Part II, Chapter 10: Of Propositions which are Compound in Meaning
THERE are other compound propositions whose composition is more concealed, these we may reduce to the four following kinds:—1. Exclusives. 2. Exceptives. 3. Comparatives. 4. Inceptives, or Desitives.
We call exclusives those which indicate that the attribute agrees with the subject, and that it agrees with that subject only, which denotes that it agrees with no others; whence, it follows that they contain two different judgments, and that they are, consequently, compound in meaning. This is expressed by the word alone, or some other like it—(or, in French, il n’y a)—God alone is worthy of being loved for his own sake.
Deus solus fruendus, reliqua utenda.
That is to say, we ought to love God for his own sake, and to love other things for God’s sake. Quas dederis solas semper habebis opes.
The only riches which will remain with you are those which you have freely given away. Nobilitas sola est atque unica virtus.
Virtue alone is true nobility.
Hoc unum scio quod nihil scio, said the Academics. It is certain that there is nothing certain, and there is only obscurity and uncertainty in everything else.
Lucian, speaking of the Druids, gives these disjunctive propositions composed of two exclusives:
Solis nosse deos, et caeli numina vobis, Aut solis nescire datum est.
Either you know the gods, while all besides are ignorant of them; Or, you are ignorant of them, while all others know them.
These propositions are contradicted in three ways; for, 1st, It may be denied that what is said to agree with a single subject does not agree with it at all.
2d, It may be maintained that it agrees with something else.
3d, Both may be maintained.
Thus, against this sentence, that virtue alone is true nobility, we may say —
1. That virtue alone does not confer nobility.
2. That birth confers nobility as well as virtue.
3. That birth confers nobility, and not virtue.
Thus, that maxim of the Academics, that it is certain that there is nothing certain, was contradicted differently by the Dogmatists and the Pyrrhonists; for the Dogmatists opposed it, by maintaining that it was doubly false, since there are many things which we know with the utmost certainty, and that thus it was not true that we were certain of knowing nothing; and the Pyrrhonists also said that it was false, for a contrary reason, viz., that it was even uncertain whether there were nothing certain.
Hence, there is a defect of judgment in what Lucian said of the Druids, since it was not necessary that the Druids held the truth in relation to the gods, or that they only were in error; for, since different errors may be held touching the nature of God, it might easily happen, although the Druids had opinions touching the nature of a God different from other nations, they were not less in error than other nations.
What is more remarkable, is, that there are propositions of this kind which are exclusives in sense, although the exclusion may not be expressed: thus that verse of Virgil in which the exclusion is denoted—Una salus victis nullam sperare salutem, Has been happily translated by this French verse, by which the exclusion is understood.
Le salut des vaincus est de n’en point attendre. The safety of the vanquished is to look for none. It is, however, much more common, in Latin, to understand exclusions, so that there are often passages which cannot be translated in all their force, although, in Latin, the exclusion may not be expressed.
Thus—2 Corinthians, x. 17.—Qui gloriatur in Domino glorietur—ought to be translated: He who glories, let him glory in the Lord alone.
Galat. vi. 7.—Quae seminaverit homo, haec et metet.
A man shall reap only that which he has sown. Ephes. iv. 5.—Unus Dominus, una fides, unum baptisma. There is only one Lord, one faith, and one baptism. Matt. v. 46.—Si diligitis eos qui vos diligunt, quam mercedem habebitis?
If you love those only who love you, what reward do you deserve?
Seneca in his Troad.—Nullas habet spes Troja, si tales habet.
If Troy has only this hope, it has none: as if he had said—Si tantum tales habet.
Exceptives are those in which we affirm a thing of a whole subject, with the exception of certain inferiors of that subject, to which we show, by some exceptive particles, that this does not belong. This clearly involves two judgments, and thus renders these propositions compound in sense: as when I say —
None of the ancient philosophers, except the Platonists, recognised the spirituality of God. This means two things. First, that the ancient philosophers believed God corporeal; second, that the Platonists believed the contrary.
Avarus nisi cum moritur, nihil recte facit.
The avaricious man does no good, except by dying.
Et miser nemo, nisi comparatus.
No one thinks himself miserable, except by comparing himself with those who are more happy. Nemo laeditur nisi a seipso.
We have no evil, except what we do to ourselves Except the wise man, said the Stoics, all men are truly fools.
These propositions may be contradicted in the same way as the exclusives.
1. By maintaining that the wise man of the Stoics was a fool as well as other men.
2. By maintaining that there were others, besides their wise man, who were not fools.
3. By affirming that the wise man of the Stoics was a fool, and that other men were not.
It must be remarked that the exclusive and the exceptive propositions are, if we may so speak, only the same thing expressed somewhat differently, so that it is always very easy to change them reciprocally from the one to the other; and thus we see that exceptive proposition of Terence—Imperitus, nisi quod ipse facit, nihil rectum putat. has been changed by Cornelius Gallus into that exclusive—Hoc tantum rectum quod facit ipse putat.
Propositions in which we compare contain two judgments, since it is one thing to say that a thing is such, and another thing to say that it is more or less such, than another; and thus these kinds of propositions are compound in sense.
Amicum perdere, est damnorum maximum.
The greatest of all losses is the loss of a friend.
Ridiculum acri
Fortius ac melius magnas plerumque secat res. We often produce more impression, even in most important matters, by a little agreeable raillery, than by argument.
Meliora sunt vulnera amici quam fraudulenta oscula inimici.
Better are the blows of a friend than the treacherous kisses of an enemy.
These propositions may be contradicted in many ways: as, that maxim of Epicurus,—that pain is the greatest of all evils,—was contradicted in one way by the Stoics, and in another way by the Peripatetics; for the Peripatetics allowed that pain was an evil, but maintained that vices, and other irregularities of the mind, were much greater evils, whereas, the Stoics would not even acknowledge pain to be an evil, so far were they from admitting that it was the greatest of all evils.
There is a question which may be here discussed, viz.: Whether it is always necessary, in these propositions, that the positive or the comparative belong to both members of the comparison; and if, for instance, it is necessary to suppose that two things are good, before we can say that one is better than the other. It appears at first that this must be so; but custom is opposed to it, since we see that the Scriptures employ the word better, not only in comparing together two things which are good: melior est sapientia quam vires, et vir prudens quam fortis. Wisdom is better than strength, and the prudent man than the strong man. But also in comparing a good with an evil, melior est patiens arrogante. A patient man is better than a proud one.
And even in comparing two evils together, melius est habitare cum dracone, quam cum muliere litigiosa. It is better to live with a dragon than with a quarrelsome woman. And in the Gospel, It is better that a man be cast into the sea, with a stone about his neck, than to scandalize the least of the faithful.
The reason of this usage is that a larger good is better than a smaller one, because there is more of goodness in it than a smaller good. Now, for the same reason, though with less propriety, we may say that a good is better than an evil, because it has more of goodness in it than that which has none. And we may also say that a smaller evil is better than a larger evil, since the diminution of evil, holding the place of good among evils, that which is less bad has more of his kind of goodness than that which is worse.
We should therefore avoid the unnecessary embarrassment which arises in the heat of debate, from wrangling on these forms of speech, as was done by a Donatist grammarian named Cresconius, in writing against St Augustine, that saint having said that the Catholics had more reason to reproach the Donatists with having abandoned the sacred books, than the Donatists had to reproach the Catholics, traditionem nos vobis probabilius objicimus, Cresconius imagined that he might conclude from these words that St Augustine allowed that the Donatists had ground to reproach the Catholics, Si enim vos probabilius, says he, nos ergo probabiliter; nam gradus iste quod ante positum est auget non quod ante dictum est, improbat. But St Augustine, first refuted that vain subtilety by examples from the Scriptures, and among others, that passage in the epistle to the Hebrews, in which St Paul, having said that ground which bore only thorns, was accursed, and fit only for the fire, adds, confidimus—Confidimus autem de vobis fratres carissimi meliora, non quia, says that Father, quia bona illa erant quae supra dixerat, proferre spinas et tribulos, et ultionem mereri, sed magis quia mala erant ut illis devitatis meliora eligerent et optarent, hoc est, mala tantis bonis contraria. And then he showed him, from the most celebrated authors of his art, how false this consequence was, since he might, in the same way, reproach Virgil with having reckoned as a good thing the violence of a disease which leads men to tear themselves with their own teeth, because he wishes a better fortune to good people:
Dii meliora piis, erroremque hostibus illum; Discissos nudis laniabant dentibus artus;
Quomodo ergo meliora piis, says that Father, quasi bona essent istis, ac non potius magna mala qui discissos nudis laniabant dentibus artus.
When we say that a thing has commenced or ceased to be such, we form two judgments,—one, what the thing was before the time of which we speak, the other, what it is after; and thus these propositions of which the one class is called inceptives, the other desitives, are compound in sense, and they are so like that it is more to the purpose to consider them as only one species, and treat of them together.
The Jews commenced, after the return from the captivity of Babylon, to disuse their ancient characters, which are those which are now called the Samaritan.
1, The Latin language has, for five hundred years, ceased to be common in Italy.
2, The Jews did not begin to use points for marking the vowels until five hundred years after Christ,
These propositions may be contradicted, according to either of their relations to the two different times. Thus some are contradicted last, by maintaining, though falsely, that the Jews always used points, at least for their books, and that these were kept in the temple; and others contradicted it by maintaining the contrary, i.e., by saying that the use of points is still later than the fifth century.
Although we have showed that the propositions—exclusive, exceptives, &c.—may be contradicted in several ways, it is nevertheless true, that when we deny them simply, without any further explanation, the negation falls naturally on the exclusion, on the exception, on the comparison, on the change denoted by the words of beginning and of ending. Hence, if a man believes that Epicurus did not place the chief good in bodily pleasure, and it were told him that Epicurus alone placed in it the chief good; if he denied this simply, without adding anything else, it would not fully express his opinion, because it might be believed, from that simple negation, that he still allowed that Epicurus had indeed placed the sovereign good in bodily pleasure, but that he believes that he was not alone in that opinion.
In the same way, if, knowing the probity of a judge, any one should ask me if he sold justice still, I could not simply reply by saying no, since the no would signify that he did not sell it now, but would leave it to be inferred, at the same time, that I allowed that he had formerly sold it. Hence it may be seen that there are some propositions which it would be unjust to demand that any one should answer simply by yes or no, since, as they involve two senses, no one could not justly reply to them without explaining himself in relation to both.