the nature of the soul is false. It must necessarily be that those who form these kinds of judgments have in their minds a distinct and particular opinion under the general term, doctrine of such a philosopher, since the quality of falseness cannot belong to a doctrine, as being of such an author, but only as being such an opinion in particular contrary to truth. And thus these kinds of propositions necessarily resolve themselves into the following: such an opinion which was taught by such an author, is false; the opinion that our soul is composed of atoms, which was taught by Lucretius, is false.
So that these judgments involve always two affirmations, even when they are not distinctly expressed;—one, principle, which regards truth in itself, which is, that it is a great error to maintain that the soul is composed of atoms; the other, incidental, which regards only a point of history, which is that error was taught by Lucretius.